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Show 590 INTERSTATE ADJUDICATIONS dam's benefits on compliance with the Compact, and to require that contracts from the United States should so provide.17 The upper States then insisted on inserting the requirement in § 5 that no one was to receive stored water without a contract, expressly and solely for the purpose of tying the Compact's enforcement to the contract power.1* There was no intent to confer absolute power to grant or withhold. Indeed, to give effect to priorities in time of shortage, up to the maxi- mum quantities permitted California by § 4(a), tends to promote the stability of water uses, a policy Congress sought to further in § 5 itself by requiring that contracts be for permanent service. In short, disre- gard of appropriations in one State in favor of those in another, except as required by the inter-basin apportionment of the Compact or by the California limitation, was no part of the purpose of this section; it was designed to insure revenue and to enforce the Compact and the California limitation.19 When the provision for water delivery contracts was first inserted in the Swing bill in 1926, it prescribed that "Contracts respecting water for domestic uses may be for permanent service but subject to rights of prior appropriators." 20 Proponents of the bill later altered this provi- sion to apply to irrigation contracts as well as to require, rather than simply to permit, that contracts be for permanent service.-1 At the request of the upper States, the phrase "subject to rights of prior appropriators" was deleted.22 The Court concludes from this bit of his- tory that Congress considered but rejected the suggestion that the law of appropriation govern the distribution of water stored in Lake Mead. But deletion or rejection of a proposed amendment is not strong evi- dence of legislative intention; the reasons for deletion may be any of a great number, not the least frequent of which is that the suggestion is redundant. Here it seems clear that there was a further reason for the change. The phrase was dropped at the same time the provision requir- ing each user to have a contract was added. Under the bill as it stood prior to this no contract was required, and new contracts were made junior to all prior appropriators, even those initiating or perfecting rights only after the statute became effective. As amended the bill required a contract of every user of stored waters, and the deleted clause was no longer in accord with the contractual plan. It is surely stretching things to suggest that deletion of this no longer accurate language signifies that the Secretary may award contracts on his own authority, without regard for priorities that would obtain under state law. In support of its construction of § 5 the Court relies in large part upon an exchange between Senator Johnson and Senator Walsh of Montana. 70 Cong. Rec. 168. The only thing this colloquy seems to make clear is that Senator Johnson had not comprehensively analyzed 17 S. 1868, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 6251, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 9826, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. This amendment, wrote Secretary Work in recommending the bill, "pro- vides for the distribution and use of all water for irrigation, power and otherwise, in accordance with the Colorado River Compact." Hearings, supra, note 1, at 8. 18 See notes 1, 2, supra, ana accompanying text. Contracts were later made subject also to the California limitation in § 4(a). 10 It is significant to contrast the language giving the Secretary authority to enter water delivery contracts with that in § 5(c). relating to the distribution of electrical power. The latter provision explicitly gives the Secretary authority to resolve conflicts in applications, referring him for the governing standards to "the policy expressed in the Fenwal Water Power Act a.s to conflicting applications for permits and licenses." 80 Hearings, supra, note 1, at 12. 21 Td,, at 115. 22 Id., at 97, 115. |
