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Show Genr!ral T ctms. Book llJ. And when general Name~ have any conncxion tl'ith particular IJ<:ings, .thefe abllract Jde.r are the 1Wedi•m that 'lltlites them: fo that the Ellcnces of Species, as dillinguifhcd and dcnommated by us, nc~thrr are,nor can be any thing but thofe preclfe abflract Idear we have in our %nds. And therefore the (ut>pofed real EiTences of Subll~nces, 1f ddlcrcm from our abflract I dear, cannot be the Eifcncesof the Spec1es we rank Thmg1 into. For two Species may be one, as rationally, as two different EfTe11• ces, be the Eifence of one Species! And I demand,,what arc the aherutions may, or may not be made in a Horfe, or Lead, Without making. cuher of them to be of another Species! By dctermn11ng the Spcc1e< ot Th,ngs, by our abllract !/ear, this is eatle to refolvc: but 1f any one 11 dl r egulate himfelfherein, by fuppofed real Effenccs, he WJJl,.l fuppofc, be at a lofs: and he will never be able to know when any dung precifdy ccafcs to be of the Species of an Horfe, cr Lead. 9- 14. Nor wiflany one wonder, that I f.1y thefe E./!ewcer, or ablbct I dear (which are the meafurcs of Names, and the boundaries nf Species,) are tl;e Worf<manfoip of the Vnduj/andiwg, who confiders, that at leall the complex ones .are often, in feveral Men, different Collections ot fimple Ideas: and therefore that is CuvetoufMfi to one Man, w!uch lS not fo to another. Nay, even (n Subllances, where their abllract !dear fcem to be taken from the thing< themfclves they are not conllantly the fcmr; no hot (n that Species, which is mbll.familiar to us, and with which we have the moll' intimate acquaintance : It having been more than once doubted,whetlier the F(lltus born of a Woman, were a Man,evcn fo fsr, as that it hath been debat~d, whether it were, or were not to he nourifhed and baptized: which could not be,if the abl\ract Id<a, or EII'encc,to which tl1e name Man belonged, were ofNature's mal<ing;and were not tile uncertain and various ColleCl:ion of limple !dear, which the Underflanding puts together, and then abllt'acting it, affixed a name to it. So that in · truth, rvery dij/intl a~f/rad Idea, ira dij/in[f E([ence : and the names that lland for fuch dillinct ldear,arc the names ,of Things eifentially dif. ferent. Thus a Circle is as eiTentially dilforcnt from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: and Rain is as e!Tcntially dilferent from Snow, as Water from Earth; that abllract Mea which is the Effence of one, being impoltbletobe communicated to the other. And thus any twoabfrratt !d<M, that in any part vary one from another, with two dillinct namco;annexed to them, conllitute two dillinst forts, or, if you pleafe, Species, as cf. fentially diffetcnr, as any two the moll remote, or oppofire in the Worltl. ~-IS'· But Iince the Eifences of Thing• arc thought, by fame, (and l)Ot witllout reafon,) to bewhoilyunknown; it may not beami!S to con• fider the [<vera! fignificat ionr of the JVord Effin<·e, · .. Firj/, Eifence may be taken for the very being _of any thing, whereby 1t 1s, what 1t 1s. And thus the real mternal, but generally in Subflanccs, 'unknown Conltitution of Thing•, whereon the~r difcoverable QEalirics de~cml, may be cnllcd their Effence. This is the proper original lignification of the Word, as is evident from the formation of it; EUentiJ, in its pnmary notanon fignifying properly Being. And in this fenfe it is fidl ufed, when we fpeak of the EiTence of particular things, without gJvmg them any Name. Secondly, The Learnihg and o;fi\mtes of theSclwols, having been mud! bulied about Genus and Specie~, t 1e Word Eifcnce bas a! molt loll its pn· macy Signification; and infread of the real Conllitwtion of things, has been almoll wholly applied to the artificial Conllitution of Genus and Speots, Chap. III. General Terms. 'Species. 'Tis true, there is ordinarily fuppofed a real Conflitution of the forts of Things ; and 'tis pal[ doubt, there mu11 be lome real Conflitution, on which any Collection of limple !dear co-exifling, mult depend. But it being evident, that Thing< arc ranked under Names into forts or Species, only as they agree to certain abllract !dear, to which we have annexed thofe Names, the Eifence of each Geniu, or Sort, comes to be nothing but thatabllract Idea, which the General, or Sortal (if! may have leave fo to call it from Sort, as I do General from Genu,,) Namellands for. And this we fhalllind to be that, whicil the Word Elfence imports, in its mofl familiar ufe. Thefe two forts of Effence, I fuppofe, may not unfitly be termed, the one the Real, the other the Nominal Ej{ence. §. t6. Bmreen the Nominal E./!twce, and the Name, there is fo near a Conntxion, that the Name of any fort of Things cannot be attributed to any particular Being, but what has this Eifence, whereby it anfwers that abftract Idea, whereof that Name is the Sign. §. t 7. Concerning the real Eifences of corporeal Subllances, (to mention thofe only,) there arc, if I mifrake not, two Opinions. The one is of thofe, who uling the Word Eifencc, for they know not what, fuppofe a certain number of thofe Effences, according to which, all natura~ things are made, and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake, and fo become of this or that Species. The other, and more rational Opinion, is of thofe, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Conllitution of their in(enfible Parts, from wh1ch flow thofe fenfible ~1lities, which fervc u• to dillinguill! them one from another, according as we have Occafion to rank them mto forts? under common Denomina~;_ions. The former of thefe Op1mons, wluch fuppofes thefe Effences as a certain number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural Things,' that ex1i1, are call, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplexed the K~owledge of natural Things. The frequent _Pro• ductions of Monllers, mall the Species of Ammals,. and of Changehn.gs, and other flrange lifues of humane Birth, ca_rry Wlth the~ Diliiculues, not poffible to con fill with thi5 Efypot!Jefir: Smce lt 1s 1mpoll!ble, that two Things, partaking exactly of the fame real Effence, fhoutd have dilferent Properties, as that two Figurespartakmg m the fame real Effencc of a C!rcle, lhould have different Properties.But were there no otherReafon a.gamllJt,yet thefuppojition of E.lfences,that cannot be known;and·yet the makmg them to be that, which dillinguithes the SpCCJcsofTlungs, tr fo wholly uftlifs, and unfervieeable to any part of our Knowledge, that that alone were fulficient, to make us lay it by; and content our felves Wlth fueh Effences of the Sorts or Species of Things, as come Wttllln the reach of our Kno~ledge: which, when fcrioully confidered, wdl be found, as I have fa~d, to be nothing elfe, but thofe abllract complex !dear, to wluch we have! annexed dillinct general Names. §. t8. E,[[enm thus diflinguifhed into Nominal a11d Rtal, we may obfcrve, that in the Species of jtmple Ideas and Moder, they are alwayr d" fame: But in Subf/ancer, al1vayr quite different. Thus a. Ftgure mcludmg a Space between three Lines, is the real, as well as nom mal Elfence of a Triangle; it being not only the abfl':'Sl: !dta to wh1ch the general Name is annexed,but the very E,[fenti.,,or Bemg, of th~ thmg1t felt,tiJ~t Foundation from which all its Properties flow,and to wh1ch they areallmfeparably annexed . .fiut it is far otherwife concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein thefe two Eifcnces are apparently different. For it is the real Conflitunon of 1ts mfenlibk Parts, on whJch depend all thofe Properties of Colour, Weight, FufibJ!Jty, F1xednefs,h&c, Cc :o w wh |
