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Show EDITORIALS Removing barriers to safety Chances are no legislator would ever admit that he's against safer roads, but the bandwagon of highway safety is stuck in a political pothole partly because Congress hasn't appropriated this year's authorized funding for improvements to roads off the federal-aid system. As time to correct that error runs short, two-thirds of all fatal accidents continue to occur on those roads (see p. 20). And, while $200 million a year won't correct decades of dubious safety practices overnight, it would demonstrate a continuing commitment to work toward that end. That would be a small price to pay for the lives it would save-as demonstrated by previous projects. Interstate and primary systems carry the bulk of intercity traffic, and they're the safest roads we've got. That's a start. But if the limited available safety dollars are to be directed where they're needed most, off-system roadwork has to be high on the list. It was with this in mind that private safety groups and the Federal Highway Administration have been pressuring Congress to transfer the Safer Off-System Roads Program (or SOS, as it's appropriately called) from the general fund to the Highway Trust Fund. There it would be less subject to congressional whim. Obviously, more pressure is needed. FHWA'S recent push for safety is commendable, but it, too, has needed prodding. When Congress first earmarked funds specifically for highway safety programs in 1973, a concentrated effort by insurance groups and others was the driving force. The same groups now are pushing for stiffer reconstruction standards than FHWA appears prepared to issue. But overall, improved safety appears to be a common goal that all are working to reach, finally. It's going to take that kind of effort to get the job done. Missing an opportunity A few years back, Congress turned down a request by the Bureau of Reclamation for extra money for tunneling research to be carried out on the Central Utah Project's $28.8-million Stillwater Tunnel, a 42,000-ft challenge in some of Utah's roughest mountain terrain. BuRec's request was reasonable. The agency wanted to evaluate various tunnel excavation and lining techniques, to confront and learn from the problems on Stillwater Tunnel how to tunnel more efficiently on other projects. Ironically, Stillwater has now turned out to be another example highlighting the need for just such test work. Black shale squeezed in around the mole driving the bore and stalled it two weeks ago (ENR 5 / 3 p. 3). Maybe the black shale would have done its worst in any case. Maybe not. But tunneling is about the riskiest kind of construction there is, both financially and physically. And the federal government, which probably pays for more tunnels than any other government or private 86 ENR May 10, 1979 owner in the country, stands to benefit heavily from anything that reduces the risk or improves the methods of tunneling. The BuRec proposal looks like a missed opportunity. But there will be others. When one comes along, Congress would do well to consider carefully not just how much it would cost but also how much it might save on other projects. The bigger risk The strategic petroleum reserve program illustrates the danger of our heavy dependence on imported oil. The cost of the program is not precisely determinable but it is known to be very high (see p. 16). Yet the U. S. is so vulnerable to interruption of the flow of oil from abroad that almost any dollar expenditure would be preferable to a prolonged 1973-type embargo by our major suppliers. Stockpiling strategic materials is an old ploy and a very necessary one when sources dry up or become uncertain. The necessity sometimes even mothers a near-permanent switch to substitutes, as, for example, in the switch from natural rubber to synthetics for tires and many other products as a result of the loss of Indonesian rubber in World War II. Unlike the loss of our natural rubber sources, which was painfully clear and unambiguous in the early 1940s, the loss of nearly half the oil we now use is only a potential event. Its seriousness is not even believed by some Americans, despite the convincing demonstration in 1973 (and continuing today) of how damaging even a short-term oil embargo can be. As a result of the uncertainty of the threat, we are not pursuing the switch to alternatives with full speed. On the contrary, we dawdle, debating relatively small risks and ignoring larger ones. More and more frequently, one hears or reads the mention of military action as a possibility in some circumstances to keep the oil flowing. This suggests that at least some Americans are beginning to slide into a state of mind in which war is a tacitly acknowledged possibility associated with an oil cutoff. The risk of war so greatly exceeds the environmental risks that go with alternatives to oil and that are being used to tie our hands that they can't be weighed on the same scale. The worst results of nuclear power, unrestricted stripmining. dirty atmosphere, dammed-up scenic rivers and the like couldn't touch the horrors of major armed conflict. We haven't nearly reached the point where we have to consider the worst of the environmental effects of alternatives to oil to obtain the benefits. But we have been at the point for several years where we court disaster by knuckling under to obstructionists on energy matters as easily as we do on soft drink sweeteners and food additives. s-sMrjew.jMESsm-'*"''''.!*- •• |
