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Show Knowledge. Book IV. or furer than he did before, or without any fuch genetal Ru(e: This then is the fir!\: agreement, or difagreement, which the Minc:V perceives in its Ideas; which it always perceives at fir!\: light: And if there ever l1appen any doubt about it, 'twill always be found to be about the Nnmcs and not the Ideas themfelves, whofe Identity and Diverfity will alway; be perceived, as foon and as clearly, as the Ideas themfelves are, nor cart it poilibly be otherwife. · §. >· Secondly, The next fott of Agreement, or1Jifagreement, fhc Mind perceives in any of its Ide~s, may, I think, be called Relative, and is nothing but t!Je Perception"of t~• Relation }etiVetn any tiVo Ideas, of what kind foever, whether Subfl:ances , Modes, or any other. For Iince all difl:inet JdetJJ .lnuft eternally beimowo not to be the fame and fo be univerfally and confl:antly denied one of another, there could be no room for any pofitive .Rnowl!'dge at all, if we could not perceive any Relation between our fleas; -aod fin.d out the Agreement or Difagreelbeht, they i1ave one wi).h anpcher, in feveral ways the Mind tal<es ()! comparing them. ' §. 6. Thirdly, The third fort of Agreement, or Difagreement, to be found in our Ideal, which th.e'i'erception of -the Mind is employ"d ll· ix>ut, is Co-exi./lence, or nonl.Co-uiflence in the fame Subje8 ; and this -belongs particularly to Subfl:ances. Thus when we pronouDce concer• ·ningGold that it is fixed, our Knowledge of this Truth ·amounts to no .more but this, that Fixednefs, or a power to rem.ain in the Fire unconfu• med,is an Idea, that alwa~s accompanies, aod isjoin'd with that particu· ·Jar fort of Yellownefs, Weight, Fuftbihty, Mal)eab)enefs, and Solubility in .Aq. Regia, which make our complex Idea, lignified by the word Gold. ~-7· FourtM-/, The fourth and !aft fort is, that of aflual real E"i• Pense agreeing to any Idea. Within thefe four forts of Agreement or Difagree.TD~nt, is, I fup~ofe contained all the l{nowlcdge we have, or are capable of: for ull the Enquiries that we can make, concerning any of our Ideas, all that w; know, or can affirm concerning any of them , IS , That It IS , or IS nor, the fame with fomc other· that it does, or does not always co-exifl: with fome other Idea in th~ fame SubjeCt; that it has this or that Relation to fome other Idea · or that it has a real Exifience without the Mind. Thus Blue is not Jeilow is of Identit:r. T'wo J_riang,les upon equal Bajis, het1veen tiVo Parallel;, are equal, .u of Relation. Iron is fufceptible of magnuicallmprej!iDHs, is of Co-ex1ilence. G 0 D IJ, IS of real Exifience. Though Identity and Coexlilence arc truly nothing but Relations, yet they are fo peculiar ways of Agreement, or Qlfagreement of our Ideai, that t)1ey deferve well to be conftdered as d1fl:mCt Heads, and not under Relation in p,encral1 Iince ther are fo d1fferent grounds of Affirmation and Negation, as will eahly appear_to any one, who will but refleCt on what is faid in feveral places of this EtTay. I fl10uld now proceed to examine the feve· ral degrees of our Roowledge, but that it is necelfary fir!\:, to confider the d1fferent acceptations of the word Kn~wledge. §. 8. Th~re are feveral ways wherein the Mind is potTetTed of Truth, each of wh1ch IS called Knowledge. 1. There IS afl•al KnoiVIedg,e, whichis the prefent view the Mind has of the Agreement, or D1fagreementof any of its Ideas, or of rhe Relation they have one to another. ?. .A Man is faid to know any Propolition,which having !Jeen once laid before lm Thoughts,he ev1dem!y perceived the Agreement, or Dif3gree· ment of the Id<as w11ereof It conli!1s; and fo Iodg'd it in hisMemory,rhat when· Chap. XL Knowledge. ----------~----------~ whenever that Propolition comes a~ain to be reflected on, l_1e, without doubt or helitation, embra~ the ngh.t fide ; atTents to, and IS certam of the Truth of it. This, .! think, one may call hahrtual_Knowledge: ,And thus a Man may be fai~ to know all thofe Truths, wh1ch are lodg d m, ~is Memory, by a foregbing clear and fQil perception, whereof the Mmd 15 atTured pall: doubt , as often ~s it has occafion to refleCt ~n . them. For our finite Underfl:andmgs bemg able to thmk, clearly and d1ilmCI:ly, but on OIJe thing at once, 1f Men had no Knowledge of aoy more than what they aCtually thought on, they would all be very. Ignorant : and he that knew moll:, would know but o~e Truth, that bemg all he was able to think on at one 11me · · §. 9. Of habitual Kno\vledge, there are alfo, Vulgarly fpeaking, two dcg;';N, The one is of fuch Tr•ths laid up in the Memory, _as •.ohen-tl e occur to tbe /11ind, it aflua!Jy percttves the Relatron IJ ~e. ~~~~n 'tLo{e Ide.zs. And this is in all thofe Truths, whereof w~ have an intuitive Knowledge, where the Ideas themfelves, by an 1~me. diate view, difcover their Agreement , or 0Ifagreement one With a, no~er. dl The other is of Jucb irutbs, IVhereof the Mind having hen econdC)', -1 •tains the memorv of the Conviflion, IVithout the Proofs. Tcohnuvrsn cae ·M , a' n rt"h at remembers .cJ ertn•m ly, th a t, he once perce1' v ed t he Demonfl:ration, that the three ~ogles of a _Tnangle are equal to two ri<'ht ones, is commonly allow _d to know 1t, becaufe he ~annot d?ubt ot"' the truth of it. But yet havmg forgot the Demdnfl:ratlon, . ftnetly ~ k" h rather believes his Memory, than knows the thmg; or r'.:ilie~n~, is fomething between Opinion and Rnowledge,_ a fort of alfurance that exceeds bare Belief, wb1ch rehes on the Tefl:1mony of another, and yet comes lhort of perfeCt Knowledge. For Knowledge con• fift" · 1 Perception of the Relanon of any two Ideas, e1ther by 1 ~ng 111;. ~ ea_r xta Polition as in intuitive Knowledge; or by the interan u~me [" :J!e~ ld~as whi~h do immediately difcovertheir Relation one ventlonho 0 ·0 Dem~nilration the Mi.nd cannot, in ftrietnefs, be faid toanot er, as I ' h · ha h b. 1 to have fo much as an habitual Knowledge, w ere 1t s not an a 1tua View of the Proofs; where it has not fuch a !'1emory ~f the De~onftration, that it can, when that Propofinon IS agam recal! d to the Mmd, perceive the conncxion of thofc Ideas, by _the mtervenuon offuchother Ideas whofe immediate connex10n, or. relation one to an~ther, lhew the relati~n of the Extremes. And hence 1t Is,that demonfl:ra_uVe Knowled_ge; is much more imperfeCt than Intuitive, as we fhall fee m the followmg Chapter. CHAP. |
