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Show z..8o Extent of Human~ Knowledge. · Book IV, a y thought !hould produce a motion in Body is as remote from the na turc of our Ideas, as how a~y Body !hould produce any Thought in the Miod. That it is fo,if Expenence d1d not convmc~ us, the Omfiderations of the Things themfelves would never be able, m the !call:, to difcover to us. Thefe, and the like, though they have a conll:ant and regular connexion, in the ordinary courfe of Things; yet that counexion being not difcoverable in the ideas themfelves, wluch appeanng to have nQ necelfary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing elfe but the arbitrary Determm~uon of that All-w1fe Agent, who has made them to be, and to operate as they do, in a way utterly :!,bove our weak Under!\anding to conceive. . . §. 19· In fame of our Ideas there are certam RelatiOns' Habitudes, and Connexions,fo vilibly included in the Nature of the Idtas themfelves, that we cannot concc;ive them feparable from them, by any Powerwhatfoever. And in thefe only, \~e are capable of certain and ~niverfal Knowledge. Thus the idta of a nght-lm.ed Tnangle necelfarily carries with it an equality of its Angles to two nght ones. Nor can we conceive tllis Relation, this connexion of thefe two Ideas, to, be pollibly mutable, or depend on any arbitrary Power, which of choice made it thus, or could lll3kc it other~'ife . . But the co~ere?ce and continuity of the parts of ~atter, the prod.ucbon of Sentmo~ ~us of Colours and Sounds, &<. by 1mpulfe and motion ; nay, the ongmal Rules and Communication of Motion, being fuch wherein we can difcover no natural connexion with any Ideas we have, we cannot but afcribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleafure of the Wife Architect. I need not, I think, here mention the Refurrectioo of our Bodies, the future ll:ato of this Globe of Earth, and fuch other Things, which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the Deternunatlon of a free Agent. The Things that as far as our Obfervation reaches, we conll:antly find to proceed regularly: we may conclude, do act by a Law fet them; but yet a Law that we know not; whereby, though Caufes work ll:cddily and Effells conftantly flow from them ; yet their Connexions and Dependencies being notdifcoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. From all which, 'tis ealie to perceive what a darknefs we are involved in, how little 'tis of being, and the things that are, that we are capable tol<Row. And therefore we !hall do no injury to our Knowledge, when we modef\ly think with our felves, th•t we arc (o far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the Univcrfe, and a!l the things .coolllined in it, that we are not capable of a philofophical Knowledge of the Bodies that are about 11s, and make a part of us: Concerning their fec~ndary ~ali ties, Powers, and Operations, we can ha vc no umverful certamty. Several Effefu come every day within the notice of our Senfes, of whic~ we have fa far fenlitive Knowledge; but the caufcs, mmner, and certatnty of thelf productwn, for the two foregoing Rcafans, we mull: be content to be ignorant of. In thefe we can go no tarrher than particular Experien~e infor~s us of matter of fact, and by Analogy to guefs what Effeels the Jike Bod1es are, upon Dfher tryals, like to produce. But as to a perfeCt ~ience of natural Bodies, ( notto mention fpimual Be1ags,) we are, .I think, fa far from being capable of any fuch dung, that I conclude It loll: labour to feek after it. • §. 30. Thirdly, Where we have adequate Ideas and where there is a certain and dikoverable connexion between them, 'yet we are often igno,..~, f~r w~nt of tr4Ctn{, tb.{e Ide"."'' h4w, or may have, and finding oat thoie tntermedulte Idtas, wluch may fhew us what habitude of agree- Chap. IlL Extent of Humane Kno'fPiedge. agreement or difagreement they have one with another. And thus many are 1gnorant of mathematical Truths, not out of any imperfection of the~r Faculne~,. or uncerramty m the Thmgs thcmfclves ; but for want of apphcattorl m acq~.rmg; ex1m1mrtg! and by.due ways comparing thofe lde4s. That wluch has mol\ contnbutcd to hinder the due tracing of our Iclea1, and finding out their Relations, and Agreements or Difag~ e:ments one With another, has been, I fuppofe, the ill ufc of Words. It IS 1mpollible that Men fl10uld ever truly feek, or certainly difcover the Agreement or Ddagreement of Ideas themfelves, whiHl their Thoughts flutter about, or fi1ck only 10 Sounds of doubtful and uncertam fignificatlons MtthcmatlCI3nS abfhacting their Thoughts from 0 Names ' and accutlomtng themfelves to fer before their Minds the Idt as themfelves that they would confider, and not Sounds in!\ead of them, have avoided thereby a great p:m of that perplexity, puddering, and confufion, .which ms fa much hmdred Mens pr?grefs in other parts of Knowledge; who fl1ckmg 1~ Words of undctermmed and uncertain fignification, were unable to d1fl1Dgm!h True from Falfe, Certain from Probable, Con6flent from Incoolill:ent, in their own Opinions : Whereby the incteafe brought 'IntO the Stock of real Knowledge has been very little, in proportion to the Schools, Difputes, and Writings,the World has been lill'd with · whilll Men, being loll: in the great ~Vood of Words, knew not whereaoo'ut they we~e, how far their D1fcovenes were advanced, or what was wanting in .their ?WO, or the general Stock of Knowledge. Had Men, in their difcovenes of the material, done, as they have in thofe of the intellectual World, involved all in the obfcurity of uncertain and doubtful terms and . ways of ~!king, Volumes writ of Navigation and Voyages, Theories and Stories of Zones and Tydes multiplied and difputed ; nay, Ships built, and Fleets fet out, would never have taught tts the way beyond the Line; tild the Antipodes would be frill as mueh unknown, as when it was declared Herelie to hold there were any. ,But having fpoken futliciently of Words; and the ill or carelefs ufe;that is commonly made of them, I !hall llOt fay any thing' more of it here. §. 31. Hitherto we have examined the extent of our Knowledge, in refpc<! t of the fever:ilforts of Beings that are. There is another t xtcnt of 11, '* rtjpc[J of'llniwrfality; wh1ch will alfo deferve to be conlidered: and in this regard, our Knowledge follows the Nature of our idtas. If lhe ideas are ab!lract, whofe agreement or difagreement we perceive, our Knowledge •is univerfal. For what is known of fuch general ideas, will be true of every p•rticular thing, in whom that Elfence, i.e. that abllract idta is to ~e found ; and what is once known of fuch Ideas, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we mu{\ fearch and find it only in our own Minds, and 'tis only the examining of our own ideas,that furnifheth us with that. Truths belonging IOEifenl:es of Things, ( that is, to ab!\raCl: ideas) are eternal,and are to be bind out by the contemplation only of thofe· Elfences; as the Exill:eocc of Things is to be known only from Experience. But having more to .afthls in th~ Chapters, where I fl)all fpeak of general and teal Know~ ge, this may here futlice as to the Univcrfality of our Knowledge 10 gener~l. .!. 0 .. . Oo CHAP • |
