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Show LARAMIE RIVER LITIGATION 671 lamation has been effected, but to prevent a proposed diversion for the benefit of lands as yet unreclaimed. With this understanding of the case in hand and of some of the matters in the light of which it should be considered, we take up the several contentions, before noticed, which are pressed on our attention. The contention of Colorado that she as a State rightfully may divert and use, as she may choose, the waters flowing within her boundaries in this interstate stream, regardless of any prejudice that this may work to others having rights in the stream below her boundary, can not be maintained. The river throughout its course in both States is but a single stream wherein each State has an interest which should be respected by the other. A like contention was set up by Colorado in her answer in Kansas v. Colorado and was adjudged untenable. Further consideration satisfies us that the ruling was right. It has support in other cases, of which Rickey Land <& Cattle Co. v. Miller <& Lttx, 218 U.S. 258; Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485; Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, and 200 U.S. 496, and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, are examples. The objection of "Wyoming to the proposed diversion on the ground that it is to another watershed, from which she can receive no benefit, is also untenable. The fact that the diversion is to such a watershed has a bearing in another connection, but does not in itself constitute a ground for condemning it. In neither State does the right of appro- priation depend on the place of use being within the same watershed. Diversions from one watershed to another are commonly made in both States and the practice is recognized by the decisions of their courts. [Citing cases.] And the evidence shows that diversions are made and recognized in both States which in principle are not dis- tinguishable from this, that is, where water is taken in one State from a watershed leading into the other State and conducted into a differ- ent watershed leading away from that State, and from which she never can receive any benefit. The principle of such diversion being recognized in both States, its application to this interstate stream does not in itself afford a ground for complaint, unless the practice in both be rejected in determining what, as between them, is reasonable and admissible as to this stream, which we think should not be done. We are thus brought to the question of the basis on which the rela- tive rights of these States in the waters of this interstate stream should be determined. Should the doctrine of appropriation, which each recognizes and enforces within her borders, be applied? Or is there another basis which is more consonant with right and equity? The lands in both States are naturally arid and the need for irriga- tion is the same in one as in the other. The lands were settled under the same public land laws and their settlement was induced largely by the prevailing right to divert and use water for irrigation, without which the lands were of little value. Many of the lands were acquired under the Desert Land Act which made reclamation by irrigation a condition to the acquisition. The first settlers located along the streams where water could be diverted and applied at small cost. Others with more means followed and reclaimed lands farther away. Then companies with large capital constructed extensive canals and occasional tunnels whereby water was carried to lands remote from |