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Show Moral Relation. Book II. ufe Words, fianding for Relations, is notbin~ but Come lim~le Ideas, or Colled:ions of fimple Ueas, compared one With another. ThiS IS fo mani· fell in that fort called proportional, that ~o.thing;canbem?re. For when a Man fays, Honey is f":eete~ than Wax, 1t 1s plam, that h1s Th.oughts m this Relation, terminate )n thiS lim pie Idea, Sweetnefs, wh,ch IS equally true of all the rell ; though, where they are compounded, or dccom· pounded, the fimple Ideas they are made up .of, are,. perhaps, feldom ta· ken notice o£ v. g. when the Word. Father IS ment~oned : Ftrj/, There iS meant that particular of Species or colleehve ·Idea , f~mfied by the Word Man ; Secondly, Tbofe fenfible limple Ideas, lignified by the Word Generation; And, Jhirdiy , The Effects of it, and all the fimple /dear, lignified by the Word Child. So the Word Friend, being taken for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, bas all tbofe foliowing Ideas to the making of it up. Firft, all the lim. pie Ideas, comprehended in the Word Man, or intelligent Being. Se· rondly, the Idea of Love. 7/Jird!y, The Idea ofReadinefs,or Difpolition. Fourrbly, The Idea of Action, which is any kind of Thought, or Motion. FiftiJiy, The Idea of Good, which fignifies any .thing that m~y advance his Happmefs ; and term mates at !all, 1f exammed, m particular lim· f!le Ideas, of which the Word Good in ~neral, lignifies any one; but if removed from alllimple Ideas quite, it lignifies nothing at all : And thus alfo, all Moral Words terminate at !all, though, perhaps, more remotely ina· Collection of fimplc Ideas' the immediate lignification of Relative Words, being very often other fuppofed known Relations; which,iftra· . ced one to ~nother, !till end in lim pie Ideas. §. 19. Secondly, That in Relations, we have for the mofi part, if not always, as clear a Notion of tbe Relation, as we bave of tboft /imple Ideas, wherein it is founded: Agreement or Difagreemenr, whereon Relation depends, being Things, whereof we have commonly as clear Ideas, as of any. other whatfoever: it being but the dillinguilbing limple Ideas, or ~heir Degrees one from another, without which, we could /tave no di• fiind: Knowledge at all. For if I have a clear Idea of Sweetnefs, Light, or Extenlion, I have too, of equal or more, or Iefs, of each of tbefe : If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman viz. Sunpronia, I know what it is for another Man to be born of the fam~ Woman, SemproBia; and fo h~ve. as clear a Notion of Brothers, as of Births, and, perhaps, clearer. For 1f I beheved, that Sempronia digged lit us out of the Parfley· Bed, (as they ufe to tell Children,) aod thereby became his Mother; and that afterwards in the fa~e manner, flte digged Cajus out of the Parfley· Bed, I had as clear a Notion of the Relation of Brothers between them, as if I had all the Skill of a Midwife; the Notion that the fame Woman con· tri~uted, ~Mother, equally to t\t~ir Births, (though I were i~norant, or mtfiaken m the manner of It,) bemg that on which I grounded the Rela· ~IOn_; and that they agreed m that Circum (lance of Birth, let it be what 1t Will. The comparing them then in their defcent from the fame Perfon, without knowing the particular Circumllances of that defcent is enough to found my Notion of their having, .or not having ti1e Relation of Brothers. But tho~gh ~he /d,ar of particular Relations, are capable ofbemg as clear and di!tmet m the Minds of thofe, who will duly confider them, as thofe of m1xed Modes, and more determinate than thofe of Subilances; yet the Nan:'es belonging to Relation, are often of as doubtful, and ·in· cerram SJgmficatwn, as thofe ofSubflances, or mixed Modes; and much morethan thof~ of lim~Ie Ideas. Becaufe Relative Words, being the Marks of thiS Companf~n. whlch IS made only by Men's Though~, and . is an . Id(l Chap. XXVIII. Clear and Obfcure Ideas. /Jea only in Men's Minds, Men frequently apply them to different Comparifons of Things, according to their own Imaginations, which do not always correfpond with thofe of others uling the fame Names. · ~. ~o. Jbirdly, That in thefe I call Moral Relations, I have a true lliotion of Relation, by comparing the Action with the Rule, whether the Rule be true, or falfc. For if I meafure any thing by a Yard, I know whether the thing I meafure be longer, or lborter, than that fuppofed Yard, though, perhaps, the Yard I mc>afure by, be not exactly thf Standard: Which, indeed, is another Enquiry. For though the Rule be erroneous, and I miilake in it: yet the agreement, or difagreement o.f that u•hich I compare with it, is evidently known by me; wherein conlills my knowledge of Relation. Though meafuring by a wrong Rule, I flmll thereby be brought to judge amifs of its moral Rectitude; becaufC} I have tried it by that which is not the true Rule: but am not miflaken in the relation that Action bears to that Rule I compar~ it to , which is agree· ment, or difagreement. C H A P. XXVIII. Of Clear and Obftu~e, 1Jiftinfl and [onfuftd Ideal •. t. 1. HAving lbewed the Original of our IdeaJ, and conlidered the feveral fortS of them, as Simple and Complex; and fhewed the difference in Complex ones, betwixt thofe of Modes, Relations, and Subllance,, all which, I think, is n~eifary to be done by an:f one,:W\to would acquaint himfelf throughly With the progrefs of the Mmd , m Its Apprehenlion and Knowledge of Things, it will, perhaps, be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the Examination of Ideas. I mull, never· thelelS crave leave to offer (orne few other Conliderations concerning them.' The firfi is, That {orne arc clear, and others o/;fcure 1 fomedij/intl, and others conjuftd. . ~ . 1 .. Perception of the Mind, being moll aptly ~xplamed by Words re· lating to the Sight, we lball bell underfland what IS meant by Clear, and Obfcure in our /d,as, by reflec.ling on what we call Clear and Obfcure in the Objects of Sight. Light being that wluch d1fco~crs to us v1fible Objects, we give the name ofObfcure, to that, .wh1ch 1s not placed m a Light, fufficient to difco1•er minutely to us th~ figure and Colo~rs,whicll are obfervable in it and which in a better Light, would be difccrnable. Thusourjimple Idea>areclear,' when they are fuch as the Ob1'ects them· fel9es, from whence they were taken, d1d. m a well·.orderec Scnfatlon or Perception, prefent them. Whil!hhe Memory retains them thus, and can produce them fo to the Mind when-ever It has occalion to con!ider them, they are clea; Ideas. So f;r as they either want any thing of that llngmalExactnefs, or have loll any of tllCir firll Frelbnefs, and arc, as It were, faded or tarnifl1ed by Tim~, fo far are they obfcure. Complex Ideas, as they are made up of Simple ones: lo they are clear, when the !dear, that go to thcirCompo!ition, are clear; •and the Number and Order of thole Simple Ideas, that are the Ingredients of any Complex one, IS deter• minate and certain. . §. J· The cauje rfObfcurity in fnnple !dear, fcems to be either dull Organs · or very fll"ht and tranlient Impreilions made by the Ob;ects; , o y l. or |