OCR Text |
Show 244 Abufe of Words. Book III. ---------------------------- Diftinctions, and accute Niceties,but Obfeurity and Uncertainty, leaving the Words more unintelligible, and the Reader more at a lofs? How eJfc comes it to pafs, that Princes, fpeal<ing or writing to their Servants in their ordinary Commands , arc eaftly underftood ; [peaking to ti1eir People, in their Laws, are not fo? And, as I remarked before, doth it not often happen, that a Man of an ordinary Capacity, very well underflands a Text, or a Law, that he reads, till he oonfults an Expofitor, or goes to Council; who by that time he hath done explaining them, makes the . Words fignifie either nothing at all, or what he pleafes. ~. 'J· Whether any by Jnterefts of thefe Profellions ·have occafioned this, I will not here examine; but I leave it to be conftdered, whether it would not be well for Mankind, whofe concernment it is to know Things as they are, and to do what they ought; and not to fj'end their Lives in talking about them, or to!Ting Words to and fro: Whether it would not be well, I fay, that the Ufe of Words were ':'acle plain, and direct; and that Language, wluch was g•ven us for the Improvement of Knowledge nnd bond of Society, lhould not be employ'd to darken Truth and un: fettle Peoples Rights ; to raife Mifts, and render unintelligible both Morahty and Rehg1on? Or that at kaft, •f tillS Will happen, it lhould not be thought Learmng or 1\nowledge to do fo? §. 14. F~urth!J, A,~other great abuft. of Words is, tbe taking tlmn for :fbmgs. Tins, though It,ID fome degrec,~!)ncerns all Names in general; yet more particularly affel'ls thofo of Subfiances: And to this Abufe thcfe Men a~c moftfl(bject, wh? cqnfine their Thoughts to any one Syftem,-and g1ve themfelves up IQto a firm behef of the Perfection of any received ~ypothefiS; whereby they coroe to be perfuaded that the Terms of that Sect, are fo fuited to the Nntur~ of Things, th~t they perfectly corre· fpond With their real EXlftence. Who is there, that has been bred up in the Penpatet1ck Plu!ofophy, who does not think the Tcri Names under which are ra~ked the 'Ie~ l?redieam~nts,to be exactly conformabl~ rothe ~ature ofThmgs t Who IS there,ofthatSchool,that is not perfuaded, that fi ljlaNtrai forms._,ve.g,eta(J1Je Souls,a/JJ;orrence of a Vacuum,i11tent ional Species, &c. are fometlungreal t Thefe Words Men have learned from their very entrance upon Knowledge, apd have found their Mafters nnd Syflems Jay great flrelS upon d1e111; andtherefure they cannot 'luit the Opinion, that they are conformable to Nature, and are the Reprefentations offomcthing that really ex1fts. ~he Pfato•ifls have their Soul of the World, and the Epuur~ans the1r C!idea'Vo~r tow~rds Motion, in their Atoms, \then at refi. The1e IS fcarce any Sect 111 J'hilofophy has not a di!1inct fet of Terms, that otbers under)\and not .. But )!qt this Gibberifi1 , which in the wcaknefs of Humane Undcrftandmg, ferves•f<; well to palliate Mens Ignorance, and COVe! tltelf Errours, C?mes by fami)mr ufe amongft thofe of the fame Tn)Je, to feem the ,mofi Important part of Language and of all others the Terros the m_oft I lignifil:a\lt; {\qd fhould Aiirial 'and /Etherial f/c· IHcles come once, by the prevalency of that Doctrine to be generally rc· ~~ed ~tltl' wl.-er-;,.~no-tlouqnhofc Terms would ~ake imprellions on f r; 'ids, fa ao to efrabliJll tljem Ill the perfuafton of the reality d uq "J;ungs • '•~'>JR111Ch, :JS , thao ,lleripatetick, Forms have heretofore one. rtU L. ' a~.,, . ~. 1·5· How IJlu~~ ~~mes,t•~for :things, are apt to mif/<ad tbe Vn- 4erflqwJ~ng, the a\):~n]:.lye ,l{f"ltlm~ of philofophical Writers would abundantly ~:hfcovcr f anl:\11ba1, · ucr\1~j>S{ i~ Wo.rds little, fufpected of any fuch :Ifuf~ IlhaUI,Ilnancem, onc.onJ~. 011d that~ very familiar one. How aqy l,lltncate P1fp_uJe~1 have ~'!