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Show R'ealitJ' of Kmrvfe~r;e,. Book IV. ~. 7· And henc• it follows, that mor'al /("owlul!!/ is as oapable ·Jf real Certainty, as Mathematicks. For Ccrrainty being but the Perception of the A«reement, or Qifugreementof our !tiNs,; and Dcmontlration nothing'but the Perception of fuel\ Agreement, by·the Intervention of otller Ideas, or Mediums, our moral ltleas, as well as mathematical, being Archetypes themfelves, and fo adequate, and compleat Ideas, all the Agree-, met¥, or DiC1greement we flmll find in th~m, wiliJiroduce, real Know· ledge, as well as in mathematical Figures. ' ~· 8, That which is requifite to m•ke our !{now ledge certain, is the Clearnefs of our Ideas ; and that whicl1 is required to make it rcal,is that they oofwer their Archetypes. Nor let it be wondred, that I plac~ the Certainty of our Knowledge in the Confideration of our Ideas, with fo little Care and Re~ard (as it may feem) to the real Exiilence of Things: Since moil of thole Difcourfes, which take up the Thoughts, and engage the Dtfputes of thofe who pretend to make 1t thetr Bu(inefs to enquire af· tcr Truth and Certainty, will, I prefume, upon Examination be found to be general Propojitions, and Notions in which Exiilence is not at all concerned. All the Difcourfes of the Mathematicians about the fquaring of a Ctrcle, cotuck Secbons, or any other part of ,Mathemattcks, concern not the Exijlence of any of thofe Figpres; b~t,their Demoniltations which depend on their Ide"' are the fame, whether there be any fquarc or Circle exifling in the World, or no. In the fame manner, the Truth and Certainty of moral Difcourfes abflracts fi·om the I:ives of Men, and the Exiflcnceof tbofe Vertues in the World, whercpf they treat : Nor is Tully's Offices .lefs true, bccaufe there is no Body in the World that exactly pral( hces hts Rules, and ltves up to that pattern of a vertuous Man which hehas given us, and which exi!ted no wher,e ,when he writ but in Idea. If it.Pe true in Speculation, i. e. in !de a, that Murther deferves Death it will ~lfo be true in Reality of any Action that exifu c0mformable to titat Idea of Murther. As for oth,cr Actions, the :Truth of that Propofition concetns them not. And thus 1t ts of all ot\wr Speetes of Thing<, which \tave .no other Effences but thofe Ideas which are in the Minds of Men. ~. 9· But it will here be faid, that if moral•l{nowledge be placed in the Confemplntion of our o.wn moral Ideas, and thofe, as or her Modes, be of our ~wn making, What ilrange Notions will th~re be of J.jlice •nd iem· 'pera•ce? What confufton of Venues and Vices, if every one may make what !de as of them he pleafes? No confufiol' nor diforder in the Things themfelves, nor the Reafomngs abou.t them; no more than (in Mathemattcks) there would be a dtflurbance m the Demontlration or a change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to an~ther lf a Man fl.10uld make a Trian&le with four Corners, or a irapezium 'with four nght Angles: that ts,m platn Engltfl1, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one Name, which Mathematicians call'd ordinarily by ano· ther. For let a Man make to lumfelf the Idea. of a Figure with three Angles, whereof one ts a ngltt one, and calltt , 1f he pleafe, Equilaterum or irapezrum , or any tlung elfe, the Properties of, and Demonilrations about that ldea, wtll be the fat;ne, as if he call'd it a Rectangular-Triangle. l co•!fefs, t)le change of the Name, by the impropriety of Speech, W11l at firll dtfiurb lum, who knows not what Idea it ilands for · but as foon as the Figure is drawn, the Copfequences and Demonflr;tion are platn and clear. And jull the fame is it in moral Knowledge, let a Man have the Idea of tak•pg from others, without their Confent, what their honelllndullry has poffeffed them of, and call this Juflice, if he pleafe. He that takes the NJme herewtthoutthe Idea put to it, will be miilaken, b.y Chap. IV. Reality of Kno-wledge. by joining another Idea of his own to that Name: But ilrip th~ /JeA of that Name, or take it fuch as it is in the Speaker's Mind and the f.1mc Things will agree to it, as if you call'd it Injuilice. In: deed, wrong Names in moral Difcourles, breed ulually more diforder, b<caufe they arc not fo eafily rectified, as in Mathcmaticlts, where the Figur<> once drawn and feen, makes the Name ufelefs , and of no force: For what need of a Sign, when the Thing fignified is prcfcnt and in view t But in moral Names, that cannot be fo cafily and fl10rty done, becaufe of che many decompofitions that go to the making up the complex Ideas of thofe Modes. BJt yet for all this the mifca!ling of any of thole Ideas, contrary to the ufual lignification of the Words of that Language, bi~:tfers rot but we may have certain and clemouj/ratiw Knowledge of their fevcral Agreements and Difagreements, if we will-carefully, as in Mathematicks, keep to the fame precife Ideas, and trace them in their feveral Relations one to another, without being led away by their Names. If we but feparatc the Idea under conoderation, from the Sign that tlands for it, our Knowledge goes equally on in the difcovery of real Truth and Certainty, wlcteYer Sounds we make ufe of. 6. 1q One thing more we are to take notice of, That where G 0 D, or any other Law-maker , hath defined any Moral Names , there they bave.nladc the Effence of that Species to which that Name belongs; and there' it is not fafe to apply 'or ufe them otherwifc: But in other cafes 'tis bare impropriety of Sj*'ch to apply them contrary to the common ufuge ofthe Country. ·But yet even thts too dtflurbs not the certatnty of that Knowledge, which is flill to be had by a due contemplation and compa-ring of thofe even nick·nam'd Ideas. . . §. 1 r. Thirdly, There is..another fort of complex Ideas, whtch bemg rtferrtrl to Arcbetypes witbcut us, may differ from them, and fo our Knowledge about them, may come fhort of being real; and ihefe are our Ueas of Subilances: which con filling of a Colle[hon of limple Ideas, fuppofed taken from the Works of Nature, may yet vary from them, by having more or diflerent Ideas united in them, than are to be found umtcd in the Things themfelves: From whence 1t comes to pafs, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to Tlungs tbemfelves. ~. n. I fay then, that to have Itleas of Subilances, \~hich, by being conformable to Things, lmay afford us real Knowledge, tt ts not enough, as in Modes, to put together fuch Ideas as have no mconfiflency! though they did never before lo exiil. 'U.g. the Ideas of Sacnlege or PerJury, &c. wereos real and true Ideas before, as after the exiflence of any fuch faa. But•ur Ideas of Su/;}lance; being fuppofed Copies,. and referred to Archetypes without us, mufl fi11l be taKeHjrom jomethmg that does or has (XI• f/eJ; they mull not conftfl of Ideas put together at the pleafure of our Thoughts, without any real pattern they were. taken from, though we can perceive no inconfiflence 10 fuch a Combtnatton. ::he reafon whereof is, becaufc we knowing not what real Confi•tutwn 1t 1s of Subtlances, whereon our fimple Ideas depend, and which really is the caufe of the llrict union of fome of them one with another, and theexclufton of others; there are very few of them that we can be fure are or are not mconfiflent in Nature, any farther than Experience and fenftble Obfervatton. reaches. Herein therefore is founded the realtty of our Knowledge concermng Subfiances, that all our complex Ideas of them mull be fuch, and fuch 'frly as are made up of fucJ1 fimple ones, as have been dtfcovcred to co-ext m Nature And our ideas being thus true,though not, perhaps, very ex~Cl: · Cop1es |