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Show cannot effectively control. Therefore, Congress may draw upon its power over commerce to effectuate local State policies. Congress may forbid movements in interstate commerce solely to prevent the defeat of local laws- although those laws vary in different parts of the country because based on different views of local policy. In all these cases, and there have been a number of them, Congress has recognized the local emphasis in the interplay of State and national interests involved in commerce among the State-. The regulation of liquor,156 food, 157 drugs,158 game,159 have all invoked the Commerce Clause to sustain local or regional social policies. The predominant State or regional interest may, then be left to State action through Congressional abstention. Also, Congress may exert its own powers to reinforce the segregated interests of a State or a region of States. Surely, then, the predominant interest of a region may constitu- tionally be recognized by Congressional assent to the protection of a re- gional interest through interstate compact. If State action over a phase of interstate commerce is permitted where the specific facts justify "di- versity of treatment according to the special requirements of local condi- tions," then the Constitutional issues turn upon the facts of the specific situation of our immediate problem, the regulation of electric power or, to put it more accurately, they turn upon a judgment on such facts which Congress, as the guardian of the national interest, may reasonably enter- tain. The constitutional issues, therefore, bring us back to the facts presented by the electric power situation, and the facts determine the constitutional issues. If the country "naturally divides itself into sev- eral power areas"l60 and "the problems in each of these power districts are essentially different" and if "a rightful solution" demands that we con- sider -them as "essentially separate problems" affecting distinct regions with distinct necessities and distinct resources, the Constitution opposes no barrier to solution through agreements between the States of a given region supported by Congressional approval. 156 Wilson Act of Aug.'8, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 313), sustained in re Rahrer (1891) l40 U. St 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, construed in Rhodes v. Iowa (1897) 170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup- Ct. 664 and Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Coot Brewing Co. (1912) 223 U. S. 70, 32 Sup* Ct. 189; Webb-Kenyon Act of Mar* 1, 1913' (37 Stat. at L. 699)* sustained in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. (1917) 2U2 U. S. 3H* 37 Sup. Ct. 180. 157Act of May 9, 1902 (32 Stat. at L. 193), sustained in United States v. Gre<en (1905 N. D. N. Y,) 137 Fed. 179* See also Act of June 30,. 1906, sec. 10 (3k Stat. at L. 80U). 158U* S. Rev. Sts. 1878, sec. i|280. I59lacey Act of May 25, 1900 (31 Stat. at L. 188), carried into Fed. Crim. Code, sees. 2^2, 2h3» 2I4J4, sustained in Rupert v. United States (1910 C» Co _A. 8th) 181 Fed. 87. See also Ivilson v. United States (1820, C. C D. Va. ) 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17,8^6, inferentially sustaining Act of Feb. 28, 1803 (2 Stat. at L. 205); Hanover NatU. Bank v. Moyses (1902) 186 u» S» 181, 2:2 Sup. Ct. 857. Compare Bradley, J. , in The Lottawanna (I87I+, U. S.; 21 Wall. 558, 581. 160see supra note 122. |