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Show Power. Book II. ACtion to its abfence, is the willing of it : and we can fcarce tell how to imagine any Being fr~er, chan to be able to do what be ~1ll: So that 10 refpeCl: of ACtions, within the reach offuch •.power 10 htm, a Man feems as free, as 'tis polliblc for Freedom to make lm~. . . ~. :z.:z.. But the inquifitive Mind of Man, willmg to finft off from hunfelf, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himfelf into a worfe fi:ate than thatof fatal Necellity, 1s not content Wlth tillS; wifl have this to be no freedom, unlefs it reaches farther : but is reody to fav a Mali is not free at aU, if he be not as free to will,ashe is to aCt, what he wllis. Concerning a Man's Liberty there yet therefore is raifed this farther ~eflion, Wbetber a Man be fru to ~v10; whtch, I clunk, 1s that meant, when it is difputed, Whether the Wtll be free : And as to that, I imagine, §. ~ 3· ~. That Willing, or Chooling being an ACtion, and Freedom conliflingin a power of aCling, or not aCting, a Man in refidl of willing any .AE/ion i~ bis power once propoftd to his Tboughts, cannot h free. The reafon whereof is very manifell: : for it being unavoidable that the ACtion depending on his Will, fhould exifl, or not ~xi~; and its exiflence, or not exiflence, followmg perfeCtly the determmauon, and preference of Ins Will, he cannot avoid willing the exiflence, or not exiflence, of that Action; it is abfolutely necelfary chat he will the one,or the other,i.e.prefer the one to the other: Iince one of them mull necelfarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his Mind; -that is, by his willing it: for if he d.i,d not will it, it would not be. So that in refpeet of the aCt of willing, a Man is not free: Liberty conlifling in a power to aCt, or not to aCt, which, in regard of Volition, a Man has not : it being neceffary, and unavoidable (any ACtion in his power being once thought on) to prefer either it• doin!l, or forbearance, upon which preference, the ACl:ion,or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. So that to make a Man free ·in this fenfe, there mufl be another antecedent Will, to determine the ACts of this Will, and another to determine that, and fo in infinitum: for where-ever one fiops, the ACtions of the lafl Will cannot be free : Nor is any Being, as far as I can com pre· bend Beings above me, capable of fuch a freedom of Will, that it can forbear to Will, i.e. to preferr the being, or not being of any thing in its power, which it has once conlidercd as fuch. ~· ~4- This then is evident, A Man is not at liberty to will, or not to will a'!)' thing in his po1v<r, t!Jat !Je onu conjid"s of: Liberty confifling in a power to aCt, or not to all, and in that only. For a Man chat ftts flill, is faid yet to be at liberty,becaufehecan walk if he wills i;. A Man that walks is at liberty in that refpeCl: : not becaufe he walks, or moves; but becaufe he can fland flill if he wills it. But if a Man fitting flill has not a po,\'er (o remove himfelf, he is not at liberty: nor a Man falling down a precipice, .though in motion, isnotatliberty, becaufe he cannot flop that motion if he would: But a Man that is walking, to whom it is propofed to give off walkmg,ts not at liberty, whether he will will, or no : he mufl necclfarily prefer one, or t'otherof them; walking or not walking : and fo it is in regard of all other ACtions in our power; they being once propofed, the Mmd has not a power to aCl,or not to aCt, wherein conlifls Liberty: It has n?t a powerlto forbear willing)t cannot avoid fame determination conccrp mng the'!', Jet th~ Coniidcration be a~ 1hort, the Thought as quick as it wdl, 1t etcher leaves th<: Man m the fiate he was belore thinking·, cr changes 1t : whereby 1t 1s mamfefltt prefers one to the other and thereby e!ther the co,tinuotion, or cha?ge becomes unavoidably v~luntary. §.