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Show 10 No innate Principles in thr! Mind. Book I. · · f Numbers alone, and Propofttions made about fevero I of ~rero~a~~~ ~ven natural Philofophy, and all the other Sc1ences afford ~;~m fttions, which are fure to meet with Affent ns foon as they are und li' od lhat t••• Bodies cannot be m the fam< pl"ce! IS a Truth that erB od .an, more !licks at,thanat that Maxim, That It Is 1mpoj!ible for tl;e no 0 l ; be and NOt to be. That Wbite is not Black, That a Square IS fame tc""g, o .,..1.' t I'e/J,···neli is •~t Sweetnefs : Thefe, and a million of a-not a Jrcoe "'" "-~ U' d"((" [tJ,~ ' -ther fuch P~opofttions, as many at leafr, as we have 1 m 'ea s, eve• Man in his Wits, at firft bearing, and knowmg what the Names lland }rr mull: necelf:trily alfent to. II then thefe Men w11l be true . to rhe•r ' Rule and have AJ[ent .t jirfll"armg and mldFI}/andmg tle Terms, o~v~~am;rk ofinnate, they mull: allow, not only as many mnarePropo~ tions as Men have diftin6l: Ide?'s; but as many as Men c:n make ~ro-fitidns, wherein different Ideas are demcd one of anothet. Swcc eve):" Propofition, wherein one different !tlea IS demed of another, w11l as y · 1 fi d • rr.ent at firft hearing and underfrandmg the Terms, as rillS certamyn . .,m l d '· ht eneral one It is impof!i/;/e for the f•me to e, an ~tot to PC, orr a ~hich is th~ foundation of it, and IS the eafier underfrol'd of the two, The fame is not different: By which Account, they \ydl have LegtOns of innatePropofitions of this one fort, Without menu?nmg any other .. But fi Propofition can be innate, unlefs the hlea snbout wh1ch tt 1s, be i~:~~;o This will be, to fuppofe all our Idra's of Colours, Sounds, Ta{\cs, Fi nr~ &c. innate ; than \Vhich there cannot be any thmg more op)'O" fig Reafon and Experience. Umverfal and ready affent, upon heanng alnted tuon d erf ta n dt' ng the Terms, is(! grant) a mark offelf-ev1dfei nce:1 b· ut fcff.evidencc, depending not on innate Impreillons, but on omct ung elfc (as we !halllhew hereafter) belongs to feveral Propoliuons, which no Bod was yet fo extravagant, as to pretend to be mnate. . ~ y N r let it be faid That thofe more parucular felf-ev1dent Propo. :liti~:S9~hi~hare alfented ;oat firll: hearing,as, That ONe ~nd Two are equal toThr;e;ThatGreen iJ not Red,&c.are received ,as theCo~fequcncesofthof~ moreuniverfal Propofttions, wh1ch are lookd on as mnate Pnnc1ples. fince any one, who will but take the Pains to obferve, what palfes m the Underll:anding, will certainly find, That thcfe, and the ltke lefs gcn~ral Propofltions, are certainly known and firmly alfented to, by thofe, "ho ure utterly ignorant of thofe more general Maxims;. and fo, bcmg ear her in the Mind than thofe (as they are called) firll: Pnnc1plcs, cannot owe to them the Alferit wherewith they arc received at firll: hearmg. §. ~o. If it be faid,that thefe Propofitions, _vi:t. T.voand Two Are e~ual to Four· Red it Mot Uue,&c. are not general Max1ms,nor of any great ufe.l anfwer: That makes nothing to the Argument of umverfalaffent, upon hear: ing and underllanding. For if that be the certam mark of mnate, whate ver Propofition can be found, that receives general affent, as foon as heard and underll:ood; that mull: be admitted lor an innate Propofitwn, as weil as this Maxim, T!Jat it it impof!ible for the fame tlnng to be, all~ not to /;e they being upon this Ground equal. And as to the d1ffcr~nce. o being m~re general, that makes this Maxim more remote from bemg 1~1 nate; thofe general and abll:rad: Idea's, being more frrungers to our fir!. Apprehenfions, than thofe of more parucula~ felf-ev1dent Propofiuons ~ and therefore, 'tis longer before they are ndm1tted and alfented to by tl~ growing Undetll:anding. And as to the ufefulncfs of thefe magmfied MJxims, that perhaps will not be found fo grcat as IS generally cancel\ e ' when it comes in its due place to be more fully confidered. . •. ~t.Butwe have notyecdor.ewith~{Je.tiugt• Propofitions at jir}l l!ear::~ Chap. II. No innate Principles in the Mind. and underj/andingtbeir Terms; 'tis fit we firll: talfC riotice, That this,inllead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary : Since it fuppofes, that feveral,who underll:and and know other things, arc ignorant of tllefe Principles, till they are propos'<! to them; and that one may be unacquainted with thefe Truths, till he he1rs them .from others. For if they were innate, What need they be propos'd, in orJer to gaining afTent; when, by being in the Under£\anding, by a natural a1id original lmpreflion (if there were any fuch) they could not but be known before? Or, doth the propoliog them, print them clcarer in the Mind than Nature did ? If fo, then the Confequence will be, That a Man knows them better, after he has been thus taught them, than he did before. Whe1ice it will follow, That thcfe Principles may be made more evident to us by other's teaching, than Nature has made them by lmpreflion : which will ill agree with the Opinion of innate Principles,and give but little Authority to them; but on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other l\nowledge, as they are pretended robe. This cannot be dcny'd, that Men grO'ov firll: acquainted with many of thcfe fclf-evident Truths, upon their being propofed : But it is clear, that whofocver does (o, lind> in himfclf, That he then begins to know a Propofition, \thich he knew not before; and which from tli.enceforth he never qucll:ions: not becaufe it was innate; but, becaufe the confideration of the Nature of the things contained in thofe Words, would not futfer him to think othcrwife, how, or whenfoever he is brought to relied: on them. ~· u. If it be (aid, The Underfranding hath an implicit Knowledge of thefe Principles, but not an explicit, before this firll: hearing,( as they rnull:, who will fay, TJ>attheyarein theUnderfranding before they are known) it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a Principle imprinted oh the underll:anding Implicitly; unlefs it be this, That the Mind is capable of underll:anding and alfenting firmly to fuch Propofitions. And thus all Mathematical Demonftrations, as well as firll: Principles, mull: be received as native Impreflions on the MinJ: which,{ fear they will fcarce allow them to be, wlw find it harder to demonllrate a Propofition, than affent to it, when demonllrated: And few Mathematicians will be fonvard to believe, That all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of thofc innate Charafrers, which Nature had ingraven upon their Minds. §.~].There is I fear this fartherweaknefsin the foregoingArgument,which wpuld pcrfwade us, That therefore thofe Maxims are to be thought innate, which Men admit at jirj//;earing, becaufe they alfent to P~opofitions, which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonll:ration, but a bare Explication or Underll:anping of the Terms. Under which, there feems to me to lie this fallacy ; That Men are fuppofed not to be taught, nor to learn ony thing de niJ'Vo; when in truth, they are taught and do learn fomething they were ignorant of before. for firfr it is evident, they have learned the Terms and their Signification : neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired Knowledge in the cafe: The Id'"'r themfelves, about which the Propofirion is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So, that in all Propolitions that are affented to, at iirll: hcaring the Terms of the Propofition, their franding for fuchidea's, and the Ide.r's themfetves that they frand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch Propofitionsthat is innate. fori would gladly have any one name that Propofttion, whofe Terms or Idea's were either of them innate. We by degrees get Idea'r and Names, and learn their appropriated conneCtion one with another; C >. and t ( |