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Show Vniverfal Proji<JfttiohJl &c. Book IV. ~. 14. Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind we murl firrl know what Changes the primary Qpolities of one Body' d<l regularly produce in the primary ~alities of another, and how. ' Se. condly, we murl know what primary ~alities of any Body produce certain Senfations or /dear in us; which, in truth, to know all ;he ElfeCts of Matter, under its divers modifications of Bulk, Figure, Cohcfion of Parts, Motion, and Reli;which.ie;Ithinl<,every body will allow is utter• ly impoffiblc to be known by us, without revelation : Nor if it' were revealed to us, what fort of Figure , Bulk , and Motion of Corpufcles would produce in us the Senfation of a yellow Colour, and what fort of Figure, Bulk, and Texrure of Parts in the fuperficies of any Body \\We fit to give fuch Corpufcles tb.eir due motion to produce that Colo~r Would t.hat be enough to make univerfal Prapofitions with certainty: concermng the fevetal forts of the~, unkfs we had Faculties acute enough · toperce1ve the Bulk~ F1gure, Texture, and Monon of Bodies in thofe mmute Parts by wh1ch they operate on our Senfes, and fo could by thofe frame our abliract !dear of them. I have mentioned here only corporeal Subrlances, whofe Operations feem to lie more level to our Underlian· d~ngs: For ~s to the Operations of Spirits, both their thinking and movmg of Bod1es, we at lirli tight lind our felves at a lofs · though perhaps when :ve have ap~lied our !lioiJghts a little nearer to 'the contideratio~ cfBod1es, and the~r Operations, and examined how far our Notions even ln thefe, reach with any clearnefs_, beyond fentiblc matter of fact, w~ fl1all be bo~nd to confefS, that even m thefe too, our Difcoveries amount to very lutle beyotJd perfect Jgnorance and Incapacity ~· 15. Thi• is evidcm, the abjlrall complex ld;as of SuHiances, for wh1ch their genetall~ames liand, not comprebending their real ConflitutJo• s, . cah af!ord uJ liut '!!tQ' ltttle unrverfal Cutai•ty; they not being that on wluch thofe ~aht1es we obfcrve in them , and would inform cur _felves about,. do depe?d, or with which they have any certain con· nex1on. 'll • . !!.· Let the Idea to wh1ch we give the name Ma•, be, as it commonly ·~·.•,Bod~ of the ordinary fl1ape,with Senfe, voluntary Motion, and Rffifon )OlD d to 11 .. Thls being the abliract Idea , and confequently the E cnce of our Spec1e~ Man, We can make Lut very few general certam P~opofiuons concermng Man, flanding for fuch an Idea. Becaufe not knowmg the real Confhtuuon on \~hich Senfation, power of Motion, and Reafomng, wuh that peculiar Shape, depend, and whereby they are uni· ted 1 together m the fame Subject, there are very few other Qpalities Wit 1 wh1ch we can perceive them to have a neceifary connexion : and therefore we cannot W1th Certainty affirm, That all Men fleep by interv~ ls; That no Man can be nourifl1ed by W ciod or Stones ; That all Men wdl be po1foned by Hemlock: becaufe thefe /Jtas have no connexion nor rcpugnar.cy w1th thiS our nominal Elfence of Man with this abliract Idea. that Name liands for. We muli in thefe and the like ap eal to tnal m particular Subjects, which can reach but a little way w~ mufl content our felves wuh Probability in the reli : but can hav; no general Certamty, wlul~ our fpecifick Itlea of Man, contains not that real Con· fl•tutlon, wluch IS the root, wherein all his infeparable Qpalities are united, and from ~hence they flow; whilli our Idea, the word Man liands for,. 