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Show Extent of Humane Knowledge. · Book IV. ------ Syfiem, Interefi, or Party, they are once engaged in. But yet after all, I think I may, witho11t injury to humane Perfechon, be confident, that _our Knowledge would never reach to all we might delire to know con. cernmg thofe Idear we h_ave ; nor be able to fu•mount all the Dilliculticr and refolve all the Qgefitons m1ght anfe concerning any of them. w; l1ave tile !dear of a SqMare, a. Circle, and EqMality; and yet, perhaps ihall never b~ able to find a C11cle equal to a Square, and certainly know' that 1t IS fo. We have the /dear of Matter and _fhi•king, but po/libl !hall never be able to know, whether Matter tlunks or no . it be y impo!Iible for us, by the contemp!ation of our own I dear, without re~~ latt~n, to chfcover, whether Omntpotency has given to Matter fitly dif. pofeil, a power :~o J>Crce1ve and thmk, or elfe joined and fixed to Matter fo d1fpofed, a tlunkmg tmmatenal Subfiance: It being equally eafie · refpcct of our Notions, to conceive, that GOp can, if he pleaf~ 'fi~ peradd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking as that he a' W fuperadd to it another Subfiance, with a Faculty of Thinking. linc~u . kno~ not wherein 'thinking conlifis, nor to wha): fort of Subfrances ~~ .Aim.ghty has been pleafed to gtve that power, which cannot be in an cre~~ted Bemg, but I)leerly by the good Pleafure and Bounty of the crJ. tor. .for what ~lfurance of Knowledge can .any one have· that c · Thoughts, fuch as, v.g. Pleafure and Pain, fhould not be i~ Body f:}:![ ~fter .a certam. mapner modtfied and moved, ~s well as that it fhould ~ •':' an 1mmat~nal Subfiance, upon the Motion of the parts of Bod : MotJOn,_ accordmg r.o the utmofi reach of our /dear, being able to :roduce no~htog but Motion, fo that when we allow it to prodqce Pleafure or PaiQ,. or the idta of a Colo11r, or Sound, we are fain to quit our Rea· fon, go beyond our own !dear, and attribute it wholly te the good Plea· fure ?four [\Iaker. For Iince we mufi allow he has annexed EffeCts 10 Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what Reafon haye weto_conclude, that he could not order them as well to be pr8od~ced m a SubJeCt we c~nnot concet.vecapable of them, as well as int a UbJCCl: we cannot concetve the motion of Matter can an rate upo?? I fay n_ot. this, that I would any way lelfen tfie w~i~t:r the Souls Immatenahty: I am not here [peaking of Probability, but Knowledge; and I thmk not only, that it becomes theM d fi f p]· lhlfo p.Ay, not to pronounce Magifl:erially, where we want ~h~t YE~den~~ Jat {;'n produce Knowledge; but alfo, that it is of ufe to us to difcern ow ~r our Knowl<ldge does reach; for the !late we are at' prefent in n~t bet~g that of Vtfi~n, we mufi, in many Things, content our felv,; With ~Btth and Probabd1~Y: And m the prefent ~efiion, about the Im· ~ertahty of the Soul, 1f <?Ur ~acuities cannot arrive at demon!lrative . tamt)', w~ need not thmk It firange. All the great Ends ofMora-hty and Rel~g10n, are ~ell enough fecured, without philofo hical ProofS of the s;>ul s Immatenahty; 11nce tt is_ evident, that he wh~ made us at lirfi _ix:gm to fulilifi here, Jenlible mtelltgent Beings, and for fevcral years ~n~b~ed ':IS tn fuch a !late, can and will refiore us to the like !late of Re~r:b~~~1anhthdr J"0~· an~ make us capable there to receive the L r. B e as e •go to en, accordmg to their doings in this 1 e. ut to retum to the Argument in hand our Know led e I fa is nodt onhly hhmJted to the Paucity .and Imperfellions of the u!; we Ji;ve· ahn wr. tc· we hem ploy it about ' bu t even comes aJo rt of that too : But' ow ar tt reac es, let us now enquire. J;;-The allirmatJons <?r negatio~ we make concerning the !dtas we have, Y. as I have before mtlmated tn general, be reduced to thefe four forts, viz. Chap. III. Extent of Humane Knowledge. . : ' vi<. Identity, Co-exifience, Relatio~, and real Exifrence. I !hall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each ofthefe: ... . .. . §. 