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Show 'Degrees .of KnoT:Piedge. 1" CHAP. u:· Of the 'Degrees of our Kn~Jlidge. §. r.A,LL our ~~~ow ledge conlifling,asi have faid,in.theview tl . i . has of Its own lde~s, .which is the utmofl Li 1 le Mm~ Certamty,we With our Faculties,a~din our way ofKno\!J ~~ and grcatefl of, It. ~ay not be amlfs, to confider a little the degree ef &e are capable The dmcrent clearne&of our Knowledge feems t s ~- •ts Ev1dence. rent way of Perception, the Mind has of the ~ n:e to •e m th~ di!Tc- 1\'e~t ~f ~ny of its Ideas. For if we will refled: ~ eement, or D1fagree~ Tlunlnng,. we fhall find, that foinetimcs the Mind n ou~ own ways of men.t or Dlfawcement of two !dear immediate! b perceives the Agreethe mtervent•on of ony other: And th·s 1 1 .Y k Y themfclves, Without bf(n oovledge. For in this thcMitld is at'n ' tun f' we ~ay call intuitive 'I ' o pams o provmg . . Ut per~e1vcs . t 1e Truth, as the 'Eye doth Li ht 0 1 °~ cxammmg, toward. 1t. Thus the Mind perceives that Yn'· ~ Y by bemg directed C.rcle IS not a Triangle That T!Jree 'are m "te IS not Black, That a One a~d J'wo. Such kind of Truths the M. ,';[e tha~; Jlvo, and equal to of the Ideas together, by bare intui~ion '\ per~lves at the. fidl: Sighi other Idea; and this kind ofKnowledg' ~It]Joul t e Intervention of any that humane Frailty is capable o£ Th'15 t Je c earefl:, and moll certain bl~, and like the bright Sun-fi1ine; fore~ ifafe~f~f Knowledge is irrefifii: ceJved, as foon as ever the Mind turns its view T'mediately to be per· room f~r Helltatwn, Doubt, or Examination t Jat way i and leaves no filled ;v1tl.1 the clear Light of it. 'Tis on th. j bu.t .the Mmd 1s prefently the Certamty and Evideneeofall our K '{ dntUJtiO~, that depends all one fi.nds to be fo great that he cannot ~ow e ge, Which Certainty every a greate~: For a Man ~nnot conceive h!m~~}"e,and therefore not require ty, than to know that any Idea in his;::: d .car,ableof a greater Ccnoin· be; and that two Ideas wherein he perc'~ IS de~ as he perceives it to an.d not precifely the f~,;,e. He that de;~vnd a 1 erence, arc different, tins, demands he knows not what· and fh s a) greater Certainty than be a Sceptick, witlJOut being able' t b fc ews on Y. that he has a Mind r6 on this Intuition, that in the next d~ e o. f zertamty depends fo wholly monjlrative, this intuition is necelTar r~ ~ IIOJV/edge, which I call Demediate Ideal, without which we c Y I the Connex10ns of the inter- §. :z.. The next degree of Kno~redot a~tam !\now ledge and Certainty. the Agreement or Difagreement of ge Is, where the Mind perceives Though where-ever the Mind pe c . any I Ideas, but not immediately. of any of its Ideas, there be certa:ne~~es t Je Agreement or Difagrecmcnt happen, that the Mind fees that A ~e~wledge: Yet it docs not always there.•s between them, even where i~is ~~nt or D•fagrccment' which !emams m Ignorance, or at moll ets n I coverable; and tn that cafe, C!ure. The Reafon why the Mind ~nno 0 flrther than a probable conje· Agreement or Difagreement of tw U t a ways perceive prefently the cermng whofe Agreement or Difagr~emeas ']' becaufe rhofe IdeM, conby the Mmd be lo pur togethe ent 1.1e Enqu1ry IS made cannot the ·rM. ind cannot fa bring 1·t' /1 as to filew lt. In this Cafe the~ when pan on, an d as I.t w~rc Juxtas wpe ali s. t ogether , as b Y t I1 C.l r .t mmediate' Com- ]Jerceivetheir Agreement or D~l o ltlon, or application one to another to of other Ideas (one or more 'agre~menr' it is f.1in, by the lnterven;ion or Dif.1grecmenr, which it fe~.~~~~~ ."P~ens) to difcover the Agreement ' an tlus IS that which we call Reafo· 11/llg. Chap. II. 