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Show r66 ViftinCI and Confufed Ideas . • · , Book II. a fort of Things, or any one particular Thing; diflintl: from ·all others, the complex Idea he annexes to that Name, !S the more d,ll,_ntl:, the more particular the Ideas are, and the greater and more deteJmmate t~e number and order of them is, whereof it is made UP': For the more 1t ha~ ~f thefe the more has it frill of the perce1vable ~1fferences, whereby 1t 15 kept 'reparate and difiin"Cl: from all ideas belongmg to ?!her Names, even thofe that approach nearefi to it, and thereby all confulion wuh them is avoided. T · §. 11• confujiow, making it a difficulty to feparate two lungs that fhould be feparated, concerns always two Ideas ;and thofc moll, which moll approach one another. Whenever therefore we fufped: any Idea to be coilfufed we mull: examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, o; which it cannot eafily be feparated from, and that will always be found an Idea belonging to another Name, and fo lhould be a d1fferent Thing from which yet it is not .fufficieotly difiinl.l; being either the fame with it, or making a part of it, or, at leafi, as properly call'd by that Name, as the other it is ranked under ; and fo keeps not that difference from that other idea, which the differeot Names import, §. , 2. This, I think, is the confufion proper to ideas; which frill carries with it a fecret reference to Names. At leafi if there be an}: other confufion of Ideas , this is that which moll: of all diforders·Mens Thoughts and Pifcourfes : ideas, as ranked under Names, being thofe that for the moll· part Men reafon of within themfelves, ami always thofe which they communicate about, with others. And therefore where there are fuppofcd two different Ideas, marked by two different Names, which are not as difiinguifhable as the Sounds that fiand for them, there never fails to be confufion : And where any Ideas are difiiqd:, as the Ideas of thofe two Sounds they are marked by, there can be between them no confujion. The way to prewnt it,is to coiled: and unite into our complex Idea, as precife. Jy as is poilible, all thofe Ingredients, whereby it is differenced ,from others; and to them fo united in a determinate number and order, apply fieadily the fame Name. But this neither accommodating Mens eafe or vanity, or ferving any defign, but that of naked Truth, which is not always the thing aimed at, fuch exactnefs, is rather to be wifl1ed, than hoped for. And Iince the loofe application of Names, to uncertain , and olmoft no ideas, ferves both to c:over our owrf Ignorance, as well as to perplex and ~~nfound others, wh1ch goes for Learning and Supe•·iority iu Knowledge, 1t1s no wonder that moll Menf!Jould ufe itthemfelves whiUl they complain of it in others. Though yet, I think, no finall par; of the confufion,tobefound in theNot!on~ of~en, might,bycareand ingenuity, beav01ded; yet I am far from thmkmg 1t every-where wilful. Some ltleas are !o complex, and made up of fo many parts, that ·the Memory does not eafily retain the very fame precife Combination of limple Id.as, under one Name ; much lefs are we able confiantly to divine for what precife complex Idea fuch a Name fiands in another Man's ufe of it. From the lirH of thefe, follows confufion in a M•n's own Reafonings and Opinions w11h1~ lumfelf; from the latter,frequent confufion in difcourfing and argumg w1th others .. But having rqore at large treated of Words, their De· fells and Abufes m the followmg Book, I !hall here fay no more of it. §. IJ. Our complex Ideas being made up of ColleCtions, and fo variety of fimple ones, may aecord10gly be very cleRr and diflinll in one part, a•J '""J obfcure and confufcd rn anotber. In a Man who fpeaks of a cbiliode· ron, or a Body of a thoufand fides, the Idea of the Figure may be very confufe~, thougl~ that of the Number be very di.llind: :. fo that. he .. being able Chap. XXVIII. ViftinCI and confufed Ideas. able to difcourfe, and demonllrate concerning that part of his complex idea, which depends upon the Number of a Thoufand, he is apt to think, he has a dillinct idea of a C biliaiidroll ; though it be plain, he has no precife idea of its Figure, fo as to diflinguifl1 it,by that,from one that lias but 999 fides : The not obfcrving wherereof, caufes no fmall Error in Men's Thoughts, and confufion in their Difcourfes. §.14. He that thinks he has a difiinct Idea of the Figure of a cJ,iliaiidron, let him for Trial"s-fake take another parcel of the fame uniform Matter, viz. Gold, or Wax, of an equal Bulk, and make it into a Figure o( 999 fides. He will, I doubt not, be able to difiinguin1 thefe two Ideas one from another by the Number of fides; and reafon,and argue difiinctly about them, whilfi he keeps his Thoughts and Reafoning to that part only of• thefe ideas, which is contai!Jed in their Numbers ; as that the fides of the one, could be divided into two equal Numbers; and of the a• ther, not, ~c. But when he goes about todifiinguifh them by their Figure, be will there be prefently at a lofs, and not be able, I think, to frame in his Mind two ideas, one of them difiind: from the other, by the hare Figure of thefe two pieces of Gold ; as he could, if the fame parcels of Gold were made one into a Cube, the other a Figure of live fides. I,n which in compleat ideas, we are very apt to impofe on our felves, and wrangle with others, efpecially where they have particular and familiar Names. For being fatisfied in that part of the Idea, which we have clear; and the Name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole, containing that part alfo, which is imperfeCt and obfcure, we are apt to ufe it for that confufed part, and draw deductions from it, in the obfcure part of its .Signification, as confidently as we do from the other. §.If. Having frequently in our Mouths the Name Eternity, we are apt to think, we have a pofttive comprehenfive Idea of it, which is a~ much as to fay, that there is no part of that Duration, which is nor clearly contained in our idea. 'Tis true, that he that thinks fo, may have a dear ln'ea of Duration; he may alfo have a very clear idea of a very great length of Duration; he may alfo have a clear Idea of theComparifon ofthatgreat one, with !\ill a greater : But it not being pollible for him to include in his u._ of any Duration, let it be as great as it will, the whole Extent together of a Duration, \~here he fuppofes no end , that part of his Idea, which is flill beyond the Bounds of that large Duration, he reprefents to his own Thoughts, is very obfcure and undetermined. And hence it is, that in Difputes and Reafonings concerning Eternity, or any other Infinite, wo are very apt to blunder, and involve our felves in manifeff Abfurdities. §.r6. In Matter, we have no clear Ideas of the fm~lnefs of Parts, much beyond the fmallell,that occurr to any of our Senfes: and therefore when we talk of the divifibility of Matter in inji11itum, though we have clear idtas of Divifton and Divilibility, and have alfo clear ItleaJ of Parts, made out of a whole, by Divilion; yet we ha~-e but very obfcure, and confufed Ueasof Corpufcles, or minute Bodies,fo to be divided, when by formcrDivifions, they are reduced to a fmalnefs,much exceeding the perception of any of our Senfes: and foall that we have clear,and dillinCl: ideas of, is of what Divil!on in general, or abfiractly is, and the Relation of Tot~"}-and Pars.; But of the bulk of the Body, to be thus infinitely divided aften:ertain Progretlions, I think, we have no clear, nor dillind: Ideas ~tall. For I ask any one, Whether taking the fmalleft Atom of Dull he ever faw, he has any d•llin~ Uea,(bating fhll the Number which concerns not Extenlion,)betwixt lhc Ioo, ooo and the 1000 ooo part of it. Or if he dunk he can refine ' ' his |