OCR Text |
Show Modes of Thinkjng. Booi ll with their ufual quicknefs,) in the Mittd, ilot fuggefted by any external ObjeCts, or known occafion ; nor under an~ Choice or Condud of the Under!landing at all ; and whether that which .we call ExtaJie, be not dreaming with the Eyes ?Peri, !leave to be exammed. §.~.Thefe are fome fe'." mftancesof thofevanousM~des of thinking,which the Mind may obferve m It felf, and f~ frame as dtftmct Ideas ot; as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of .this fet of ideas, which are <>ot from Reflection, that would be to make a Volume. It fuffices to my pn!fent purpofe, to have lhewn her~, by fame few Examples, of what fort thofe Ideas are, and how the Mmd comes by them ; efj>ecially Iince 1 lhall have occafion hereafter. to treat more at large of Reafoning, Judging, P'olition, and Knowledge, whtch are ~on:e of the moll: confiderable Operations of the Mmd, and Modes of thmkmg. §. 3· But, perhaps, it may not be an unpardonable Digreffion nor wholly impertinent to our prefent Detign, if we refled here upon th~ dif: ferent State of the Mind in thinking; which thofe infiances of Attention Refvery, and Dreaming, &c. before mentioned natunilly enough fuggefi: That there are Ideas, fome or other, always prefent in the Mind of a waking Man, every ones Experience convinces him ; though the Mind employs it felf about them with feveral degrees of Attention. Sometimes the Mind fixes it felf with fo much earnefinefs on the Contemplation of fome Objeds, that it turns their Idtas on all fides; remarks their Rcla· tions andCircumfiances; and views every part fo nicely,and with fuch intention, that it lhuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary lmpreffions made then on the Senfes, which at another Seafon would produce very fentible Perceptio~s : At other times, it barely obferves the tram ~f Ideas that fucceed m the Underftanding, without di· redmg and purfumg any of them: And at other ttmes, it lets them pafs almofi quite unregarded, as faint lhadows that make no Impreffion. §+Tins dtff'erence of lntentton,and Rcmtffion of the Mind in thinking, with .a great .variety of Degrees, between earnefiStudy, and very near muidmg nothmg at all, Every one, I thmk, ·has experimented in himfel£ Tr~ce it a little farther, and you lind the Mind in Sleep, retired as it were· from the Senfes, and out of the reach of thofe Motions made on the Organs of Senfe, which at other times produce very vivid and fenfible Ideas. I need not, for thi.s,infiance in thofe, W~JO lleep out whole fiormy Ntghts, Wtthout heanng the Tlmnder, or feemg the Lightninrr or feeling ~he lhaking of the Houfe, which ar~ fenlible enough to tho!~· who are walung. But m thiS retJtement of the Mind from the Senfes it often retains a yet moreloofe and incoherent manrrer of thinking, whici1 we call Dre.J· "'••g,and lafiof al~ found. Sleep clofcs the Scene quite,and puts an end to all Appeararu:es. l'hts I thm~ almoft every one has Experience of in him· felf! and hiS own Obfervatton Wtthout dtfficulty leads him thus far. That whtch I would farther conclude from hence is, That fince the Mind can fenfibly put on,at fe~eral times,fevet:al degrees of l'hinkiQg; and be fomcttmes even m a wakmg Man fo remtfs, as to have Thoughts dim and obfcure to that degree, that they are very little removed fi'om none at all; and at !all m the dark ret\rem~nts of found ~leep, lofes the fight perfectly of all Ideas whatfoever: Smce, I fay, thts IS eVIdently fo in Matter of Fact, and conftantExpenence,I ask whether it be not probable, that thi>ik· ,.gzs the Aflzon, and not tbe .~Oence of tbe Soul? Since the Operations of Agents wtll eafily adrrutof wrentton and remiffion; but the Effences of thmgs, are not concetved capable of any fuch variation. But this by the ~~ CHA ~ Chap. XX. Modes of Pleajure and Pain. CHAP. XX. Of Modes of Plea{ure aud Pain. §. 1. A mongft the fimple Ideas, which we receive both from Senfation and RefleClton, Pam and Pleafore are two ~cry confidcrable one•. F'?r as m the Body, there is Senfation barely in its felf, or accompameJ wtth Pam or Plcafure :. fo the Thought, or Perception of the Mind t• fimply fo, ~r clfe accompanted alfs with Pleafure or Pain, Delight or Trouble., calltt how you pleafe. Thefe like other fimple Ideas cannot be defcnbed, nor thctr Names defined ; "the way of knowing them is, as · of the fimple Ide•s of the Senfes,only by Experience: For to define them by the Prefence of Good or Evil, is no otherwife to make them known to us, than by J~oking us reHect on what we feel in our fclves, upon the feveral and vanous Operatton• of Good and Evtl upon our Minds, as they are dif'fi:rently •pplicd to, or confidered by us. , ~. Things then are good or evil, only in reference to Pleafure or Pain . That. we call Good, which is opt to caufe or increafe Pleafure, or diminifl; Pam m us; or clfc to procure, or preferve us the polfetlion of any other Good, or obfence of any Evtl. And on the contrary we name that Evil which is apt to produce or increafe any Pain, or diminilh any Pleafur; in us; or elfe ~o procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleafurc and Pam,. I mu~ be underfiood ~o mean of Body or Mind, as they ~re c~m~only dlfttngudhed; though m truth, the~ ~ only different Confittuttons of the Mmd, fomettmes occafioned by difori:!er in the Body fometimes by Thoughts of the Mind. ' §.1. Pleafure and Pain,and that which caufes them, Good and Evil are the hinges on which our Pa.ffions turn: and if we refleCt on our fel~es how thefeunder various Confiderations operate in us, what Modification~ or Tempers of Mind, what internal Senfations, (if! may fa call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to our felves the Idea> of o~r Paffions. .~· 4· Thus any one relleClinJ? u~on ~he Thought he has of the Delight, wluch eny prefent or abfent thmg ts apt to produce m him, has the Idea we call Lo.ve. For when a Man declares in dutum•, when he is eating .them l or m Sprm~, when there arc none, that he loves Grapes, it is no more,but thatthe tafte ofGrapesdehghts him; let an alteration of Health orConfiitution dellroy the delight of theirTa!le,and he then C'JO be faid to love Grapes no longer. §. )· On the contrary, the ~hougl~tofthe Pain which any thing prefent or abfent ts apt to produce m us, ts what we call F-latrtd. Were it my bufinefs here to enquire any farther, than into the bare Ideas of our Paffions, as they depend on different Modifications of Pleafure and Pain, I fl10uld remark that our Love and Hatred of inanimate !nfenfible Beings,is commonly founded on that Pleafure and Pam we recetve from their u(e and application any way to our Senfes, though with their Defiruction; but Love anJ Hatred to Beings capable of Happinefs or Mifery,is often the Pam or Delight we have in their very Being or Happincfs. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing confiant Delight in lum, he is faid con flam! y to love them. But it fullices to note that our Ide"' of Love and Hatred, ore but the Difpofitions of the .'\'lind, in rofpe: l: ofPlcJfurc and Pain in general howevercaufed in us. Q. §. 6. The rq |