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Show 4 No innate. Prirkiples in the Mind. Book!. he will find in thefollowiPg 'J;reatife. It being that'J;erm, which,! think, ferves befi to !land for whatfoeve~ is the ObjeCt of the Underfianding when a Man thinks, I have ufcd 1t to. expr~fs whatev~r 1s meant by Pha~tafm, Notion, Species, or whatever !tis? which the Mind c~n be employ d about in thinking; and I could notavOtd frequently u/ing It. , \ , , I prefume it will be cafily granted me,that.there are fuch!d~a s m Men s Minds ; every one is confcious of them m lumfelf,and a Mans Words and ACtions will fatisfie him, that they are 10 others. . ." , Our firfi Enquiry then !hall be how they tome 10to the Mmd. CHAP. II. 'No innate Principles i11 t/,e .:Mind: ~· t.lT is an cfiablilhed Opinion amongfi fome Men, That there arc in ' the Underfianding certain innate Principles; fome pnmary_ No-tions , KOJvc<J tiivo'"' , Ch~raders_, as it were fiamped upon .the Mmd of Man which the Soul receives 10 tts very firfi Bemg; and brmgs 10to the Worid with it. It would be fufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the falfenefs of this Suppcfition, ifl fhould only !hew (as I ho~e I !hall in the following Parts of this Difcourfe) how Men, barely by the U~ of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the i{nowledge they ha\le, \~Ithout the help of any innate Impreffions ; and may arnve a~ Certamty, without any fuch Original Notiopsor Principles. For I 1magme any one will ealily grant, That it would be impertinent t~ fuppofe the Idea's of Colours innate ina Creature, to whom God hath g1ven S1ght, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from external ObjeCts: and no lefs unrea· fonable would it be to attribut~ feveral Truths w the Imprellions of )\'ature and innate CharaCters, when we may obferve m our felves Faculties,. ~t to attain as ealie and certain Knowledge of them, as 1f they were Ongt· nally imprinted on the Mind. . But becaufe a Man is not permitted\vithout Cenfure to follow Ius own Thoughts in the fearch of Truth, when they lead him ever fo little out of the commo8 Road : I !hall fct down the Reafons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excufe for my Mifiake, if I be in one, which I leave to beconfider'd by thofe, who with me difpofe themfelves to embrace Truth, where-ever they lind it. §. ~. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles both Specu/ati7Je and PraEii_cal (for they (peak of both) univerfally agreed upcn by all Mankind: wh1ch therefore they argue, mufi needs be the confiant Imprellions, :vhi~h the Souls of Men receive in their fir!l Beings, and which they bnng l_llW the World With them, as riecelfarily and really as they do any of thetr mherent. Facu.lues. §. 3· This Argument, drawn from Vni7Jerfa/ Conftnt, has tlus Mtsfor· tune in it, That if it were true in matter of Fad, that there were cerum_ Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, II there can be any other way !hewn how Men may come to that Univerf.1l Agreement in the things theydoconfcnt in;which I prefume may be done. ~- 4· But, which is worfe, this Argument of univerfal Confent, winch is made ufe of to prove innate Principles, feems to me a Demonfirntton that . Chap. II. No innate Principles in 'the Mind . that there are nr.ne fuch: becaufc there are none to which all Mankind give an univerfal Alfent. Ilhall begin with the Speculative, and inlbnce in thofc magnified Principles of Demonftration Whatfoever iJ/s; and'Tis ,1mpo.f!i/J/e for the fomethmg to h, and not tole, which of a~thersJthink have the mofi allow'd Title w innate. Thefc have fo fctl a Reputation of Maxims unil>erfally 'received, that ·nvlil, no doubt,.bb ought ftrange if any one lhould fecm io"lu_efiion it. But yet I take libe y to fay, ,That ~hefe Propofitions are fo far from having an univer.fill AITent, that ~here arc a great Part of Mankind; to whom they sre not foirhudi as loTO\<'n. , §. 5. For, firfi 'tis evident that all C!Jildreuand Ideo•s have not the leal]; A pprehcnlion or Thought .of them : and the want of that is enough to <lefiro~ th~t untver(a! Alfem, Which mufi needs be the necelfary concomitant ot all ~nnateTruths: tt feemmg to me near a C?ntradiction, to f.1y, that there arc Truths nnprulted on the Soul, wh1ch It perceives or underfiands not; imprinting, if it fignifie any thing, being nothing clle but the making certain Truths ~o be perceiv~d. For to imprint any thing on the Mmd Without the Mmd s perceiving It, feems to me hardly inte!Ji<>ib! c. If therefore Children and Ideots have Souls, have Minds "ith thgfe Imprellions upon them, they mufi unO:v'oidably perceive the1~ and neceffirily know and alfent to thefe Tr~ths: which Iince they do'not, it is evident that there arc no fuch Impreffions~ For if they . are not Notions !'aturally imprinted, How can they be innate? And if they are Notions 1mpnnted, How can they be unknown? 'To fay a Notion is imprinted on .the Mind, and yet at the fame time to fay that ~he Mind is ignorant of It, and never yet took not1ce of It, IS to make this Impre!lion nothing. No Propofitionlcan be faid to be in the Mind, which it never yet knew; which it was never yet aonlcious o£ Fot if any one may; then, by the fame Reafon, all Propolitio~s that are true, and the Mind is capable ever of alfentmg to; may be (aid to be In the Mmd, and to be imprinted : Since if any one can be faid to be in the Mind, which it never yet kne\v, 1t mufi be only becaufe It IS capable of lmowmg tt; an.d fo the Mind i.; of all Trutl!Sit. cv~r !hall know. Nay, thus Truths may be imprinted on the Mmd, which It never d1d, nor ever /hall know: for a man may Jive long, and d1e at !aft In Ignorance of many Truths, which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with Certainty. So that if theCapacity of knowing be the natural ImpreOion contended for,all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will,by this Account,be, every one of them innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper. way of fpeaking; which whilfiit pretends to alfert the contrai'y, fays notlung different from thofe,whodeny mnate Principles. For noBody, I think, ever denied that the Mind was capable of knowing feveral Truths. The Capacity, they fay, is innate, the Knowledge acquired. But then to what end fuch contefi for certain innate Maxims! If Truths can be imprinted on the Under/landing without being perceived, I can fee no difference there can be,between any Truths the Mind is capable of knowing In rcf}1ed of their Original: They mufi all be innate or all adventitious: In vain fl1all a Man go about to difiinguifl1 them. 'He therefore that talks of innate Notions in the Underfianding, cannot (if he intend thereby any difimctfort ofTruths) mean fuch Truths to be in the Undcrllanding, as it never perceived, and is yet fully ignorant of. For If thefe Words (to 6e in t/;( Vwderftanding) have any Propriety, they fig;mfie to be undcrfiood._ So that, to be in the Underfianding, and, not to be underfiood ; to be m the Mmd, and, never to be perceived, is all one as to fay, any thing is, and is not·, in the Mind or Underfrandiog. lf • |