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Show CJ'he Original of our Ideas. think, and thence draw this infallible Confequence, That there is famething in us, that has a Power to think: But whether thnt Subfbnce perpetually thinks or no we can be no farther affiired, than Expcnence mforms us. Fo~ to fay, that actual thinking is effential to the Soul,. and infeparable from it, is, to beg what is in Q,Jdhon, and not to prove It by Reafons; which is neceffary to be done, 1f 1t be not a felf-e,vident Propofition. But whether this, That the Soul always thmks,beafelf-evident Propofition, that every Body affents to at firfl: hearmg, I appeal to Maa- , kin§d. . . 'tl 1 n. I grant that the Soul in a waking Man IS nevenv1 mutt 10ughr, becaufe it is the condition o( being awake : But whether fleepmg wuhout dreaming be not an Afleaion, of the who!~ M~n, Mmd as well as Body,may be worth a waking Mans Confiderauon; 1tbemg hard to conceive, that any thing lhould thmk, and not bt: confc10~s of 1t. If the Soul,doth think in a flee ping Man, Without bcmg confc10us of It, I ask, whether, during fuch thinking, it has any Pkafure or Pam, or be capable of Happinefs or Mifery? I am fure the Man IS not, .no more. than the Bed or Earth he !illS on, For to be happy ormiferable Without bemg confc10us of it feems to me utterly inconfifl:ent and impoClible. Or if it be pollible, that 'the Soul can, whilfl: the Body is flceping, have its Thinking, Enjoyments, and Concerns; its Pleafure or Pain apart, which the Mail is not confcious of, nor partakes in, It is certain, that Socrates a!leep, and SocrAtes awake, is not the fame Perfon1 but his Soul when he fleeps, and Socrates the Man confifl:ing of Body and Soul when he is waking, are two Perfons: Since waking Socrates, has no Knowledge of, or Concernment for that Happinefs, or Mifery of his Soul, which ir enjoys alone by it fclf whilfl: he Oeeps, without perceiving any thing of it, no more th~n he has for the Happine!S, or Miferyof a Man in the l•die~, whom he knows not. For if we take wholly away all Confcioufi1efs of our .Actions and Senfations, efpecially of Pleafure and Pain, and the concernment that accompa- . nies it, it will be hard to know wherein to place perfonal Identity. 9. n. The Soul,during found Sleep, thinks, fay thefe Men. Whilj} it thinks and perceives, it is capable certainly of thofc of Delight or Trouble, as well as any other Perceptions; and it muj/ necef{arily be confciow of its own Per<eptions. Bu~it has all this a·part: The !lceping Man,'tis plain, is confcious of nothing of all tllis. Let us fuppofe then -the Soul of Ca(lor, whilfl: heisfleeping, retired from his Body, which is no impollible Suppofition for the Men I have here to do with, who fo liberally allow Life, wi~hout a thinking Soul to all other Animals. Thefe Men cannot then judge it is impollible, or a contradiction, That the Body fl1ould live ~vithout the Soul; nor that the Soul fubfifl:s and thinks, or has Perception, even Perception of H~ppinefs or Mifery,without the Body. Let us then, as I fay, fuppofe the Soul of Caj/or feparated, during his Sleep ,from his Body, to think apart. Let us fuppofe too, that it choofes for its Scene ofThinking,the Body of another Man, 11.g;. Poltux,whois fleeping without a Soul: For if Cqf/or's Soul, can think whilfl: Caj/or is afleep,what Caf/or ~ never confcious of, 'tis 'no matter what Place it choofes to think in. We haveherethen the Bodies of two Men with only one Soul between them, which-we willfuppofe tofleepand wake by turns; and the Soul fhll thinkivg in the waking Man, whereof the fleeping Man is never confcious, has never the leaf!: Perception. I ask then, Whether Caf/or and Pollux, thus, with only one Soul between them, 'which thinks and perceives in one, what the other is neveJ confcious of, nor is not concerned for, are not tw~ asdifl:inct Perfo{ls, as Caj/orand