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Show : li II ,I .I• ,'I, I i I I I I I~~ !I II II II i' I! I tl 'f II ~ II il " \' I I ~ I , I I t ,1, , ·c· ~ .,_-1 -<!. jo6 Maxims; Book IV. q. 17. Seco~Jiy, Another that hath gone farther in framing and col- · leCl:ing the Idea ne calls Man, . and to the outward Shape adds Laughter, and ranonal Difcoude, may dcmo~firate, that Infants and Changelmgs ~ Men by this Maxim It is •mpo.flible for the fame JIJing to h , a11d .:~ ; 0°/;e ; And 1 have difc~urfed with very rational Men , who have actually denied that they are Men. . §. 1 8. ibirdly, Perhaps, another makes ~s the complex Idea wluch he calls Man, only out of the Ideas of Body m general, and the Powers of Language and Reafon, and leaves out the Shape wholly : Tlus Man :sable to demonfirate, that a Man _mal:' have no Hands, but be_ 0JadrNpes, neither of thofe being included m h1s Ide~ .o~ Man; and 1h whatever Body or Shape he· found Speech and Reafon )Otn d, that _w~s a Man : becaufe having a clear knowledge of fuch a complex Idea, 1t lS certa1i1; that What is, is. : §. 19. 5o that, ifr1ghtly confidered, I thmk we may fay, that w/;ere ouf Ideas are clear and diffinEI, and the Nam.s agre.ed on, that lhall frand for each clear and difiinct Idea,therc is little netd,or no ufe at all if thefoMa• •xims to prove the agreement, or difagreement of any of them. He that cann~t difcern the Truth or Falfhcod of fuch Propofitions, without the help of thefe, and the like Maxims, will not be helped by thefe Maxims to do it: lince he cannot be fuppofed to know the Truth of thefe Maxims themfelves without proof, if he cannot !molt the Truth of others without proof, which are as felf-evident as thefe. And U_Pon the very fame grounds, intuitive Knowledge ne1ther re'lu!fes nor adm1ts any proof, one part of it tnore than another: He that W11l fuppofe 1t, does takeaway the foundation of all Knowledge, and Certainty : And he th•t needs any proof to make hitn certain, and give his Alfent to·this Propofition, that Two is equal to Two, will alfo have need of a proof t_o mal~e him admit, that What is is. He that needs a probatton to convmce hun, that Two Is not Three, 'that White is not Black, that a Triangle is not a Circle,&r. <!T any other rwo_clear difiinc;t Jde~s are not one and the fame, Wtllneed alfo a demonfiratwn to convmce h1m , that tt tS tmpo.flilil~ for t!JC fame thing to he, and not to be. · . 9. 10. And as thefe Maxims are pf little ufe, where we have clear and difiinct Ideas, fo they are, as I have fhew.ed, of dangerous ufe, where our Ideas are not clear and difrinct; and where we ufe Words that are not annexed to clear and difiinct Ideas, but tofuch as are of a loofe and wandering lignification, fometimos fianding for one, and fometimcs for another Idea ; from whii:h follows mifiake 2nd err<!lur, , which thefe Ma~ xims (brought as , proofs to efrablilh Propofitions, wherein the terms fiand (or confufed or uncertam Iileos) do by thc1r Authonty confirm and river. I. \ ,, CHAt'. Chap. VIII. Trifling Propojitionr. C H A P. VIII. 0 J Trifling PropoFti~ns. •. r. w7 Hcther the Maxims treated of in the fore·going Chapter be of that ufe to real Knowledge, as is generally fuppnfed 1 leave to be confidcred. This, I think, may confidently be affim1ed, Tl;at there are umverfal Propofinons; that though they be certainly true yet they add no light to our UnderfiaAdings, bring no increafe to our (\~owledge. Such are, ~- ;.. Fir}f , All purely identical Propojitio~'· Thefe obvioutly, and at firfi blufl1, appear to contam no lnfiruCl:wn m them. For when we af.. firm the f.1mc term of it fclf, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it cont•ins any clertr and real Idea, it fhews us nothing,but what we mull: certainly know before, ll'hether fuch a Propofitio11 be either made by, or propnfed to us. Indeed, that mofr general one; WJ;at is, is, may ferve fomctimes to fhew a Man the ab!urd1ty he lS guilty of, when by circumIOClltioll, or e'luivoc~l terms, he would, in particular infl:ances, deny the. Jame thing of 1t felf; becaufe no body w1ll fo openly b1d defiance to common fenfe, as to affirm vifible and direct Cdntradictions ih plain Words·: Or if he does, a Man is excufed if he break off any farther difcourfe with him. But yet, I think, I may _fay, that neither that received Maxim, nor any other identlca~ Propofiuon, teaches us any thmg: !'-nd though in fuch kind of Propofiuons, tlus great and magmfied Max1m, boafied td be the foundation of Demonfiration, may be, and often is made ufe of to confirm them , yet all it proves, amounts to no more than this, That thefame Word may with great certainty be affirmed of it felf, without any doubt of the Truth of any fuch Propofition ; and let me add alfo, withoutany reall\Jlowledge. . ' · 4. 3· For at this rate, any very Ignorant perfon, who can but make a Propof,tlon, and knows what he means when he fay& Ay, or No, may make a million of Propotitions, of whofe Truth he may be infallibly certain and yet not know one thing in the World thereby ; '11. g. what is a Soui is a Soul ; or a Soul, is a Soul ; a Spirit, is a Spirit; a Fetiche, is a Feti~he, &c. Thefc all being equivalent to this Propofition, 'lliz. W/;at is, ;, l. e. what hath Exifience, hath Exifience; or who hath a Soul, hat!J,a S:,ul. What is this more than trifling with WordSi It is but like a Monkey lhiftinghis Oyfierfromone hand to the other; and had he had but Word~, tnight no doubt, have fa1d, Oyfl:cr m nght hand IS fubject, and Oyfier in left 'band is predicate: and fo might have made a fel!;evidenr Ptopofition of Oyfier, i. e. Oyfier is Oyfier; and yet, with all this, not have been one whit the wifer, or more knowing: and that way of handling the matter would muci1 at one have fatistied the Monkey's Hunger, or a Man"s U~derfianding; and they would have improved in Knowledge. and bulk together. · ~. 4. Secondly, Another fort of trifling Propofitions is, when a part of the tomplex Idea is predteatet! of the Name of t/Je whole i a part of the de• finition of the Word defined. Such are all Propolit1ons ll'heretn the Gt•us is predicated of the Species, or more c0mprchmfive of leiS co.mprebcnfiVe terms: For what Information, what !\now ledge carnes tlus P~c· R r :z. pofiuon ., I ·•i .. "'· • ! t _,. ·'· |