>)· Chap. XXI. Power. ~-1.). Since chen it is plain, a Man is not at liberty, wh~ther he will Will, or no ; (for w.hen a thing in his power is propofed to Ins Thoughts, he cannot forbear Volition , he mufl determme one way or other;) the next thing co be demanded is, Whether a Man he atlihert.Y_ to will •v!Jic!J of t!Je two !Je pleafes, Motion or Rejl. Tlus Q)leflmn Carnes the abfurdtty of it fo manifeflly in it fclf, that one mtght thereby futlictently be con• vinced, that Liberty concerns not the Wil~ in any cafe; For to ask, whether a man be at liberty to will either Mouon,or Refl; Spealnng,or Stlence; which he pleafes, is to ask, whether :t Man ca.n wtll,what he. w!lls ; or be plea fed with what he is plea fed with. A Q)leflton wbtch,I clunk, needs no anfwer: and thev, who can make a Q)leflion of it, mufl fuppofe one \Viii to determine the-Acts of another, and another t? determmatc that; and fo on in infinitum, an abfurdity before taken nouce o£ §. ~6. To avoid thefe,and the like abfurdmes, nothm!i can be of greater ufe, than to eflablilh in our Minds clear and fleady _Not10ns of the tlun~s under Confideration:if the I de as of L1bercy,and Vohtton,were well fixed 10 our Underfiandings, and carried along; with us in our Minds, as they ought, through all the Q)leflions are ra~fed about them, I fuppofe, a great part of the Dttliculties, that perplex Mens Thoughts, and entangle thetr Uoderflandings, would be much ealier refolved ; and we fhould perc~tve where che conlufed lignification of terms, or where the nature ofthe thmg caufed the obfcurity. , . §.~7. Firfl then, it is carefully to be remembr.ed, That Freedom conJifls in t!Je dependence of the Exijlence, or not Exif/ence of anJ Affton, upon our Jl'o/ition of it, aJJd not tJZ tbe depeNdence of ~'!J 4lfton,, or Jts contra-.. ry, on our preference. A Man !landing on a chff, 1S at hberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea; not becaufe he has a power to do the contrary ACtion, which is to leap twenty Yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, becau!"e he has a jXlWer to leap, or not to leap. But if a greater force_ than h!S,etther hold Ium fall? orcumble him down , he is no longer free 10 that cafe : becaufe the domg, or forbearance, of that particular ACtion, is no !on germ hts power. He that 1s a clofe Prifoncr,in a Room twenty foot fquare, bemg at the North-tide of his Chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, becaufehe can walk, or not walk it: but is not,at the fame nme,at hberty,to do the con-trary; i.e. co walk twenty foot Northward. . In this then confifls Freedom ( vr.:.) 10 our bemg able to aCt, or not to act according as we !hall choofe,or will. ~- 1.8. Secondly, In the next place we mufl remember, that Volition or Willing, regarding only.what 1s m our power, ".nothmg but the prefer• ring the doing ofany thmg, to the not d01ng of 1t; ACl:ton to Refi, f!f contra. Well, but what is this Preferring! It u nothmg but the he~ng pleafed more rvitb tbe one, than the other. Js then a Man mdtfferent _to ~e pleafed, or not pleafed, more with one thing than another? Is 1t 10 hts choice, whether he will, or will not be bet,ter pleafed wa.h one thmg than another! And to this, I think, every ones Expencnce 1s ready to mal<c anfwer, No. From whence it follows, . . . §.19. 7/Jirdly, That the IVill,orPre!ercnce, ~~ determmed by fometlung \1 ithout it felf: Let us fcc then what 1t 1s deter~mned by. If wtllmg ,be but the being better plea fed, as has been f\Jewn,tt 1s ealie to kno\~ what us determines the Will, what 'us pleafes befl: every one knows tlS Happmefs, or chat which makes any part of Happmefs, or conmbutcs to 1t; and that is it we call Goot!. Happinefs and Mifery are ,the names of two extremes, the utmof\ bounds whereof we know not: t1s what Eye batb not feen, R 1. Ear |