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Show Adequate and Inadequte ideas. Book Ill. plex Idea, made up of the remaining lim pie ones of Body, Life, and Nourifllment, becomes a more general one, under t!1e more comprehenfive term, Yivens. ,\nd not to dwell longer upon this particul~r, lo evident in it felf, by the fame way the Mind proceeds to Body, Su6jl.mce, and at lall to Being,, lbi>tg,, and fuch univerfal terms, which lla~1d for any of our Ideas wl~atfoever. To con.clude, this whole myf/ery of Genen and Specm, wluch make fuch a nolfe m the Schools, and are, W1th Jull1ce, folittlo 1·egarded out of them, is nothing elfe but abllraCl: IdeaJ, rriore or lefs comprehenllve, with Names annexed to them. In all wbich, this is conilant Rod unvari~ble, That every more general term, ilands for fuch an Idea os is but a p~rt of any of thofe contained under it. ' §. 10. This may fhew us the reafon, JVby, in tbe defining of lf?ou/1 which is nothing but declaring their fignificatior1, JVe make uft of tbe Ge: ntu, or next general Word that comprehends it. Which is not out of nccefflty, but only to fave the labour of enumerating tlle feverallimpla Idea; which the next general Word, or Gem~.r, llands for; or, perhaps, fame: times the fl1ame of not being able to do it. But though defining by Genus and Differentia, (I crave leave to ufe thefe terms of Art, though originally Latin, Iince they moll properly fuit thofe Notions they are applied to;) I fay, though defining by. the GenUJ be the lh_ortell way; yet, 1 tlunk, 1t may be doubted, whether Jt be the bell. Th1s I am furc, it is not.the only, and fo not abfolutely neceffiiry. For Definition being n<i. tbing but making another underlland by Words, what Idea the term defined llands for, a .defin.ition is ~ll ~ade by enumerating thofe limplc Ideas that are combmed m the ligmficat10n of the term Defirted : and if inllead of fuch an enumeration, Men have accullomed themfelves to ufe the next general term, it has not been out of neccffity, or for greater clearnefs; but forquicknefs and difpatch fake. For,l think, th~t to one who de: fired to know what Idea the word Man fiood for· if it fl1ould befaid that •. Man was a folid extended Subllance,having Life; Scnfe, fpontaneoli; Monon, and the Faculty ofReafomng. I doubt not but the meaning df the term Man, would be as well underfiood; and the Idea it llands tor, be at ]call as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational A,;. m•l; which by the feveral definitions of Animal, Pivens, and CorpUJ, rcfolv~ rtfelf mto thofeenumcrated lcle.r.l have in explaining the tflm.Ma., followed here the ordmaryDefimnon of the Schools: which though, per· haps,not the m~ll exaCl:,yerferveswell enough to my prefent purpofe.And one may m th!Smllance, fee wiJat gave occalion to that Rule that a Dclimtlonmullconftll of 1ts Ge.nuJ, and D1ferenlia: and it fuilices to fhcw us the. httle neceffity there .lS.offuch a Rule, or advantage in the llria: obfervmg of 1t. For Defimtwns, as has been faid, being only the explainmgofone Word, byfeveral others fo, that the m~ning, or Idea it fiands for, maybe certainly k~own, Languages are not always fo made, a~cordmgto the Rules of Logrck, that every term can )1ave its lignilicatlo. n, cxad:ly and clearly exprelfed by two others. Experience fulliciently fat!Sfies us to the contrary; or elfe thofe who have made this Rule, have · done 111,. t!)(lt they have given us fo few Definitions conformable to it. Bti[ of Dcfimuons, more in the next Chapter. §. