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Show 692 INTERSTATE ADJUDICATIONS appears to have been made indicative of any occasion at that time for a broader injunction. Of course, in the absence of such a showing, a broader injunction was not justified. Certainly the limited injunction which was granted does not warrant any inference that it marks the limits of what was intended to be decided. Such an inference would be inconsistent with other parts of the decree and with the opinion and the findings therein. Construing the decree in the light of the record and opinion, to which counsel for both States appeal, we think it was intended to and does define and limit the quantity of water which Colorado and her appropriators may divert from the interstate stream and its tribu- taries and thus withhold from Wyoming and her appropriators. But it is said that water claims other than the tunnel appropriation could not be, and were not, affected by the decree, because the claim- ants were not parties to the suit or represented therein. In this the nature of the suit is misconceived. It was one between States, each acting as a quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests and rights of her people in a controversy with the other. Counsel for Colo- rado insisted in their brief in that suit that the controversy was "not between private parties" but "between the two sovereignties of Wyo- ming and Colorado"; and this Court in its opinion assented to that view, but observed that the controversy was one of immediate and deep concern to both States and that the interests of each were indis- solubly linked with those of her appropriators. 259 U.S. 468. Decisions in other cases also warrant the conclusion that the water claimants in Colorado, and those in Wyoming were represented by their respective States and are bound by the decree.1 The contention that the present bill shows that the acts complained of are not acts done by Colorado, or under her authority, but acts done by private corporations and individuals not parties to the present suit, is shown by the bill to be untenable. It is there alleged that Colorado in 1926 permitted a diversion from the Laramie through the Laramie- Poudre tunnel appropriation materially in excess of the 15,500 acre feet specified in the decree; that in 1926, 1927 and 1928, with the knowledge, permission and cooperation of Colorado, diversions were made from the Laramie and its tributaries through the Skyline ditch appropriation in stated amounts materially in excess of the 18,000 acre feet specified in the decree; that in 1926,1927,1928 and 1929, with the knowledge, consent and. cooperation of Colorado, diversions were made from the Laramie and its tributaries through the meadow land appro- priations in various amounts pronouncedly in excess of the 4,250 acre feet specified in the decree; and that Colorado has permitted other diversions from the Laramie and its tributaries in violation of the de- cree through the Bob Creek and other designated ditches, none of which were recognized or named in the findings of the decree. ^ The contention that the bill fails to show with certainty any viola- tion of the decree or any damage to Wyoming or her water users is largely refuted by the allegations just noticed, and is further refuted by an allegation that annually since the entry of the decree the amount 1 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 142- s. c 206 U. S. 46, 49 ; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230, 237 ; Hudson Water Co v McCarter, 209 U. S. 349, 355; Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 550, 591, 595 • North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U. S. 365, 373 ; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts. 12 Pet. 657 748 ; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478, 494, 510, 522. |