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Show t81. True and Falfe Idear. Book II. Things without, canriot be thought falfe, being eic:act Reprefentations of fomething: nor yet if they have any thing in them, differing from the reality o!Thirigs, carl they properly be faid to be falfe Reprcfentations or Jdw of Things, they do not reprefeht. But the rhifiake and falf. hood is . . §. u'. Firft, Wh!'~ th: Mind having any Idea, itjudgti arid contludes tf the fame , that zs tw other Mens Mrnds, figwi{ied bJ tbe fame name, or that it is conformable to the ordinary received lignification or de: finition of that Word, when indeed it is not: Which is the m~fi uftial m1ftake 10 mixed Modes, though other Ideas alfo are liable to it. 9: tL Secondly, When it havin~ a q>mplex Idea made up of fuch a Collection of limple ones, as Nature never puts togeth_er! ~t judges it to agra loa Spec us of Creatures really exiftrng; as when 1t JOIOS the weight of Tm, to the colour, fufibility, and fixednefs of Gold. §. L 3· lbirdly, When in its complex Idea, it has united a certain num' ber of fimple Ideas, that do really exift together in fome forts of Crea· tures, but has alfo left out others, as much infeparable, it judges rhis to he a perjefl compleat Idea, of a fort of thiwgs which reaDy it is not . 'll g having joined the Idw of fubftance, yellow, malleable moft heavy ;nd fulible, it takes that complex Idea to be the compleat /dea of Gold ~hen yet 1fs peculiar fixednefs and folubility in Aqua Regia are as infeparablc from thofe other Ideas, or Q!alities of that Body, as they are one from another. §. L4· Fourthly, Th~Miftake is yet greater,when I judge, that thiJ com· plex !dea, co~tams zn tt the real E.Dence of a.ry Body exiffing; when at leaft It contams but fome few of thofe Properties which flow from its teal Elfence andConftituti?n· I fay, only fome fe~ ofthofe Properties; for tl~ofe Properties conli!hng mofily in the active and pallive Powers, it has, m reference to other Things, all that are vulgarly known of anyone Bod/.; and of wh1ch the co_mplex Id.a of that kind of Things is ufually rna e, a_re but aver:>: few! 10 comparifon of what a Man, that has feveral ways tned and exammed It, knows of that one fort of Things • and all thatch~ moft expert Man knows, are but few, in comparifon of:.Vhat arc really In that Body,_ and depe~d on its internal or eifential Conftitution. J.he eifence of a Tr~angle, hes m a very little compafs, conlill:s in a very ew Ideas ; three Lmes meetmg at three Angles, make up that Eifence: But the Properties that flow from this Etlence , are more than can be eaMly known, or e_numerated. So I imagine it is in Subll:•nces their real E ences he, tn a httle compafs; though the Properties flowing from that tnternal Confritution, are endlefS'. h' §. L5 · To conclude, a Man having no notion of any Thing without 1m, but by the Idea he has of it in his Mind; which Idea, he has a flower to call by what Name he pleafes, he may, indeed, make an Idta neit~er finf':"fiercTbg the reality of Things, nor agreeing to the Ideas com· fa!~~ Jde~g~f e Tl ~ other ~eo~les Words; _but cannot make a wrong , or /d, I ha af' ung, which IS no otherw1fe known to him but by the '" 1e so It. _v.g. Wl_1eni frame an Idea of the Legs, Ar~s, and Body of:fl~ r.;~n, afnd J010. to tlus a Horfe's Head and Neck I do not make a a ,e wea o any thmg . b fe · , . ' . when I call it a Ma ' ecau It re1're,e~ts n?tl~mg wtthout me. But fl'al Be' . 1 n, or Tartar, and 1magme 1t either to reprefent fome fame n~;';e ~~:;~~:hme, f~r cr. be,the fame Idea' that others call by the · 1 . ' ero 10 e ca,es, I may err. And upon this account It ;s• t Jat It Cham~ to be mmed a fa(fe TJ.a; though indeed the fulfhood Ie not m t e Iaea, but m that tacit mental Propofttion, w'here.in a con· formity Chap. XXX. True and Falfe !dear. for~ity and refemblance is attributed to it, which it has not. But yet, if havmg framed fuch an !tlea 10 my Mmd, without thinking, either that Ex1flence, or the name Man, or Tartar, belongs to it, I will call it Man or Tartar, . I may be juflly thought phantall:ical in the Naming; but not erroneous 10 my Judgment; nor the Idea any way falfe. §. 26. Upon the whole matter, I think , That our Ideas, as they are confidered by the Mmd, either 10 reference to the proper lignification of the1rNames; or 10 reference to the reality of Things, may very fitly be called ngM, or wrong; Tdeas,accordmg as they agree, or difagree to thofe Patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true, or falfe, 'tis fit he ufe a liberty, which every one has, to call Things by thofe NanK~ he thmks bcft; though in propriety of Speech, Truth or Faln10od, will, I think, fcarce agree to them, but as they, fome way or other, vmually contam 10 them fome mental Propofition. The Ideas that are in a Man's Mind, limply confidered, cannot be wrong, unlefs complex ones, where10 mconliftent parts are jumbled together. All other Ideas are in themfelves right; and the lmowledgeabout them, right and tru~ !{now ledge: but when we come to refer them to any thing, as to thm Patterns and Archetypes, then they arc capable of being wrong, as far as they dilagree with fuch Archetypes. §. '7· Having tbus given an account of the original, forts, and extent of our Ideas, with feveral other Conlidcrations, about thefe (I know not whether I may fay) Inflmments, or Materials, of our knowledge, the method I at firll: propofed to my fclf, would now require , that 1/hould immediately proceed to fhew, what ufe the Underfianding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them. This was that which in the firfi general view I had of this Subjetl', was all that I thought I fhould have to do: bot upon a nearer approach, I find, that there is fo clofe a conncxion between Ideas and Words; and our abll:raCl: Ideas, and general Words, have foconfiant a relation one to another, that it is impoll:ble to fpeak clearly and difiinCl:ly of our !{now ledge, which all conlifts in Propolitions, without confidering, firfi, the Nature, Ufe, and Signification of Language; which tl1erefore mull: be the bufinefs of the next Book. BOOK |