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain, by what has been faid, That Gener.l and'lJnn;erfal,belon'f!, not to the real cxillenceofThings;bUt are the Im,.nllonr and Creatures of tl;e'lJnderj/anding made by it for irs own ufc,and co11cern only Stg,nr, whether Words, or Ideas.' Words arc general, as h~s beenf31d, when ufed,for figns of general Ideas· and fo are applicable in· differently to many p•rucular Things: And!dra; arcg~neral, when they are Chap; III. General 'Terms. arefet up,as the Reprefcritatives of many ~articular Things: but Univerfa· hty belongs not to Tlungs themfelves, wluch are all of them particular in. thell' Ex11lence, even thofe Words, and Ideas, which in their li"nification are general. When therefore we quit Particulars, the Generals that refi' are only Creatures of our own making, their general Nature beina nothing but the capacity they ar~ put into by the Underllanding, of fig~ifying or reprefentmg many particulars. For the figmficat1on they have is nothing but a relation, that by the Mind of Man is add~d to them. ' §. n. The next thing therefore to be conftdered i'l, Wbat kind of Jig,ni: fication it ir, that general Words have. For as it is evident that they do not fignifie barely one particular thing; for then they w;uld not be general Terms, but proper Names: So on the other fide "is as evident they do not fignific a plurality; for Man and Men w~uld then fi"nifi~ the fame; and the dillin8:ion of numbers (as Grammarians call tl~em) would be fuperlluous and Ufelefs. That then which general Words'lianilie, is a fort of Things ; and that each of them doc:s , by being a fig~ df an abllraCl: Idea m the Mmd, to wllich Idea, as Thmgs exilling are found to agree, fo they come to be ranked under that name ; or which is all one~ be of tim fort. Whereby it is evident, that t.he Ej[e11c~s .o/thefortr, or (if the Lat1n word pleafes better) Sp.mes of Tlungs , .are nothing elfe but thefe abllraCl: Ideas. For the havmg the Etfertce of any Species being that which makes any Thing to be of that Species, arid the ~on'formiry .tO the .fdea, tO Which the na~e is annexed > I being that wllich g1ves a rrght to that name, the havmg the Eifence, and lhe having that Conformity, mull needs be the fame thing: Since to be of any SpecieS, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one. As forexarriple, to be a Man, or of the Species Man, arid to have a right to the name Man, is the fame thing. Agairi, to be a Man, or of the Species Mmt, and have the Elfence of a Man, is the fame thing. NoW Iince nothing can be a Man, or have a right to the name Man, but what has a conformity to the abllraCl: Idea the name Man llands for ;. nor any thing beaMan, or have a right to be of the Species Man, bur what has the Effimce of that Species, it follows, that the AbllraCl: /Jea, for which the name fiands, and the Elfence of the Species, is one and the fame. From whence it is eafietoobferve,that theeffences of the forts ofthings,and confequenrly the forting ofThjngs,is the Workmanfhip of the Underllanding, Iince it is theUnderllanding that abllraCl:s and makes thofegeneral ft!ear. §.q. I wouldnotherebe thought to forger, mucl.1 lefs to deny, that Nature, in the produ8:ion of Thing$, makes feveral of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, efpecially in the Races of Animals, and all Things propagated by Seed. But yet, I think, we may fay, the [orting of them under Names, is the Workman/hip of tbe Vnderjlanding, tajing riccafion from thejimilitude it obferves amongll them, tom~ke abilraCl: general Ideas, and fer them up in the Mind, with Names annexed totheLil, as Patterns, or Fonm, (for in' that fenfe the word Form has a very proper fignification,) to which, as particular Things exifring, ate fo~nd to agree : fo they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, of are put into that ClajTis. For when we f.1y, this is a Man, that a Horfe; this J•flice, that Cruelty; this a Pf/atch, that a Jack ; what do weelfe ,but rank Things under different fpecifick Names, as agreeing to thofe abllrad Idem, of which we !rave npde thofe Names the ligris? And what a;e the Effences of thdfe Species, fer out and marked by Names, but thefe abllract !dear in the Mind; which are, as it were, the bonds betwcten par; ticular Things that exifi, and the Names they are to be. tanked untlef I Cc And |