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Show COLORADO RIVER LITIGATION 589 ciples; existing law was quite adequate to deal with all questions save those Congress expressly solved by imposing a ceiling on California. Third, Congress throughout the dispute exhibited great reluctance to interfere with the division of water by legislation, because of a deep and fundamental mistrust of federal intervention and a profound re- gard for state sovereignty, shared by many influential members. Fi- nally, when Congress was forced to legislate with respect to this prob- lem or face defeat of the entire Project Act, it chose narrow terms appropriate to the narrow problem before it, and even then acted only indirectly to require California's consent to limiting her consumption. It is inconceivable that such a Congress intended that the sweeping federal power which it declined to exercise-a power even the most avid partisans of national authority might hesitate to grant to a single administrator-be exercised at the unbridled discretion of an admin- istrative officer, especially in the light of complaints registered about "bureaucratic" and "oppressive" interference of the Department which that very officer headed.14 It is utterly incredible that a Congress un- willing because of concern for States' rights even to limit California's maximum consumption to 4,400,000 acre-feet without the consent of her legislature intended to give the Secretary of the Interior authority without California's consent to reduce her share even below that quan- tity in a shortage. III. The Authority of the Secretary under Section 5 of the Project Act The Court holds that § 5 of the Project Act, which empowers the Secretary to contract for water delivery and forbids delivery of stored water without a contract, displaces the law of apportionment among the Lower Basin States, giving the Secretary power to divide the water by contract and to distribute the burden of shortages, without respect- ing appropriations. But it does not follow that because no user is entitled to stored water without a contract the Secretary may award or withhold contracts inde- pendently of priorities. In fact, § 5 reflects no such intention. The Sec- retary's power to contract upon appropriate financial charges for water delivery, not included in the early bills, was added during the 1926 hear- ings in response to a request from Secretary of the Interior Work that users of water, as well as of power, be made to bear the cost of the project.15 At the same time § 4(b) for the first time provided that no work under the Act should begin until these revenues were assured by the Secretary's contracts. There was yet no provision prohibiting deliv- eries without contracts.16 Thus originally purely a financial tool, the contract power was later made to serve the additional purpose of enforcing the Compact's pro- visions against Arizona in the absence of her ratification. At the urging of the upper States § 8 had been amended to subject the United States in operating the dam to the Compact, to condition the enjoyment of the 14 See note 10, supra, and accompanying text. 15 Hearings, supra, note 1, at 6, 46. 18 H.R. 9826, 6&th Cong., 1st Sess.. 8 5. |