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Show 2.68 Vtgrm of K.norPltdge. Book IV. there may be a Q.ucilion made~ bea~fe Men may have fuch Idw in their Minds, when no fuch Thing nifis, no fuch Objed affel.ls their Senfes. But yer here, I think, we are provided With an Evidence, that puts us pati doubtmg: For I ask any one, Whether he be not invincibl conll:ious to himfelf of a different Perception, when he looks on the Su~ by d•y, and thinks on it by night; when he a&tally tafies Wormwood or fmells a ~fe, or only t~ on that Savour, or Odour? We as plain: ly find the diffc-mJce there ts between any Uta revived m our Minds by our own Memory, and aCtually coming into our Minds by our Senfes as we do between any two difunc.t !dtai. If any one fay, a Dream rna' do the fame thm_g, and all thefe !dtai may be produced in us, withoJc any external C?bjeds, he may p!e:J,fe to dream, that I make him this 30• fwer, 1. That tts no great matter, whether I remove his Scruple or n . Where all is but dream, Reafoning and Arguments are of no uf; Tru~h <1nd Knowled&e nothing. ~. !hat I believ~ he will allow a very mani· [eft difference ~ean dreammg of bemg m a Ftre, and being actually mit. But yet if be be refolved to appear fo fceptical, as to maintain that what I call being •dually in the Fire, is nothing but a dream ; and that we cannot thereby certamly know, that anr fuch thing as Fire aCluall exifis Without us; I anfw~r, That we cer~amly lipding, that Pleafure !r Pam follows upon the applicatton of cenam. OJ:>iects to us, whofe Exi· ll~nce we perceive, or dream that we per~eiVe, by our ~nfes ; this Certamty u as great as our Happmefs, or M1fery; heyoJld which we have no concernment to know, or to be. _So that, I think, we may ~dd to the two former fons of Knowledge, _this alfo, of the exifience of particular external ObJed:s, by that pcrcept1on and confcioofnefS we have of the aCtual entra~ce of !dtai from them, and allow thefe thrie drgrui of Knowltdge,_ \"IZ.lntuJtwt, Dtmonf/ratrw, and Stnjitivt: in each of which there are d1fferent degrees and ways of Ev1dence and Certainty ' §.15. But fince our Knowledge is founded on and empl~ 'd abo t only our ldeai, Will it not follow from thence, ttu:t it is confo;mable ~0 our ldeai ; and that where 0"! Utai are clear and clifiinCl, or obfcure and confufed,our Knowledge Will be fotoo t To which I anfwer No. F our Knowledge conlifiin1;in the perception ofrheAgreement,o; Difa. r~: :nent of any two Uear, its. clearnefs or obfcurity, conlifrs in the cJea~nefs or obll:unty of that Perception, and not in the clearnefs or obfcurlty of the Idear themfelves: v. g. a Man that has as clear Idea I of rhe Angl of a Trl3ngle, and of Equality to two right ones, as any Mathematician i~ the World, may yet have but a very obfcure Perception of their Agreement, and fo have but a very obfcure Knowledg ol it. But obfcure and confufed Ideai, can never produce any clear or difiinCl Knowledge. becaufe as far. as any Utar are confufed, or obfcure, fo far rhe Mmd can never perce1ve clearly, whether they agree, or difa[!;ree. · CHAP. Chap. III. Extent of Humane KnoJliledge. C HAP. III. OJ tiJe Extent of Humane !(now/edge. §. 1. KNowledge, as has. been faid, lying in the Perception of the Agreement, or D1fagreement, of any of our !deai it follows from hence, That, • ' Firj/, We can have Knowltdge no farther than 1vt bave I dear. §. 2. Secondly, T hat JVe can have no Kno1vledge fartht~, than JDI! can have Perception of that Agreement, ilr fJif.tgrcement: Which Perception being, 1. Either by lnruition,or the immediate comparing any rwo !delu; or, 2. By Reafon, exammmg the Agreement, or Difagreemcnt of two Idear, by the mtervennon ot fome others: Or, 3· By Senfation, perceiving the Exifience of particular Things. Hence it allo follows, 9. l· Thirdly, That we cannot bave an intuitive {(no1vledge, tl;at [ball txtend it felf to all our Idear,and all that 'we would know ahout tbem;becaufe we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one t<l another, by juxta-poiirion, or an immediate comparifon one with another. Thus having the Ideai of an Obtufe , and an acute angled Triangle, both drawn from equal Bafes, and between Parallels, I can by intuitive Knowledge, perceive the one not to be the other; bur cannot that way know, whether they be equal, or no ; becaufe their Agreement, or Djj:. agreement in equality, can never be perceived by an immediate compa· ring them : The di!Terence of Figure makes their parts uncapable of an exact i~nmediate application; and therefore there is need offome intervening ~anriries to meafure them by, which is Demonfiration, or rational Knowledge. ' §. 4 Fourthly, It follows alfo, from what is above obferved, that our rati01tal Knowledge, cannot rtacb to the tvhole extent of our Ideas. Be-caufe between two different !dear we would examine, we cannot always ftnd fuch Mediu,.s, as we can connect one to another with an intuitive !\now ledge, in all the parts of the Deduction; and where-ever that fails, \1 e come 010rt of I<nowledge and Demonfiration. ~- 5· Fift bly,Senjitive Kn01vledge rracbingno fartl;er tban tbe Exi/}enc. of Thing I aflually preftnt to our Senfti, is yet much narrower than either of the former. ~- 6. From all which it is evident, that tbe extent of oor Knowledge comer not only jhort of the reality of //;ings, hilt t 'Uen of tbe exttnt of . our o1vn ldeai. Though our Knowledge be limited to our !dear, and cannot exceed them either in extent, or perfection ; and though thefe be very narrow bounds, in refpcCl of the extent of All-being, and far lhort of what we may jufily imagine to be in (orne, even created Underfiandings, nor tied down to rhe dull and narrow hi formation, is to be recei· ved from fome few, and not very acute ways of Perception , fuch as are .. cur Senfes; yet it would be welt with us,if our Knowledge were buras large as our Ideai, and d1ere wue not many Doubts and Enquiries concerning the !dear we have, whereof we are not, nor I believe ever !halt be in this World, refolved. Neverthelefs, I do not yet ~efiion, but (hat Humane Knowledge, under the prefent Circumfianees of our Beings and Confri· tutions, may be carried much farther than it hitherto has been, if Men \1 ould lincerely, and with freedom of Mind, employ all that Indufiry •nd labour of Thought, in improving the means of difcovering Truth, \1 hich they do for the colouring or fupport ol falfbood, to maintain a Syfiem, |