8. Firff, As to 'Jdtwtity and Diverfty ,in this way, of the Agreement, or Difagreement of our ideas, our.intuitive Knowledge is .m fa' e;. ttnded as oa~ Ideas themfelves: and there can be no Idea in ~he ~nd, which it doe~ not prefcntly, by an intuitive Knowledge, perceive to be \vhat it is, and to be dilferen.t from any other.. , . . §. 9. Secondly, As to the fecond fort, which is the Agreement, or Di} agreement of our idea~ i11 Co-exif/ence; in this our Knowl:"ge isvery./hort;. though in this confi,!ls the greatcfi and mo!l matenal Part of our Knowledge concerning Subftances. For. our Idear of the Species of Subfianccs, being, as I have !hewed, nothmg but ~ertam C~llethons of lim pie ideas united in one Subject, and fo co-ext!hng together : v. g. Our Idea of Flame, is a Body hot, luminous, and m9ving upward; of Gold, a Body heavy to a certain degree, yellow, malleable, and fufible: for thefe, or fome fuch complex ltleas iJ.s thefe in Mens Minds, do thefe two names of different Subfiances, Flame and Gold, ftand for. When we would !mow any thi~g farther concerning thefe, or. any other for,tof Subfiances, wha~ do we enquire but what other QJ!ahlles , or Powers, thtfe Subfiances luve, or h1ve not; which is nothing clfe. but to ,know,, whether (\mpl~ /dear do, or do not co-exifi with thofe that make up that complex Itlea. ' . ~- 1 ~. This, how w~ighty and conf1derable:a part foever of Humane Science is yet very narrow, and fcarce any at alL The reafon whereof is- tlut' the lirnple !dear whereof our complex !dear of Subfiances are ~de up, arc, for the moil: part, fuch as car_ry with them,. in their own Nature, no vifble neteffary_ con.exlo~, or trn:onfifiency WJth any pther umple it/ear whofe co-exifience with them, we would inform our felves ilbout. ' . . . . . • . .. §. • t. The !dear that qur complex. ones ~f Subfiaoces, a~e made up of, and abotitwhichour Knowledge, concermng Sub!lances, IS mon employ'd, are thofe oftheirfeconrfary{t!Jalitieri whi~h d7pendinga_ll (as has .been !hewed) upon the primary Qgaliues. of thetr mtnute and mfenlible ~rts; or if not upon them, upon fomethmg yet more remote from our Comprehenlion, 'tis impojibie wt fhould k•ow,whllh have aneceifary ·~mon. <JT iwconftftenty one with another: ~or not knowmg the l!.oot they fpnng from, not knowing what lize, figure, and texture of Parts. they are, on. which de pend, and froni which . refult thofe Qgahucs whtch make our t:omplex ide; of Gold, 'tis inip~ffible we fhould know what other Q!!aJitics refult from the fame ConfittutJOn of the mfenfible parts of Gold; and fo confequently mufi always co-exifl: with that complex Ideo we have :Of it, or elfe ate inr.onlifient with it.· . . . . §. I>. Befides this Jgnon!nce of the primary Qgaht1es of the mfepfible Parts of Bodies, on which depend all thetr fecundary ~ahues, there 1s 'Yet another and more incurable part of Igoora~ce , wluch fets us more 'teiJlote from a certain !\now ledge ?f the Co-ex1fie_nce, or Inco-ex1fience (ifi may fo fay) of different ideas m the fa[\le SubJeCl:.; and that 1s, that ,t/Jere is no difcoverahle connexion between anJ Jecundary f2$ality, and thofe Jlrimary 9.J!alities tbat it depends on. , § .. 13. That the fize, figure, and motion of ~JOe Body, fl10uld caufe a change in the lize, figure, and motion of another Body , JS not beypnd bur Conception ; the feparation of the parts of one Body, upon the mtru-. Iiion of another · ~nd the change from Refi to Mouon upon 1mpulfe; thefe and tl1e Jil:e fecm ro lis t'o hiive.fon\e connexion one Wtth another, ' ' And |
