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Show Another major use of compacts regain." untried in the United States, al- though partial examples are available in the so-called concordats of the Swiss cantons. In its report of 1921 the Committee on Interstate Compacts of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws stressed (in addi- tion to state cooperation in the control of commerce and in penal and police matters, such as the much needed arrangement for the extradition of witness- es) two important phases of the relation of compacts to uniformity in com- mercial law. Neither was then a strictly new suggestion (see American Bar Association, Reports, Vol. xxxiv * 1909* p» 1029; also, J. H. Wigmore in Illinois Law Journal, vol. x, 1916, p« 385 * vol» xxii 'i, 1929* P» 734)• One phase is the proposal that in adopting uniform state laws compacts should be used to restrain states from amending them except in unison. The other phase recognizes the need for international uniformity and the embarrassment of the federal system of the United States in meeting it. On this point the committee declared* "It is therefore absolutely necessary for the future international self-respect of this country that this power (of the states -to make compacts with foreign powers) should be promptly exercised by the lead- ing commercial States of the United States." It was urged that the national authorities should arrange for state representation at future international conferences affecting commercial matters. The difficulties of adjudication as a means of interstate adjustment are conceded. It is true that in dealing with suits between states the court has rid itself of most of the benumbing analogies drawn from inter- national relations and has broadened its conception of the interest of the states in the affairs of their citizens. The judicial basis of adjustment is wider than the delegated legislative power. "Through these successive disputes and decisions," it was said in Kansas v. Colorado (206 U. S. i|6* 9$ (1907))* "this court is practically building up what may not improperly be called interstate common law." Special masters lighten the courtfs task:* The court is not wholly without administrative resources. Repeatedly it has appointed and supervised boundary cornmis si oners, assessing the costs ccn the states involved. In the case of Kentucky v. Indiana (281 U. So 163* 7^0 (1930))* noteworthy because it enjoined specific performance of a contract between states, the highway department of Indiana was ordered to file semi- annually "a report to this court adequately setting forth the progress made." Interstate common law, however, cannot be a substitute for the creative force of legislation. The capacity of the court for continuous administration is narrowly limited. Even a successful decision can do little more than fix a starting point for the real settlement. A cogent illustration was the reso- lution of Congress in 1929 (U5 Stat. lJj\i\) requesting the president to con- fer with the Governors of Texas, Oklahoma and Hew Mexico in order to arrange compacts for the complicated transfer of property made necessary by recent; decisions of the Supreme Court in two interstate boundary suits which had been before the court since 1919 and 1913 respectively* Adjudication has a place-crucial, but hardly prominent- in the future* use of contrnctual relationships in producing varying combinations of govern- mental units. In 1925 representatives of New York, New Jersey and Pennsyl- vania unanimously signed an agreement regarding the use of the Delaware River watershed, but only New York ratified it; when the City of New York proceeded with its plan to draw water from the river, New Jersey brought -1*7- |
