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Show YELLOWSTONE RIVER COMPACT 371 desired by the States, be in accord with generally recognized princi- ples of Federal administration. Designation of the Federal representa- tive to the operating commission by the Director of the Geological Survey rather than by the President is objectionable in that the Fed- eral representative to interstate compact commissions should repre- sent the interests of the United States as a whole rather than those of a single department, agency or bureau. These representatives should, therefore, be appointed by the President even though the representa- tive may be drawn from the personnel of a particular agency. The Yellowstone Compact should not be regarded as a precedent with respect to such administrative provisions and the Federal representa- tive to the negotiating commission should recommend that similar provisions not be included in future compacts. "Changes in the substance of compacts, subsequent to ratification by the States concerned, can be made only be resubmitting the altered compact to the States for reratification. The Federal Government is naturally reluctant to insist on resubmission of a compact which has taken a long period of time to negotiate since resubmission may unduly delay the coming into operation of the compact and may upset com- promises previously agreed upon among the States. In the case of the Yellowstone Compact, for example, neither the provisions, im- properly locating authority to appoint the Federal representative to the operating commission, nor the possible ambiguity of certain of its provisions which wais criticized by the Department of Justice, was deemed sufficient cause for withholding the Congressional consent or for disapproval of the enrolled enactment by the President. It is apparent that reluctance to insist on resubmission of a compact sets practical limits on the opportunity of the Federal Government to require that the terms of proposed compacts do not conflict with the interests of the United States. It is, therefore, essential to insure ade- quate consideration of legitimate Federal interests prior to ratifica- tion of the compact by the States. "Several steps can be taken to insure this consideration. First, a general preliminary report may be made to the President by the nego- tiator at a reasonable time prior to the date or dates on which the draft of the compact is to be submitted to the States for ratification. This report should, of course, be concerned only with matters of Fed- eral interest and should not deal with matters purely of interest to the States. It should include a copy of the draft compact, information on the date or dates on which it will be submitted to the States, and a report on the provisions included in the compact for Federal partici- pation in its administration, if the States so provide, and for the protection of the interests of the people of the United States. We believe that such a preliminary reporting procedure would be most helpful in assuring that interstate compacts reflect as clearly as pos- sible a recognition of the respective responsibilities and prerogatives of the United States and the affected States. Second, liaison between the Federal negotiator and the interested Federal agencies during the compact negotiations can be improved and widened. The Depart- ments of Agriculture, the Army, the Interior, Justice and Commerce and the Federal Power Commission and Federal Security Agency frequently have an interest in compacts relating to the apportionment of waters among the States. Therefore, it would seem desirable for |
