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Show -172- intention of the frame rs of the constitution in using all these words, *treaty;• 'compact,1 * agreement.1 The word 'agreement* dees not necessarily import any direct and express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in writing. If there is a verbal understanding to which both parties have assented, and upon which both are acting, these terms, 'treaty,* *agreement,* 'compact,1 show that it was the intention of the framers of the constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that they anxiously desired to cut off all con- nection or communication between a State and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the word "agreement" its most extended signification, and so apply it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or informal, positive or implied, by the mutual under- st and ing of the parties • ', ~~ "Neither is it necessary in order to bring the case within this prohibition, that the agreement should be for the mutual delivery of all fugitives from justice, or for a particular class of fugitives. It is sufficient, if there is an agreement to deliver Holmes, For the prohibition in the constitution applies not only to a continuing agreement embracing classes of cases, or a succession of cases, but to any agreement whatever, * • • "• • , • It was one of the main objects of the constitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications between foreign governments, and the several state author- ities. The power now claimed for the states is utterly incompatible with this evident intention, and would expose us to one of those dangers against v/hioh the framers of the constitution have so anxiously endeavored to guard." This case deals with a transaction with a foreign nation. It does not deal with a contract between the several states. It is controlled as much by the provision which grants to the president and two-thirds of the senate the ex- clusive treaty making power, as by the prohibition elsewhere contained on the activities of the several states. It is none the less sweeping and comprehen- sive in i-ts terms and it takes the broad position that all matters which in- volve a negotiation with a foreign nation come within, the treaty making pre- rogatives of the general government, and this whether it be a treaty, a compact, or an agreement, and, if this be so, it would seem logically to follow that all compacts and agreements between the several states are also subject to the national -tutelage and require the congressional consent. At the date of the decision in Holmes v» Jennison,6 there being no extra- dition treaty with Great Britain, and the president having disclaimed any authority to surrender up a fugitive to that government, unless Vermont could do so it could not be done at all. It could, therefore, with some propriety be asked, with what federal power does the proposed exercise of authority by Vermont conflict? This question was asked by Justice Thompson, who held that it could, at most, be repugnant to a dormant power which might possibly be brought into action in the future, by treaty, and too remote for consideration. The reasoning of Chief Justice Taney in Holmes v. Jennison would seem to Supra, note !• |
