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Show -43- In no wise does this solution imply a transfer by Congress of its duty towards national affairs. On the contrary, it is a deliberate recognition by Congress that a particular electric power situation is predominently the concern of the region limited by the radius of a specific electric power de- velopment and outside the regulative concern of the nation* In a zone for legislation open both to Congress and the States, the controlling facts justify, at least for the time being, cooperative State adjustment. Con- gress does not surrender any of its powers; it merely finds no occasion for its present exercise of them. There is* therefore, no "delegation" of its power in any legally significant use of the term, 16l But Congress does not 16l It is now clear that the cases in notes 156 and 159 involve no "de- legation" of legislative power from Congress to the States.. They merely il- lustrate the process of Congressional delimitation of the respective areas of Federal and State control over a field, such as interstate commerce, sub- ject to the legislative authority of both State and Nation. This conception of the true nature of the issue thus presented was set forth by the Court; in sustaining the Wilson Acts "Congress did not use terms of permission to the State to act, but simply removed an impediment to the enforcement of the state laws in respect to imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on its part. It imparted no power to the State not then possessed, but allowed ,imported property to fall at once upon arrival within the local jurisdiction." In re Rahrer, supra note 156, at p» 56U* 11 Sup» Ct* 870. The misconception about "delegation" was exposed again, by.Unite, C» J., in sustaining the validity of the Webb- Kenyon Act* "The argument as to delegation to the States rests upon a mere misconception . . . Or, in other words, stating the necessary result of the argument from a concrete consideration of the particular subject here in- volved, that because Congress in adopting a regulation had considered the nature and character of our dual system of government, State and Nation, and instead of absolutely prohibiting, had sq conformed its regulation as to produce cooperation between the local and national forces of government to the end of preserving the rights of all, it had thereby transcended tine complete and perfect power of regulation conferred by the Constitution. And it is well again to point out that this abnormal result to which the argument leads concerns a subject as to which both State and Nation in tkieir respective spheres of authority possessed the supremest authority before the action of Congress which is complained of, and hence the argument vir- tually comes to the assertion that in some undisclosed way by the exertion, of congressional authority, power possessed has evaporated." Clark Dis- tilling Co. v» Western Maryland By. Co. supra, note I56, at p. 33* 37 Suj>» Gt. 185» The source of the misconception as to "delegation" is a misinter- pretation of Leisy.v. Hardin (1890) 135 U« S* 100, 10 SupB Ct» 681. This case, widely criticized by judges and the profession, has been "restrained in its application to the case actually presented for determination." See Plumley v« Massachusetts, supra note lhX$ at p» hlh» 15 Supo Ct. at p» 159* For our purposes, the decisive case is in re Rahrer, supra note 156* Th« effect of that decision is to put a quietus on any question of "delegation." Recent writers on the Webb-Kenyon Act have demonstrated the myth of "dele- gation" in the field of interstate commerce. See Denison, States1 Rights and the Webb-Kenyon Liquor Law (I91I4) llj. Col. L. Rev. 321$ Rogers, State |