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Show -1.9- rigidity to political controversies between States.^ By the constitution, Congress is given the power to regulate commerce be- tween the State a and with foreign nations. In the beginning; this meant practi- cally nothing but the regulation of water traffic and transportation; in short, control of the navigable interstate, "boundary and territorial waters. Its virtue for the commerce of the Union at the time it was written into the con- stitution lay in the fact that, being exclusive, it automatically opened all the navigable communicating waters of the States to all the people of the United States unless and until Congress provided otherwise-which it has never done. The original sovereign power of each of the independent and disunited States to regulate such navigation within the scope of its authority is the same identical power that is given exclusively to Congress under the consti- tution; hence it requires no affirmative action by Congress to prevent the State; from exercising a power they no longer possess. Federal inaction of itself leaves the navigable connecting waters unburdened by regulation and, therefore, open to all. It is in this way^ so different from river navigation in Europe, that the navigable interstate and boundary waters of the States are open to all those submerged sovereignties, riparian and non-riparian, upon equal terms, negatively and indirectly by their constitutional grant to the federal govern- ment of all power, to close any such waters rather than by direct and affirma- tive agreement of each State that such waters shall be open to all the other States, The federal control and regulation of -water navigation between the States is further amplified by the very extensive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred upon the federal courts by the constitution. 44- Conceivably the Court may bo influenced by the civil law which prevailed in all the vast areas coded to the United States with the sovereignty of France Spain and Mexico, The civil law yields but little to stare decisis and still less to precedent. See Henry, Jurisprudence Constante and Stare Decisis, (1929) 15 A«B«A. Jour. 11, where Judge Henry ends his comparison of the common law and the civil law with these words: "Thus it ir that the Civil Law is the more simple, certain and adaptable, the Common Lay/ -the more complex, confused and rigid«': The United States Supreme Court has declared it is not limited to any- cue system of law in deciding controversies between States. Kansas v« Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 22 Sup, Ct. 552, 46 L, Ed. 838 (1902); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 27 Sup» Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed» 956 (1907)5 also (but with doubtful wisdom) that uniform municipal laws may supply a rule of decision. Wyoming v« Colorado 259 U.S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 532/ 66 L. Ed. 999 (1922), permission to file petition for rehearing granted, 42 Sup. Ct. 5'3? (l9:-^)> decree modified 26O UoS. 1, l\3 Sup. Ct. 2, 66 L. Ed. 1026 (1922)o hh The extent of federal jurisdiction in admiralty is discussed and declared in American Ins. Co, v. Canter, 1 Pet* (U.S.) Rll, 7 L. Ed. 2l\d (182b)3 Frotz v. Bull, 12 How, (U.S.) 1166, 13 L, Ed* 1068 (1851)5 Gencsee Chief v. Fitzhuigh, 12 How, (U.S.) i.jl:3, 13 L. Ed, IC58 (I851)s Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Pall. (U.S») 5k, 1 L. Ed. 507, Fed. Gas. #L0925 (1795); City of Panama, 101 IJVS. U53, 25 L. Ed. 1.061 (1879); In re Garnott, 1.^1 U.S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct. &4O, 35 L. Ed. 63I (1891)5 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 336, 368, k L. Ed. kOk, ill? |