Hercules; or, as Soqates, and Plato · " were? Chap. II. Men thin{ not al'lJJti_ys. --~------------~-----~--------~ were ? And whether one of them might not be very happy, and rhe other very miferable? Jufl by the fame r7afon, they make the' Soul and the Man two perfons, who make the Soul dunk apart, what the Man is not con-fciOus or. F?r, I fuppofe, no body will make Identity of perfons, to confill: '!' the Souls bemg umted to the v~ry fame _numerical particles of matter: For 1f that be necelfary to Identity, twill be Jmpoj]jblc,in that conftant flux of the particles of our Bodies, that any Man lhould be the fatne perfon two days, or two moments together. ' §. IJ· Thus, methinks, every droufie nod lhakes their Doctrine who teach, That the Soul is always thinking. Thofe, at leaf!:, who do ~tany timefleep w1tho111 dreammg, can never becon~mc'~d, That their Thoughts ~re fomet1mes for four hours bulie Witho~t their knowing of it; and 1f they are taken lD the very ad, waked In the middle of that fleeping contemplatiOn, can gLve no manner of account of 1t. 9-14. 'Twill perhaps be faid, That the Soul thinks, even in the f6undell: Sleep, 6ul the !flemory ret aim it not. That the Soul inla fleeping Man !hould be this moment bulie a tlunkmg, and the next moment in a wakmg Man, not remember, nor be able to recoiled one jot of all thofe Thoughts, Js very hard to be conceived, and would need fame better Proof'than bare Affertion to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado, but being b:ir~ly told fo, imagine, That the greatefl: part ofMen~do,du~mg all their Lives, for fev~ral hours every Day, think of fometlung, wluch 1f they were asked,even 1ri the middle of thefe Thoughts, they could remember notlung at all of? Moil: Men, I think palS a great part ,of their Sleep without dreaming. I once knew a Man, that was bred a Scholar, and J1ad no bad Memory, who told me, he had never dream'd in his Life, till he had that Fever, he was then newly recovered of, .which was about the Five or Six a~d Tweritieth Year ·of his Age. I fuppofe the World affords more fuch Inflanc'es: At leaft every ones Acquaintance, will furnifh him with Examples enough of fuch, as pafs moft of their Nights without dreaming . §. 1 5· To tbink often, and ne7Jer to retain it fo mucJJ as oni momfnt iJ a very ufelefs fort of thinking : and the Soul in fuch a ftate of thinki~g, does very little, 1f at all, excel that of a Lookmg·glafs, which confl:antly recetves vanety of Images, or Ideas, but retams none; they difappcar and vamlh, and there remam no footfl:eps of them; the Looking-glafs is never the better for fuch Ideas, nor the Soul for fuch Th9ughts. Perhaps it will be faid, that in a waking Man, the materials of the Body are employ'd~ and made ufe of, in thinking; and that the memory of Thoughts, 15 retamed by the unpremons that are made on the Brain, and the traces there left after fuch thinking; but that in the tbinking of the Soul, which is not perceived in a}leeping Man, there the Soul thinks apart, and making no ufe of the Organs of the Body, leaves no imprej!ions on it, a•d conjequent[ y no memory offuch ThougHts. Not to melltion again the abfurdity of two diflintl: Perfons, which follows froni this Suppolition, I atJfw er 6rthcr, That whatever Ideas the Mind can receive , and contemplate without the help of the Body, it is reafonable to conclude, it can retain without the help of the !lady too,or elfe the Soul,or any feparate Spirit, will have bm little advantage by thinking. If it has no memory of its 011 n Thoughts; if it cannot record them lor its ufe, and be able torecall them upon any oocalion; if it cannot reflect upon what is pafl, and make ufe of its former Experiences,Reafonings,ar.d Contem plations,to wb:rt purpofedoes it think? They who make the Soul a thinking Thing, at this rate will not make ita much more noble Being, than thofe do, whom they G condemn, |