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Show Jlbufe of Words. Book III. truly it amounts to no more,) but would have this underfiood, viz. t!Jnt Gold; i.e. what has the real E!fenceofGold is malleable, which amoun(s to thus much, that Malleablenefs depends o~, and is infeparable from the real EifenceofGold. But a Man, -not knawmg wheret~ that real EtTencc confifis the connexion in his Mind of Malleablenefs, ts not truly with an E!fe~ce he knows· not, but only with the found Gold he puts for it. Thus when we fay, that Animalr~tionale is, and {inimalimplume biber Ia tis unguibu.r is not a good defintt!On of a Man ; tiS p!am, we. fuppofc the Name Man in this cafe to fiand for the real Eifence of a SpecKs, and would fignifie, ,that a. rational Animal better defcribed that real E!fencc, than a two-leg d Animal w1tb broad Nails, and •vttbou~. Featl>en. For elfe, why might not Plato as properly make the Word, «v!p'"''~, or M""• ihnd for his complex /Jea, made up of the Ideas of a Body, dtfilllgUI· ihed from others, by a certain lhape and other outward appearances, as Ari/lotle make the complex Idea, to which he gave the Name ii.llfQ~o;, or Man 'of Body and the Faculty of reafoning join'd together, unlefs the name &:e~"'~• o; Man, were fuppofed to fiand for fomething elfe, than what it lignifies, and the Idea a Man profeifes he would exprefs by it 1 §. 1 8. 'Tis true, the names of Subfiances would be much more ufeful, and Propofitions made in them much more certain, were the real Elfences of Subfiances, the Ideas in our Minds, which thofe Words lignified. And 'tis for want of thofe real Eifences, that our Words convey fo little Knowledge or Certainty in our Dif~ourfes about tl~em : And therefore the Mind, to remove that Imperfechon as much as tt can, makes them, by a fecret fup]'ofition, to fiand for a thing, having that real Elfencc, as if thereby it made fame nearer approaches to it. for though the Word Man or Gold, fignifie nothing truly but a complex Idea, of Properties, united together in one fort of Subfiances: Yet there is fcarce any Body in the ufe of thefe Words, but often fuppofes each of thofe names to fiand for a thing having the real Eifence, on which thofe Properties depend; which is fo far from diminilhing the ImperfeCtion of our Words, that by a plain Abufe, it adds to it : when we would make them fiand for fomething, which not being in our complex Idea, the name we ufe, can no ways be the tign of. 9. '9· This thews us the Reafon, Why in mixed Modes an.r of t/;e Ideas that make t!Je Compojition of the complex one, hi•g left out, or c!Janged, it is allowed fQ be anotl;er thing , i. e. to 6e of anotber SpecieJ , as is plain in Chance-medly , Man-llaughter, Murther , Parricide, &c. the Reafon whereof is , becaufe the complex Idea iigniftcd by that name, is the real, as well as nominal Eifencc ; and there is no fecret reference of that nome to any other Elfence, but that. But in Subf/,mce s, it is not fo. For though in that called Gold, one puts into his complex Idea, what another leaves out; and Pice Perfh: yet Men do not ufually thi~k, that therefore the Species is chanf;\ed : Becaufe they fecrerly in thetr Mmds refer tbat name, and fuppofe tt annexed to a real immutable Elfence of a thing exi!l:ing, on which thofe Properties depend. He that adds t!