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Show Maxims. Book IV. llCCUltoms it felfto have recourfe to them, as to the .Standards of Truth and Falfhood: by which familiar ufe of them, as Rules to meafure tile "f~uth of other Propofitions, it comes in time t? be thought, that more particular J;'ropofiuons have thetr Truth and Evtdence from thetr confermit~ to thefe more general ones, which in Difcourfe and Argumemation, •It! fo frequently 'urged, and conltantly admitted. And this I think to be tf1e reafon why amonglt fo many felf-evident Propofitions, the moll gen~ ral only !;ave l)ad the Title of Maxims. ,. §. a. One~hing farther, I think, it may not be amifs to obferve concerning thefe general Ma~i.ms, That ,they are fo far from improving or 'eltablifhing our Minds in true Knowledge, that if our Notions 6e zvro•g, lpoft, or unj/eady, and we refign up our Thoughts rather to the found of Words, than to fetled, clear, diJlind: Ideas o(Things: I fay, thefe general Ma;yims, wi!lferve to co•frm ur in Mif/akeJ; and in fuch a way ofufeof Words, which is molt common, will ferve to prove Contradid:ions: v. g. He that, with Carter, fhall frame in his Mind an Idea of what he calls Bot(y,1 to be nothing but Extenfion, may eafily demonfirate, that there is no Vacuum; i.e. no Space void of Body, by this Maxim,Wbat ir, ir. For the /Je• to which he annexes the name Body, being bare Extenfion, his Knowledge, that Space cannot be without Body,is certain. For he knows his own idea of Extenfion clearly and difiind:ly, and knows that it is IVbat ~~ ir, and, not another Idea, though it be called by thefe three names, Extenfion, Body, Space; which three Words !landing for one and the fame Idea, may, no doubt, with the fame evidence and certainty, be affirmed one of another, as each of it felf: And it is as certain, that whillt I ufe them all to ltand for one and the fame Idea, this predication is as true and identical in its lignification, that Space ir Body, as this predication is true and identical, that Body ir Body, both in lignification and found. 9: I J. But if another !hall come and make to himfelf another Idea different ffom Cartes, of the thing, which yet, with Cartes, he calls by the fame name Body, and make his Idea, which he expreifes by the word Body, to confifr of Extenjion and Solidity together, he will as eaiily demonltrate, that there may be a Pacuum , or Space, without a Body, as Cartes demonltrated the contrary, becaufe the Idea to which he gives the name Space, bemg bare Extenfion, and the Idea to which he gives the name Body,bemg the complex Idea of Extenfion and Relillibility, or Solidity together;thc!e two Ideas are not eud:ly one and the fame,but in the Underfranding as dillinfr as the· Ideas of One and Two, White and Black, or as of Corporeity and H•mani~y, if I may ufe thofe barbarous terms: And therefore the predication of them in our Minds or in Words !landing for them is not identical, but the negation of the;n one of another, as certain and evident, as that it' is impojible for tbe fame tbing to be, and not to be. 9. '4· But yet though both thefe Propofitions (as you fee) may be equally demonfrrated, viz. That there may be a Pacuum , and that there cannot be a Vacu•m., by thefetwo certain Principles, (viz.) What ir, ir; and the fame thmg ca•not be, and not be; yet neither of thefe Principles Wtll ferve to prove to us that any, or what Bodies do exilt; for that we arc left to ourSenfes to difcover ~o us as far as they can : "rhofe univerfal and felf-evtdent Pnnctples, bemg only our confront, clear, and dillinCt Knowledge of our own Ideas more general or comprehenfive, can alfure us of nothmg that pa!fes Without the Mind, their certainty is founded only upon the !I now ledge we have of each Idea by its felf,and of its diJlinCtwn from Chap. VII. Maxims. from others; about which, we cannot be mifraken whilfr they are in our Mmds, thou{\h we may, and often are m1fraken, when we retain the Name~ Without the idea•; or ufe them confufedly, fometimes for one, and fomettmes for another Idea. In wluch cafes, the Ioree of thefe Axioms reaching only to the Sound, and not the Signfication of the Words ferves only to lead us into Confufion, Millal<e,and Errour. ' 9- '5· But let them be ofwhatufe they will in verbal Propolitions, they cannot dtfcover or prove to us the leafr !\now ledge of the !'iature of Subfiances, ~s they arc found and exilt without us,nny f.1rtlter than grounded on Expenencc. And though the confequence of thcfe two Propolitions called P~inciples, be very clear1 and their ufe not very dangerous, 0 ; -hurtful, 10 the probation of fucn Thmg,, wherein there is no need at all of them for proof, but fuch ~s are clear by themfelve> without them, viz. where our !dear are clear nna dillmd:, and known by the Names that Hand for them; yet J~:be11 thefl Prhlcip!es,viz. H/h.1t is, is; and, It is im· poffible for tbefam< tbing to he, and not to he, are m.u/e u{e of in tbe pro· batlan of Propojittons, where111 are Words /lowdingfor complex Ideas; v.g Man, Horfe, Gold, Venue; there tbey are of iHf•ite danger, and moil commonly make Men rccetve and rctam Fai010od for manifclt Truth and Uncertainty for Demonltration; upon which follows Errour, Oblli~acy, <tnd all the mtfcluefs that can happen from wrong reafoninrr. The rca• fon whereof is net, that thefe Principles are lefs true in fuch "Propofitions, confi(hng of Words lta~dm~ for complex /dear,_ than in thofc of fimplc /dear. But becaufe Men m1ltake generally, thmkmg fuch Propolitions to be about the reality of Things, and not the bare fignilication ot Words when indeed they arc, for die molt part, nothing clfe, as is clear in th~ demonltration of Vac•um, where the word Body, fometimes !lands for one 'Idea, and fometimes for another : But thall be yet made more rna: nifeft. · ' ' §. r6. As for inltance: Let M<tn be tliat;concerning which you would by thcfe firlt Principles demonltrate ahy thing, and we 01all fee, that fo far as d~mon~ration is by thefe' Principles, it is only verbal, and gives us n~certamUilt verfal true Propoliuon, or knowledge of any Being exilting Without us. P~tfr, a Chtld havmg fra)lled the Idea of a Man, it is probable, that his Idea is jult like that pid:ure, which the Painter makes of the vifibleappearances joined together; rand fuch a complexion of ideas together in his Undcrltancling, makes up the lingle complex Idea wltich he calls Irian, whereof White or Flefil·Colour in England being one, the Child can demonltrate to you, that a Negro is not a Man, becaufc Whitecolour was one of the confiant fimple !dear of the complex idea he calls .Man: and therefore he can dqnonfrrate by the Principle,it ir impoj!i6le for the fame ]bing tole, and not to be,that a Negro is 1101 a Man; the foundation of his Certainty being not that univerfal Propolition, which, perhaps, he never heard nor thought of, but the clear dillind: perception he hath of his own fimplc ftleas of Black and White, which he cannot be perfuaded to ta1<e, nor can ever millake, one for another, whether he !mows that Maxim, or no: And. to tl_l\s, Child, or any one who hath luch an idea which be calls Ma•:'Can You o~~cvcr demonllrate that n Man hath a Soul, becaufe his idea of Man includes no fuch Notion or Id<a in itk And therefore to him, the Principle of Wbat is, iJ, proves not this matter; but it depends upon Colled:ion and Obfcrvation, by which he is to make his _CjOmplcx idea called Man. !{r |