| OCR Text |
Show YolJJer. Book II. So that the ltlea of Li~erty, is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any Action, according to the,determination or thought of the Mmd, whereby e1ther of them IS prefcrr d to the other ; where either of them is ,not in the Power of t!1e Agent to be produced by )lim according to his pr~fercnce, there is not J;.i/;ertJ_, That Agent is under 'Ntce.flity. So that L1berty cannot be, where there 1s no Thought, no Volition no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Votiuon, where there is no Liberty. A little Conflderation of an obvious inftance or two may make this clear. ' §. 9· A Tennis-ball, whether in Motion by the ftrokc of a Racket or lying Hill at reft, is not by any one. taken to be a free Ag<ot. It we' en-. qutre mto the Reafon, we !hall find 1t ts, becaufe we conceive not a Tennis- ball to think, and confequently not tohaveany Volition, or preference of Monon to reft, or 71/Ce '!JerfJ; and therefore. hos not Lihrty is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Reft, come under our' Id<a of Neceffary, and are fo call' d. Likewife a Man falling into the Water ra Bridge breaking under him,) has not herein liberty, is not a free Age~t. For though he has V clition, though he preferrs his not falling to falling • yet the lorbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the ftop ot Celfat10n of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he i~ not fre~. So a Ma~ ft!iking hi':'felf, or his Friend, by a Convulfiv~ morton of hts Arm, whtch ~~not m h1s Power upon his Pr<'ference ot Vohuon to fo~bear ; no Body thmks he has in this Liborty; every one ptttes htm, as actmg byNeceffity and Conftraint. §. xo. Again,fuppofe a Man be carried, whilft !aft afleep into a Room where .is a Perfon he longs to fee and fpeak wit~l; and ~there locl<eJ fan m, beyond hts Power to get out: he awakes! imd is glad to find lumfelfm fo defirable Gompany, wluchbe ftays w1lhngly in, i.e. preferrs hiS ftay to gmngaway; I ask, Is not tlus fray voluntary? I think no Body will doubt it; and yet being locked fafl: in, 'tis evident he is dot· at liberty not to £lay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an Idea ~elont)ng to VolitiOit, or preferring; but to the Perfon having the Power of doin~, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind 0101! chufe. Our Idea ofL1berty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For whereever refiramt comes to check that Power, or compultion,takes away that Ind1fferency to aCt, or notto aCt ; there liberty, and our Notion of it prefently ceafes. · ' · ~- r r. We have in~ances enough, and often more than enough in our own Bodtes. A Mans Heart beats, and the Blood Circulates, whid1 'tis not m h1s Power by _any Thought or Volition to fl:op; and therefore ia refpetl: of thefe Mot1ons, where reft depends not on his choice nor would follow the determination of !1is Mind, if it lhould prefer it,• he is not a fr~e A~ent. Convullive Mot1ons ag1tate lm Legs; fo that though he W1lls 1t nevet fo much, he cannot by any power of his Mind £lop their Monon,(~ 111 that odd Dlfeafe_qtllcd Cborea SanEli VIIi,) but he is perpetually dancmg: He IS not at L1bcrry 111 th1s ACl:iop, but under as muc!l Neceflity of movmg, as a Stone that falls, or a Teanis-baU !\ruck with a ~ackct. On the other fide, a Pal fie or Stocks hinder his Legs from obeytng thedeternunatton ofhts Mmd, 1f tt would thereby trans!err his Body to anot!JCr Place. In all _thefe the!e is \\'ant of Freedom, though the littmg ilill even of a Paralmck, wh1lfl: he preferrs it to removal, •• truly voluntary: Voluntary then II not oppojed to Neceffary; but to fnvoluntJry. For. a_Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he 1s m, to 1ts.abfence or change, though Neceffity has ma<!e it in it fdf unalterable. §: "· Chap: XXI Power. §. n. As it is in the Motions of the Body, fo it is in the Thought; of our Mmds; w!t7re any one 1s fuch, that we have power to take it u , or lay ltby,accordmgto the preference of the Mind, there weare at Ii'f.rty. A wal"ng. Mat! beu~g under. the neceffity of having fame Ideas con! lantly tn Ius Mmd, IS not at hberty to think, or not to think . no more than he i~at liberty, whether his Body fl1all touch any other ~r no· But ',Vhethcr he will remove his Contemplation from one Idea t~ nnoth~r, is mony ttmes tn Ius chotec; and then he ts in refpect of his Ideas as much at liberty, as he is in refpeCl: of Bodies he refl:s on: He can at p\eafure re'!' ove himfelf from one to another. But yet fame JdePs to the Mind, !1ke fame Motions to the Body, are fuch, as tn certain circumfl:ances it cannot avoid , nor obtain their abfence by the utmofl: effort it can ufe. A Man on the Rack, is not at liberty to lay by the Idea of pain, ~nd entcrtam other Contemplattons; and fometimes a boifl:erous Paffion hurries our Thoughts,. as a Hurrican~ does our Bodies, without Jeaying vs the !tberty of thmkmg on other thmgs, which we would rather chufe: But as foon as the Mind_ regains the power to fl:op or continue, begin or forbear any of thefe Mouons of the Body Without, or Thoughts within ~ccording as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, then we confide; the Man as a free Agent again. §.IJ· Where-ever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear, there Nece.flity takes place. This in an Agent capabl~ of Voli· tion, when the beginning or .continuation of any Action is eon.trary to that preference of hiS Mtnd, ts called Compul/ion ; when the hindring or !lopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is called Reflraint. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing ne· ~elfary Agents. ~- t4. If this be fo, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be conlidered whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, J thini<, unrrafonable, becaufe unintelligible, ~efl:ion, '!Jiz, ffhetber Ma1is Will f,e free,or no. For if I miftake not, it follows from what I have faid, that the ~efl:ion it f;lf is altogether improper: And it is as infigniftcant to ask, whether Mans W1ll be free, as to ask, whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue fquare; Liberty being as little applicable to the Will, as fwifrnefs of Motion is to Sleep, or fquarenefs to Vertue. Every one woulp lau"h at the abfurdity offuch a Qyefl:ion as either of thefe, becaufe it is 0bvio~s, that the modifications of Motion being not to fleep, nor the difference of Figure to Vertue ; and when any one well confiders it, I think he ·wiH as plainly perceive, that Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will, which is alfo but a ,Power. §. r 5'· Polition, 'tis plain, is nothing but the aCtual chooling or preferring forbearance to the doing, or doing to the forbearance, of any particular Action in our power,that we think on. And what is the Wt/1, but the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty anything more in effect, than a Power, the power of preferring any Action to its Forbearance, or '!Jice '!Jerf!J, as far as it appears to depend on us! For can it be denied that whatever Agent has a power to think on its own ACtions, and to preferr their doing or omiffion either to other, has that Fac.ulty call'd Will. PI/ill t11en is nothing but fuch a power; Liberty, on the other fide, is the power a Man has to do or torbear doing any particular Action, ac.cording as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the Mind, which is the fame thing as to fay, according as he himfelf wills it. |