>been alDout !ffatter, as if tl!ere were • ~ l . fome Chap. X. Abufe of Words. fame fuch thing really in Nature, diftinCl: from Body, as 'tis evident the Word Matter fiands for an Idea diftinct from the Idea of Body. F~r if the Ide <IS thefe two Terms ftoo,d for, were precifely the fame, they might indifferently in all Places be put one for the other: but we fee, that tho' it be proper to fay, There is one Matte~ of all Bodies, one cannot fay, There is one Body of all Matters. we fam1harly fay, one Body is bigger than another, but it founds harfh (and l think is never ufcd) to fay, one Matter L< bigger than another. Whence comes thi< then ? Piz. from hence, that though Matter and Body be not really diftinct ; but where-evq there is one, there is the other : Yet Matter and Bod_v, ftand for two diffi: rentConceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, an.d but a part of the other. For Body ftands for a folic\ extended figured Subftance, whereof Matter is but a partial, and more confufed Conception, it feeming to me to be ufed for the Subftance and Solidity of Body, without taking in its Extenfion and Figure : And therefore it is that fpeakiog of Matter, we fpeak of it always as one, becaufe in Truth, it exprefiy contains nothiNg but the Idea of a folid Subftancc, which is every where the fame, every where uniform : And therefore we no more conceive, or fpeak of diflerent Matters in the World, than we do of different Solidities; though we both conceive, and fpeak of different Bodies, becaufe Extenfion and Figure are capable of variatio~. But fince Sohd1ty cannot mft \~Jthout Extenfi?n? and Figure, the takmg Matter to be the name of fometlung really ex1ftrng under that Precifion, has no doubt produced thofc obfcure and ilntntelligible Difcourfes and Difputes, which have filled the Heads and Books of Philofophers concerning Materia Prima; which Imperfection or Abufe, how far it may concern a great many other general Terms, I leave to be confidered. This, I think, I may at leaft fay, that we lhould have a great many fe~er Difputes in the World, if Words were taken for what they are, the figns of our !tleas only, and not for Things themfelves. Fot when we argue about Matter, or any the hke Term, we truly argue only about the Idea we exprefs by that Sound, whether ti~at precife Idea agree to any thing really exifting in Nature, or no. And 1f Men would tell, what !dens they make their Words ftand for, there could not be half that Obfcurity or Wrangling, in the fearch or fupport of Truth, that there is. ~. >6. But whatever inconvenience follows from this miftakcofW~rds, this, I am fure, that by conftant and famifiar uf~, they charmMen mto Notions far remote from the Truth of Tlungs. Twould be a nard Mat· ter, to perfuade any one, that the Words which his father or SchoolMafter the Parfon of the Parifh, or fuch a Revend DdCl:orufed, f1gmficd nothing that really exifted in·,Nature: Which, perhaps, is •one of the leajl Caufu, tbat Men are fo hardly draiVH to quit tbeir MijlaA•e!; eve? 10 Op1• nions purely philofophical, and where they have no other Jntereft but Trutl1. For the Words, they have a long time been ufd to,remaimng firm in their Minds, 'tis no wonder, that rhe wrong N onons annexed to them, fhould not be removed. ~. 17. Fifthly, Another Abufe of Words, is the ft,fting theitf in the place of T!Jings, IVhich they do or can bJ no metnls Jignift!. ,· We.mayobfcrve, that in the general names of Sub(bnces, whereof the notnmal Elfences are only fmown to us, when we put them into Propofiti~ils, and allirtn or deny any thing about them, we do mofi common!)'. t\ic1tly fuppofe, or intend, they fl1ould ftand for the real E{fence of a certallt fort of Sub~a~ces. for when a Man fays Gold is malleable~ he mealls;, and would mfinuate fomething more than th~, that \~hat 1· call Gold' IS ma1!table, (thouug~h |