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Show -41- In fine, from time to time what was of local concern, and therefore wisely left to local action, becomes a national concern vindicated through national regulation. But always the concrete issues - whether of adjudica- tion or of legislation - turn on the concrete circumstances. The practical necessities and the shrewd judgments about practical matters which underlie the decisions are conveyed in recurring phrases of the opinions - "the diversified regulation "which was necessary, 150 "diver- sity of treatment according to the special requirements or local condi- tions, "151 "under all the circumstances of the case. "152 "distinctly local in character although embraced within the Federal authority,"153 "the super- ior fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of different systems of regulation drawn from local knowledge and experience, and con- formed to local wants. "154 These practical considerations of majority opinions gain significance from dissents which were rejected because they insisted on doctrinaire views leading to an arbitrary and impracticable di- vision between State and national authority over interstate commerce.155 The cases that invalidate State legislation, as well as those that sustain it, recognize that our constitutional system not only sanctions, but in its practical workings necessitates State treatment of phases of interstate commerce. Where Congress is silent* then, State action may cope with State needs, so long as it does not minister to State interests at the expense of com- merce among the States. But our constitutional system permits even greater flexibility in the regulation of interstate commerce. Federal legislation is sometimes exercised not to supplant State action but to support it. We have seen that States may deal with those phases of interstate commerce, which as a matter of practice, peculiarly affect them. But this local interest may be defeated by currents of interstate commerce which a State 150 Hughes, J., in Port Richmond & B» P. Ferry Co. v. Freeholders of Hudson County (1914 234» U S. 317, 327, 3k Sup. Ct. 821, 82i|. 15lHughes, J. , in Port Richmond & B. P. Ferry Co. v. Freeholders of Hudson County, supra note I50, at p. 330* 3U Sup* Ct. 8255 Hughes, J., in Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 399* 33 Sup, Ct. 729* 739» 15&Iarshall, C» J., in Wilson v# Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., supra, note 155, at p. 252. 153Hughes, J., in Wilmington Transportation Co. v.'R» R. Comm. of California (1915) 236 U« S. 151, 15^, 35, Sup. Ct. 276, 278. 154 Curtis, J. , in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note II4O, at p» 320. 155See e. g. McLean, J., dissenting in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note II4O, at p. 3 21m "In this case, the power to regulate pilots is admitted to belong to the commercial power of Congress; and yet it is held, that a State, by virtue of its inherent power, may regulate the subject* until such regulation shall be annulled by Congress . . . And it is in tlnis light that the decision is chiefly to be regretted. The power is recognized in the State, because the subject is more appropriate for State than Federal action; and consequently, it must be presumed the Constitution cannot have intended to inhibit State action. This is not a rule by which the Consti- tution is to be construed*" |