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Show Adequate and Inaduquate Ideas. Book II. Ideas be of an Elypfts, if ~e h.~d rio oth_er Idea of it, but fame few of its Properties! Whereas hav10g 1h our pla1n Idta, the whole EITencc of that Figure we from thertce diftovet thofe Properties, and detnonfrrativcly fee ho;_, they flow, and are infeparable from it. §. 12 •• Thus the Mirld has three forts of abfrract Idtas, or nominal Erfences: , Fi'r/1, Simple !tleas, which art <•1tnroc, or Co pits; but yet certainly adequate. Becaufc ~ing interlded to exprefs. nothing but the power in Things to produce 10 the M10d fuch a Senfat10n, th:!t Senfanon, when 1t is produced, cannot bu~ be the !'ffect of that Power .. So the Paper I write on, having the power, 10 the Light, ( I fpeak ~ccordi~g to the co'!lmon Notion of Light,) to produce 10 me the Senfanon, which I call White, 1t cannot but be the Effect of fuch a Power,in fomething withtrUt the Mind; Iince the Mind has not the power to produce any fuch Idta in its felf, and being meant for nothing elfe but the Effect of fuch a Power, that ftmple Idea is real and aderuatt : the fenfation of White, in my Mind, being the Effect of that Power, which is in the Paper to produce· it, is perfefrly adequate to that Power; or elfe, that Power would produce a different Idea. Stcondly, The complex Ideas ofSu~j/ances are Ellypes,Copies too ; but . not perfeCt ones, not adequate: which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives, th:!t whatever ColleCtion of limple Ideas it makes of any Subfiance that exifis, it cannot be fure, that it exactly an· fwers all that are in th:!t Subfiance. Since not having tried all the Opeutions of all other Subfrances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or caufe irt other Subfiances, it cannot have an exatt adequate Collection of all its active and paffive Capacities ; and fo not have an aderuate complex Idta of the Powers of any Subfiance exifling, and its Relations , which is that fort of complex Idea of Subfiances we have. And, after all, if we could have, and a<'lually had, in our complex Idca,an exact ColleCtion of all the fecundary ~alities, or Powers ofaoy Subftance, we fhould not yet thereby have an Idta of the Effence of tbat Thing. for Iince the Powers, or ~alities, that are obfervable by us, arc not the real .Effence of that Subftance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Colled:10n whatfoevcr of thefe ~alities cannot be thereal Ef· fence of that Thing. Whereby it is plain, that ou~ Ideas of Subfrances are not adequate; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Belides,a Man has no Idta ofSubftance in general, nor knows what Subfiancc is in itfelf. §. 14. Thirdly, Complex Idtas •f Mod" and &lations are Originals,and Arcbetyp" ; .are not C?.Pie~, nor made after the patte~n of any real Exi· fience, to which the Mmd 10tendsthem.to be confOrmable and exactly to anfwer.Thefe being fuch ColleCtions of limple Ideas, that 'the Mind it felf puts together,and fuch Collections,that each of them contains in it preCifeJy all that the Mind intends it 1hou!d, they are Archetypes and Effences of Modes th:!t may.exift: and fo are deligned only for, and belong only to fuch Modes, as when they doexifi, have an-exact conformity with thofe complexldeas. The id<AsthereforeofModes a'nd Relations cannot but be adequat<. ' CHAP. Chap. XXXI. 7' rue and Fa/fe Ideas. CHAP. XXXI. OJ Tme and Falfe Ideas. :.L ' ~I ·• §.I. THough Tru~hand falfhood, bdon!l,in Propriety of $p~ech,only to Propoftttoos; yet Ideas are oftentimes termed trMe or falfe (as what ':"o_rds a~e there,. that arc not ufed with great Latitude, and witl~ {orne devJatwn from their fin(); and proper Significations,) Though, 1. thmk, that when Ideas themfelves are termed true or falfc there is frill fome fecret or tacit Propofition, which is the foun~ation of ~hat Denomination : as we fhall fee, if we examine the particular Occafions, wherein they come to be called true or falfe. In all which, we fhall find fome kind bl Affirmation, or Negation, which is the Reafon of that Denom:nation. F~r our Ideas, being nothing but ba~e Appearances or Perceptions 'in our Minds, cannot properly and limply 10 themfelves be faid to be true or f•lft, no more than a lingle Name of any thing, can be filid to be true or falfe. §. 1. Indeed,both ideas and Words, may be faid to be trMe in a metapbyft• cal Stnfe of theW ord Truth; as all other Things,that any way exifr,are faid to be true; i.e. really td befuch as they exifr. Though in Things called true, even m that Senfe, there 1s, perhaps; a fecrer reference to our Id<as, look'd Upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a mental Propoli· tion, though it be ufually not taken notice of. . ~. l· But 'tis not in that metaphylical SCnfe at 'truth, which we en· quire here, when we examine, whether our Ideas are capable of being true or falfe; but in the more ordinary Acceptation ofthofe Words :And fo I fily, that the.Ideas in our Minds, being only fo many Perceptions, or A~pearances there, none of them are falfe. The Idea of a Centaur, ha· ving rio more Falfhood in it, when it appears in our Minds l than the Name Centaur has falfhood in it, when it is pronounced by our Mouths, or written ori Paper. For Truth or Falfhood, lying always in fome Affir. matioil,or Negation, Mental or Verbal, our Idea; are not caf>9ble any of them of hingfalfe, till the Mind paffes fame Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies fomething of them. §. 4· When ever the Mind refers any of its IJ<as to any thing extraneous to them , they are then capa;le to /;e caUed tr•e or fa/ft. Becaufe the Mind in fuch a reference, makes a tacit Suppolition of their Conformity to that Thing: which Suppolition, as it happens to be trae or falfe ; fo the Ideas themfelves come to be denominated. The. lnofr ufual Cafes wherein this happens, are thefe following : §.f.Firfl,When the Mind fuppofes any Idea it has, conforrnaUe to that in •t?er Men's Minds called by the fame common Name; v. g;. when the Mmd intends, or judges it< Ideas of Juflice, l'emperanct, lleligion, to be the fame, with what other Men give thofe Names to. Secondly, When the Mind fuppofes any Idea it has in it felf, to be con~ formable to fome real Exi/lence. Thus the two Ideas,of a Man,and a Centaur, fuppofed" to be the Jt!eas of real Subfrances, are the one true, and the other falfe; the one having a Conformity to what has reallyexifred ; the other not. Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Confl:i·. tuuon, and Ef{ence of any thing, whereon all its Properties depend : and thus the greatefr part, if not all our Ideas of Subftances, are fa.lfe. A a §.6. |