'Degrees of Knowledge: •i•g· . Tl~us the Mind being willing to know the Agreement or Difagreement 10 b1gnefs, between the three Angles of a Tnangle, and two right ones, cannot by an 1mmed1ate v1ew and comparing them, do it : Becau!e the thre.e Angles of a Tnangle cannot t c brought at once, and be com· pared w1th any <;>ther .one, or two Angles; and fo of this t!JC Mind has no Jmmed~ate, no mtumve 1\nowled,;e. In thiS G1fe the Mind is fain to find out fame other Angles, to which the tbree Angles of a Triangle I13ve an £quaht}_ ; and findmg thofe equal to two right ones, comes to know thm Equahty to two nght ones. ~- 3· Thofe intervening Ideas, which ferve to !hew the Agreement of aQy t~o othe~s, are called Proofs; and w" erc the Agreement or Difagree· mentIS by tillS means plamly and clearly r .ceived, it is called Demowjlr~ tion, It bemg ihewn to the Undcrfl:anding, and the Mind made fee that It IS fo. A qmcknels 10 the Mind to find out thefe intermediate fdeai (that !hall difcover the Ar;reement or D>fagreement of any other,) and to apply them nghr, IS, l luppofe, that\\ h>ch is called ~at,acity. §. 4·. J'hJS Kno:vleclt,e by mterven1111, Pro!![s, though It be certain, yet the EVIdence of It IS not altogether fo c!e"r and bright, nor the affent fo ready, lis in intuitive I\nowledg,e. For though in Demonfl:ration, the Mmd does at Ia11: perceive the Agreement or Difagreement of the Ideai It confiders ; yet 'tis not without Pains and Attention: There mufl: bi: more than one tranfient view to find it. A fleddy application and purfuJt, is required to this Difcovery : And there mufl: be a Progrellion by fleps and degrees, before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty and come to perceive the Agreement or Repugnancy between two fdeas'that ilced Proofs, and the Ute of Reafon to {hew it. . §. 5· Anotber d~lference between intuitive a'!d Jemonflrative Knowledge., IS, that though in the lattet all doubt be removed, when by the lnterven-' ti~n of the intermediate Ideas, the Agreell!e.nt or Difagreement is perceived; yet before the Demonfl:ratiOn there was a doubt, which in intuitl~ e Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind that has its Faculty ofPerc~ption left to a degree capable of difl:inet Ideas, no more than it can be a doubt to the Eye, (that can difl:inetly fee White and Black,) Whether this Ink, and this Paper be all of a Colour, If there be Sight in the Eyes, it wdl at firfl: _glimpfe, without Hefitation, perceive the Words printed on thiS ljaper,ddferent from the Colour of the Paper: And foiftheMindbave the Faculty of diflinct Perception, it will perceive the Agreement or Difa· greement of thofc ideas that produce intuitive Knowledge. If the Eyes have loll the Faculty of feeing, or the Mind of perceiving, we in vain en· qmre after the quicknefs of Sight in one, or clearnefs of Perception in the other. ~.li. ''tis true the Perception, producCd by demonfl:ration, isalfo.very clear; but yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lufl:re and full affurance that always accompany that which l call intuitive; like a Face refleCted by feveral Mirrors on.e to anoth~r, wliere as long as it re· tams the fimdJtude and agreement With the Obje/1, ot produces a Know· ledge ; but 'tis fl;ill every refleCtion, with a leffening of that perfect Clearnefs and Difiin:Olnels, which is in the fi•fl:; rill in many, removes it l10s.a great mixture of Dimncfs, and is not at firfl: Sight fo knowable, efpecially to weak Eyes. Thus it is with Knowledge, made -out by a long train of ~~ I . . §. 7· Now, in every j/rp Rea fun mal:es in demon.(lrative Knowledge, t!Jer< "an intuitive !(n01vledg~ of tha.t A~reement or Difagreementltfeeks W1t)1 the next JntermcdJate ilea, wluclJit u!es as a Proof: For 1f It' were not Mrii · fa, |