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Show -35- compact would operate. Its availability, as a matter of law, depends on whether the constitutional grant to Congress of power to regulate commerce among the several States, however unused, excludes all State action, how- ever reasonably conceived and restricted to the interests of a region of > States immediately affected. ^ A simple syllogism is supposed to furnish the ans er. Congress alone can regulate interstate commerce; the, flow of energy from State to- State is interstate commerce} therefore, its control is beyond the authority of the States. In the elaboration and application of the argument there are recog- nized exceptions and qualifications, but the lowest terms to which we have reduced it is the guiding mode of approaching a conception of the Commerce Clause.127 The mode of approach is everything in constitutional controver- sies; it is largely decisive in the solution of specific problems under the Commerce Clause. And the attitude which we have summarized will work mis- chief in concrete situations because it embodies the fallacy of over- sim- plification. The frequent resort in recent years to the Commerce Clause as a source of regulatory power by Congress,128 has blurred its historic purpose and its continued use as a veto power on obstructive and discriminatory state action. It is a reservoir of Federal power and not a dam against State action, as State action. The experience which evoked the Commerce Clause, its contem- poraneous construction, and the course of judicial decision, compel the con- clusion that the States are not exoluded from dealing with interstate com- merce as long as Congress itself has not legislated, provided that State action neither discriminates against interstate commerce nor unreasonably hampers it. These provisos are not self-enforcing conditions. They imply a process of adjustment by the Supreme Court between State and National interests. Their application is difficult and is bound to .result invariable judgments- But the process is an accommodation of actualities} it deals with real interests and is not intended for exercises in logomachy. These real interests are the stuff of the decisions and determine thoir results*129 But the line they prick out is too often dimmed by expansive or vague lan- guage, which constitutional controversies too frequently provoke. Terms 127See e, g. Cooke, Commerce Clause (1908) pp. iv-vi. 128see e.g. Interstate Commerce Act of Feb. i+, 1887 (2h Stat. at L« 379); Sherman Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 209); Clayton Act of Oct. 15, 1911+ (38 Stat. at L. 730); Bills of lading Act of Aug. 29* 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 538)5 Federal Employers* liability Act of April 22* 1908 (35 Stat. at !•• 65)} Federal Trade Commission Act of Sept. 26, 1911; (38 Stat. at L* 717); Packers and Stockyards Act of Aug. 15, 1921 (U2 Stat. at L. 159)} Grain Futures Act of Sept. 21, 1922 (1*2 Stat. at L. 998); Federal Water Power Com- mission Act of June 10, 1922 (1+1 Stat. at L IO63); Pure Food and Drugs Acts (3l| Stat. at L. 768, 32 Stat. at L. 19l*, 632, 29 Stat. at L. 253, 26 Stat. at L. 1*1101 Lottery Act of Mar. 2, 1895 (28 Stat. at L. 963). 129CF. Davis v. Farmers* Cooperative Co. (1923) 262 U. S«312, 315, h& Sup. Ct. 556, 557, per Brandeis, J.% "That the claims against interstate carriers for personal injuries and for loss and damage of freight are numer- ous; that the amounts demanded are large} that in many cases carriers deem |