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Show Reality of Knowledge. Book IV. t HAP. IV. OJ the ~ality of our J010JVIedge. ~- x. I doubt not but my Rehder, by this time~ may be apt to think, that I have been all this while only bmld1n~ a Cafile m the A1r; and be ready to fay rome, To what purpofe all tlu~ fbr! I{nowledge, fay you, is only rhe perception of the agreement or d1fagreement of our own Ideas; but who knows what thofe !tle~s may be? Is there any thmg fo extravagant, as the hnaginationsofMen s Brams! Where IS the Head that has no Cbimeras m 1t ? Or 1f there be a fober and a w1fe Man, what difference will there be, by your Rules, between his Knowledge, and that ofthemofl extravagant Fancy in the World! They both havethe~r ld.as,. and perceive their agreement and d1fagreement one wah another It there ~e any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm-headed Man's fide, as having the more Jdegs, and the more hvely. And fo, by your Rules,he will be the more knowing. If It be true, that all Knowl•dge lies only in the perceptiOn of the agreement or d1fagreemcnt of our own Idus the Vifions of an Enthufiafl, and the Reafomngs of a {ober J11an will be equally certain. 'Tis no matter how Things are : fo a ')\1a,n obfer've but the agreement o~ his o~n In\aginati;ms, and talk con• rormably; it is i!ll T~uth, all Certamty. Such Caflles 111 the_ A1r, wdl be ~s flrong floWs ofTnith ~ as the. Demonflranons of Euclid. That an Har_P;y is not a Gentaur, . IS by th1s way as certam knowledge, and as much a Truth, as.that" Square is not a Circle. But of 1vhat ufd iJ all/his fine Knowldg; of Men's own ~maginations,to ,ll M:lq that enquire~ after the reahty of Tlungs1 •It matters not what Me,ns fancies are, 'tis the Knowlec:tgc•of Tlungs that 1S only to he, pnzed: t~s this alone gives a value to our Rcafonm!>;s, and preference to one Mans Knowledge over anotl)er's , that it is of Things as tiiey .roolly are, and .not of l>rea1,11s and Fancies. . - · . . 9- ~. To which I anfwer, That 1f our I{nowledge of our Ideas term•· nate in t!\eni, and· reach no farther , whe~ tiTere is fome'thing farther Intended, o\Jr mofl ferlous Thoughts woqld f,~ rof little nlore ufc, than the Refveri~$ of a crarie brain;nnd tlle-'T•rullt!buitd thereon ilfno.more we1ght, than the DifoourJ;esof'a Man, who fees Things c!ear!y .in a Dream, and \Vith gn':lt affuro11ce utms them• But I f1ope, before' I have done,, to maf<e It evident, thaF this way •t!Pcerta\A"ty, by the•knllwlcdge· of our own tt/e-as, goes <~-little llmher than bare.lllt1ll{\ination: aod, I bel1~vc, 1t wl~ ap~ear, that_aHthe certah~t~ .of gcMral T>ruthsa Man has, hes 111 no-ti\ mg eife. 1 ·' _, - ~.YJ. 'Tis evident, the Mind knoivs not 1'hings immediately, but only by the intetV'en\iO,n ofthe /dear i~ has_ of tl!.~m. O~r K>~owteige therefore Is "at, ~~ly fo fdr f! ihe" 1S a conform-Jty bffwtek our Idea~ and the r<Ritty ef 'I'h,ing.r. But what fhall be heyc the Gri1:erion t HO\v Jhall the M1~d, whet! it perceives nothing but its own U i!aJ, know that they ag'ree With Things themfelves? Th<S, though it feem not to want difficulty, yet~ I rhink, there be two forts of fdMs that, we may be affured, agree w1th Things. ~- 4· Firjf, The firfl are Jim pie fd-.s, which fincc the Mind, as has be<:~~!hello'ed, can by no means make to 1t felf, mull necc!farily be rhe produCt of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and produCing Clup. IV. Reality of Knowledge. Cing therein thofe Perceptions, which by the Wifdom and Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that · fotp!e Me.u are not jillions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular producrions of Things without us, really operating upon us; and fo l'llrry with them all the conformity our !late requires, which is to repre· fent Things un,der thofe al>tlcarances they are fitted to produce in us • whereby wa ma¥ .difl;ing~>if4 the Subflances they are in, and apply the~ to our Uics. Thus the fd.a of Whitenefs, or Bittcrnefs, as it is in the ll!ihd; eliatl:IJ atri\vering t!1at 'Power which is in any Body to produce it &tlax:, has all the re". c0nformity it can, or ought to have, with Things' w.itho•t us. Alld tim conform tty between our limple !dear, and the exi· lleoce at l ' hinr;s, is fuflicicnt for real Knowledge. · 9. 5· Sec•ntllj , Ail our comJfex ltfeas, except tho{eof Subj}ances, being Arthety~Jes of the Mind's own making, not intended to he the Copies of '"l' thing, n6r referred to the exiflence of any thing, as to their Origi· 1141<, tannoi want any conformity necej[ary to re.al K>1ow!edge. For that whiel1 is not dcfigned to reprefent any thmg but 1t felf,can never be capable .r a \\'~ong rt!prcfentation, nor miflead us from the tr~e apprehenflon of any thing , by 1ts ddl1kenefs to 1t ; and fuch, exceptmg thofe of Subfiances are all our complex Ideas; which, as I have fl1ewed in another place, ;reCombinations of Ideas, which the Mind, by its fr~e choice, puts together, •Without confidennf\ any aonnex10n they have m Nature.• And hence it is, that in all thefe forts the !tleas themfelves are confide- red asthe Archetypes, and Things no otherwife regarded, but as they are' conformable to them. So that we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the !\now ledge we attain concerning thefe Ideas is real,- and reaches Things themfelves: Bccaufe 111 aU our Thoughts, Reafomngs, and D1f.; Collt'Jes of this kind, we intend Thmgs' no farther than as they are con· fOrmable to our Ideas ; fa t11at in thefe, we cannot mifs of a certain un• ~oubtcd reality. . ~- 6. I dou~t not but it will be eafily granted, that the Knowl.dge w,e may'ht!Ve of mathematical ,Truths, i.s not only _certam,, but real Knvwledge 1 11ot idle Chimeras of Mens Brams: And yet 1fwe Will confider, we JhaiJ ind that it is only of our own Ideas. The Mathematician confiders die Truth and Properties belonging to a Retl:angle,or Circle, only. as they ~ in Idea in his own Mind; for' tis parTible he never found e1ther of fllem exilling mathematically, i.e. preeifely true, in his Life: Bu~ yet the knowledge_ he has of any Truths or Properties belongmg to a C~tcle, or iny other mathematical Figure, are nev~rtheiefs true and certam, even ef r<al Things exifling : hccaufe real Thmgs are no farther concerned, iler intend~d to be meant by any fuch Propofitions, than as Things really agree to thofe Archetypes in his Mind. Is it true of the Et!ea of a Tn· angle, that "its three Angles are equal to two nght ones' It IS. true alfo of i'Triangle; where-ever it really ex1fls. What ever other F1gure ex1fls, tllat is not exaCtly anfwerable to that Idea of a Tnangie 111 Ius Mmd, iinot at ail concerned in that Propofinon. And theretore he IS certam all his Knowledge concerning fuch Ideas , 1s real I{nowiedge: becaufo ifttendleg Things no farther ~han they agree with thofe his fdeaJ, he is{•re what he knows concermng thofe F1gures, when they have barely r. fdeal exif/e.ce in his Mind, will hold rrue of then; alfo, when they brve a real exiflence in Matter; his confiderat1on bemg barely of thofe Figures, which are the fame where-ever or however they CXlfl. Oo:~o |