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Show Trifling l'ropojitionr. Book IV. Words, with their ordinary Acceptations annex_ed to them; v. g. Sul;ftance, Man,Animal,F orm,Soul, Vegetauve,SenfitiVe,Rauonal?may make feveral undoubted Propolitions about the Soul, Without k~m1·mgat all what the Soul really is; and of this fort, a Man rna~ find nn m0mtc number of Propofitions, Reafonings, and Conclufions, m Books bt Metaphyficks, School-Divinity; and fame fort of natural_ Pllilofophy_; and after all, Jmow as little of G 0 D, Spirits , or Bodies, as he thd before he fet out. · I r,' ·r ~. to. He that hath liberty to define, ;, <. determme t \e •gmncation of his Names of Sub!bnccs, (as certa1nly every ones docs m effeCt, who makes them !land for his own Ideas,) and makes .their Significations at a venture, taking them from his 6wn or other Men's Fanfies, and not from an Examination and Enquiry into the Nature of Thmgs themfelves, may, with little trouble, demonfl:rate ti:em one of another; Wherein1 however Thing.~ agree, or difagree, m the1r own Nature, he need mmcJ nothing but his own Notions, with the Names he hath befl:owed upon them: but thereby no more increafes his own Knowledge, tha~ he does his Riches, who taking a Bag ofCount~rs, calls one m a _certam place a Pound, another in another place, a Shilhng, and a tlmd m a tlurd place, a Penny; and fo proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon nght, and call: up a great fumm, according to his Counters _fo placed? and fl:anding for more or Jefs as he pleafcs, Without bemg one JOt the nchrr, or Without even knowing how much a Pound?Shilhng,or Penny is, but only thatdnc is contained in the other twenty times, and contams the other twelve 1 which a Man may a!fo do in the lignification of Words, by making therrl in refped: of oneanother, more, or lefs, or equally comprehenlive. §. I 1. Though yet concerning moft Words uted in Difcourfes '· efpec;. ally Argumentative and Controverfial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worfr fort of Tr;fUng, and wh1ch fets us yet farth~r from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attam by them , or lind HI them, vh. that moll: Writers are fo far from infl:rueting us in the Nature' and Knowledge of Things, that they uft t!J<;r Words loof/y and uncer• tainly, and do not, by uting them con!lantly and fl:eddily in the .fame lignification, make plain and clear deduCtions of Words one from ana. ther, and make their Difcourfes coherent and clear, (how little foeverit were inftruetive,) which were not difficult to do , did they not find it convenient to fhcftcr their Ignorance or Obfl:inacy , under the obfcurity and pcrplexednefs of their Terms; to which,perhaps,Inadvcrrency,and ill Cufl:om does in many Men much contribute. ~. u. To conclude, barely ''erbal Propojitions may be known by ~hefe following Marks .- Pirj}, All Propofitions, wherein two abfl:raet Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the lignification of Sounds. For Iince no abo fl:raet Idea can be the fame with any other but its felf, when its abfl:raLl: Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can fignifie no more but this, tliatit may,orought to be called by that Name ; orthatthefetwo Names iignifie the fame/dea. Tim~ fhould any one fay, that Parfimony isFru· gality, that Gratitude is Jufl:ice; that this or that ACtion is, or is not Temperance: However fpecious thefc and the like Propofitions may at fir!l: fight feem, _ret when we come to prefs them, and examine nicely what they concam, we I hall find, that it nil amounts to nothing, but the' lignficationofthofe Terms. §. 13· Chap. IX. KnorPiedge of Exiflence. 9. I~· S<condly,All Propojit;ons,wl;erein a part of the complex ld<a, whicll any Term fl:ands for, ;s predicated of that Term, are oJt/y verbal, v. g. to fay, that Gold is a Metal, or heavy. And thus all Propofitions, wherein more comprehenfive Words, called Genera, are a/Jirmed of fubordinate, or Jefs comprehenfive, called Sped<r, or Indiv;duals, are barely verbal. When by thefe two Rules, we have examined the Propofitions, that make up the Difcourfes we ordinarily meet with, both in and our of Books, we fhall, perhaps, find that a greater part of them, than is ufually fufpeeted, are purely about th9 (lgnification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but tile 0te and Application of thefe Signs. This, I think, I may lay down for an infallible Rule, that where-ever the di!linet Jclea any Words !land for, is not known and confidered, and fomething not contained in that Idea, is not affirmed, ov denied of it, there our Thoughts !l:ick wholly in Sounds, apd arc able to attain no real Truth or Falfhoood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might fave us a great deal of ufclefs Amufement and Difputc·; and very much lhorten our trouble, and wandring· in the fcarch of real and true Knowledge. CHAP. IX. OJ our l(noToledge of Exiftmce. ~. I.Hithetto we have only cohfidered the E!fences of things1 which being only abftract ldeas,and thereby removed. in ourThou~hts from particular Exifience, (that bcmg the proper Ope.ration of the Mm~, in Abfl:raCtioh, to confider an Idea under no other Exifrence, but what It has in the U nderftanding,) gives us no Know ledge of real Exifience at all. Where by the way we take notice, that un;verfal Propofit;oJts, of whofe rrutb or Fa/fhood we can have certain Knowledge, &OHcern not Exi· j}enre • and farther, that all pa(ticular Affirmations or Negations, that woufci' not be certain if they were made general, are only concerning Exifl:ence; they declaring only the accidehtal Union or Separation of !de a< in Things exifl:ing, which in their abftraet Natures, have no known ne-tc! fary Union or Repugnancy. . . 9. :1.. But leaving the Nature ofPropofitlons, and different ways of Predication to be confidered more at large m another place, Let us proceed ho\lr to enquire conccrnihg our Knowledge of the Exifl:ence of Things, and how we come by it. I lay then, that we have the Knowledge of. mir owt\ 'Exifl:ence by Intuition ; of the Exifl:ence of God by Demonfl:ratJon; and Of other Things by Senfation. . . . . ~. 3. As for bur own Exiften~e, w~ perceive It fo plamly, and focertamly, t!1at it neither needs, nor IS capaole of any proof. . For nothmg can be more evident to us, than our own Exifl:ence. I dunk, I reafon, I feel Pleafurc and Pain; Can any of thefe be more evident to me, than my b'>\'Jl Exi!lence ? I( I doubt of all other Thmgs, that very doubt makes me . }lerccive my own Exiflence, and Will not futfer me to doubt of ~hat. For if I know I feel Pain it is evident, I have as certam a Perception of my own Exifl:eoce, as of the Exifl:ence of the Pain I feel: Or if I k11ow I doubt, l bav'e as certain a Perception of the Extfl:encc of the dung doubtmg, as llfthat Thought, which I call doubt. Expenence then convmc~s U>, 'that loe have an ;ntnit;w /{!lowledge of our own Exi/l<n«, ••" an mter- lla1 |