1s ~nly an •mperfetl: Collection offome fentible Qpalities and Pow· ers m h•m, there IS no dlfcermble connexion or repugnance between our fpec1fick Idea • a~d the Opemuon of either the Parts of Hemlock or Stones , upon h1s C-onfhtut1on. There are Animals that fafel eat Hemlock , and ethers that arc nourifhed by Wood and Stones [ But as Chap. VII. Maximr. as long n< we want Ideas of thofe real Conllitutions of Animals whereon thcfe, and the lil<e ~alities and Powers depend , we muft not hope to reach Certainty in univerfal Propofttions:· concerning them. Thofe few Ideas only, winch havead1fcerruble connex1on with our nominal Effence, or any port of it, can alford us.fuch Propofitions. But thefc arefo few, and offalittle moment, that we may julily look on our certain general Knowledge of Subliances, as almoli none at all. ,J ~. 1'6. To conclude, General Propofitions, of what kind foever are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms ufed in them, fbnd for fuch Ideas, whofe agreement or difagreement, as there exprelfed, is ca-• pable to be difcovered by us. And weare then certain of their Truth or Falfl;lood, when we perceive the Ideas they liand for, to agree or not agree, ' according. as they are affirmed o~ denied one o1 another. Whence we10ay take nonce, that general Certamty u nl."ller to 6e fou•d lut in oot Jdu>.• Whenever we go to feck it elfewhere in Experiments, or Obfer· various without us, our Knowledge goes not beyond particulars. 'Tis the cOntemplation of our own abliract ltfeas, that alone is able to alford JlS general Knowledge. CHAP. Vlf. Of Maxims. ~- r. THere. are a fort of Propolitions, which under ,the name ,of Maxims and Axiomr, have palfed for Pnnc1ples of Se1ence: and becaufe they arefelfe7Jident, have been fuppofed innate, without ~hat, any Body (that I know) ever went about to fhew the reafon •.nd foundation o[ their dearnefs or cogency. It fllay however be worthwhile, to enquire into the reafon of their evidence, and fee whether it be peculiar to rhenl alone; and alfo examine how far they influence and govern our ether Knowledge. . , . §. i: 'Knowledge, as has been fhewn, confilis m the percept1on of the agreement or difugreement of !dear: Now wbere that agrument or difasr, reemeNt il perctived immttliate/y o/ it felf. '· without tlie i~terventi.im or help of anJ other, tbtre our knowledge tr jelfevtdent. Th1s Will appea~ to be fo 'to any one, who will but confider any of thefe Propofitions, Which, \vithout any proof, he alfents to at firli tight: for in all thef~ be will find that the reafon of his A !Tent, is from that agreement or difagreeA'.-;, nt tile Mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in thofe Jtfw aMMoring the A'ffirmation or Negation in the Propofitjod. ·' · §. ~ :' :-rhiL9eing fo 1 in the next place,letAu_s confide~, whether th1s ;,) -~ Self.evidefltoe pecuhar only to thefe Propdllnons, wh1th are rcce1v~d~ _ · for Ma;xims , and have the dignity of AxiofllS ;I! owed them; and hercl tis pl#,!n 1 Fhat fev~~alpther Truths, not allo;y (\ to be Ax1.oms, partalce equatJ9~\1;{h them ~~ tlus Self.ev•d,nce. Th,i? we lhall fee, , tf ~ego over thefejeV'~~~ I forts of agreement ,of, di,fagreeme~t of Jdeti.r, \v!i1ch I haye above \h6-.ti<;,1ed 'lliz. Identity Refanon,Co,ex,flence,and real Ex1flencej whicli'\v.iU" difco~er to'us tha~ ~~t only thOfe few Propofitions, whicl~ I'' , 1 t .(li I l have ·had the credit dl flf.zximij ,_~re .(elf-ev_rae,~t, uul a great ma1!Y, ey~? almo!Y::'p .jnfinited ~mberof otber PropojiliOnl are fuch. . , §. 4~:'1'ol:, Firfl, tlj~ lmmed10tef.~rl:epnon bf the ~greem.e?t or Magre~~ ment of1Irtentity, bring founde.d 1n 1he Mmd s havmg dJflinct /dear, tl~!j alfords'b§.tts many f!lf'evidenr Phlpofitions, as we have d•flmct Itfe~r. ' Q.q :t. Ever)' |