} his complex Idea of Gold, that of fixednefs, or Solubility in aq. regia_, '\Vh1ch he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the Spectes; but only to have a more perfefl Idea, by adding another, wluch is always in rerum natura, joined with thofe other, of which his former complex Idea confified. But this reference of the name, to a thing whcrepfwe have not the Ide~, tsfo far from helping at all, that it only Jcrves the more to mvolve us m Di.fficulttes. For by this tacit reference to the real Elfeoce of that Species of Bodies, the Word Gold (which by tlanding for a .Chap. X. Abuje ofWor'ds. 147 --~----~~--~~ ----------~----~~ a more or' leG per feLl Coiled ion of fimple Ideas, fervcs to dcfJ.gn _'that fort ofBody well enough in civil 'Difcourfe) comes to have no Slgntfica. tion at all, being put ,for·fdmewhat whereof we. have. no Idea at all; and focan fig;nifle nothing at'•all ., when the B6.dy trfelf tsaw~y .. For how• ever it may be thought all one ; yet, tl \veil conf1dered, tt Wtll be found a quite. different thing, 'to argue about Gold m na'?e, and about ;t par~el 9r the Body it fel f, v. g.· a p1ece of loeaf.Gold latd be!ore us; though m Difcourfe, we are fain to fubfittute the name for the ththg. _. . ~- 2 0. That which, I thin!<, very much dtfpofes Men to fubfittute thClr names for the real Eifences of Species, is the fuppofition before ~enrioned, that Na.ture works regularly in die Production of Tlungs, ahll fets rhe Boundaries to each or thofe Species, by giving exaflly the fame real internal Confritution 'to eacl1 individual, which w~ rih~ under one general name. Whereas ahy -one who obferves their different O!Jalities, can hardly doubt th~t many ofrhe lndivid~~ls, calle-d by the fame name, are tn their internal Conftirarlon, as dtf!erent one from another, as feveral of thofc which are ranked under different fpcctfick Names. 11m JuppojitiOn, however that the fame prtcift intemal Conjlitution goes always with tbe fame jpeciftck name, makes /J1e11 forward t~ t«ke thofe name! for the. Reprefe• tatives of thofe real E.f{euus, though mdeed they figmfie not lung but the complex Ideas they have in their Minds, when they ufe them. So that, if I may fa fay, figmfymg one dung, and bemg fuppofed for, or put in the place of anod1er, they c~n not but, m fuch a. kmdof ufe, caufe e. great deal of Uncertamty m Me~ s Dtfcourfes ;. efpectally tn thofe who havethroughly imbibed the Do!J:nne of!ubfianttal Forms~ whereby they firmly imagine the feveral Spec1es of Tlungs to be determmed and dtfim-guiflled. · §. • r. But however prepofierous and ab(urd it be, to make our names fiand for !Jeas we have not, or (which is all one) Eifences that we know not, it being in effetl, to make our Words the tigns of nothmg; yet tis evident to any one, whoever fo little reflcfu ?n the ufe Men make of their Words, that there is nothing more famthar. When a Man asks, whether this or that thing he fees,let tt.be ~ Dnll,or a monfirous Ftr:us,be 2 Man, or no; 'tis evident, the O!Jefiton 1s not, Whether that particular thing agree to his complex Uea, expreifed by the name Ma": But whe· ther it has in it the real E!fence of a Species of Things, which he fuppofes his name Man to fiand for. In wbich way of ujing the names of Subjlances, there arethefe falfe Juppojitions contained. . . l'irfl, That there are certain precife Elfences, accordmg to \~luchflNd ture makes all particular Things, and by which d1ey are ~fit~gUt. 1e. into Species, That every thing has a rea~ Corr!htutt~n, w ere 'Y. lt ts what it is, and on which its fenfi~le ~aht1es depend,. ts ~afi dfu~t. But I think it has been proved, that th~s makes not rhe ddbnchon o pectes, as we rank them; nor the boundanes of thetr names. Secondly This tacitly alfo infinuates, as tf we had Ideas of thefe propofed Eifence;, For to what purpofe elfe is it, to en<J,utre whether tillS or that thing have the real Eifenr.e of the Species Man,. If we d.1d not fu~~'iF~ that there were fuch a ft>ecifick Elfence !mown? Wluch yet ts uttftly da f< e · And therefore fuch Application of names, as would .make them ad R or 'Ideas we have not mufl needs caufe great diforder 111 D1fcourfes a~ _ea· funings abo~t the~, and be a great inconvenience in our Commumcatton by Words. §. u. |