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Show since 1921 have concerned bridges (Lake Champlain Bridge, New York and Ver- mont 9 1928, k5 State 120; Henominee River Bridge, Wisconsin and Michigan, 1928, k5 Stat. 300; Red River Bridges, Oklahoma and Texas, 1930, J46 Stat. 15i|). The last of these is an instance of pre-approval. Such projects, how- ever, are subject to control - at present, congressional consent subject to supervision by the Department of Uar - under the commerce clause of the con- st itution* The fact just noted explains in part why it is difficult, almost imposs- ible, to identify all of the virtual compacts to which Congress has in some way assented. Frequently Congress authorizes the private construction of a bridge over a boundary river with the stipulation that either or both of the states may take it over. Sometimes one state is authorized to build it, subject to the otherTs right to acquire a half interest; an arrangement of this kind gave rise to the contract enforced in Kentucky v» Indiana, dis- cussed below. Sometimes authority is given without particularization to two or even three states (see for example Hississippi and Ohio River bridges, Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky, i+3 Stat. 999 (1925)). A growing number of instances of bridge legislation not treated as compacts recognize joint agencies of various kinds, although none of these is as complete as the Port of New York Authority or, on a much smaller scale, the Lake Champlain Bridge Commission. A single example serves to point the important lesson of the utility of a carefully considered formal agreement instead of reliance mere- ly on concert effected through concurrent legislation. The Delaware River bridge at Philadelphia was built by a joint commission on the basis of laws passed by Pennsylvania and New Jersey in 1919- Congress sanctioned it as a bridge project (1921, 1|1 Stat. 1101); it was financed by the states se- parately. In 1925# shortly before its completion, Pennsylvania declared by law that it should be free. New Jersey, alleging that its bonds had assumed tolls, countered by attempting to stop construction. Pennsylvania began a suit but early in the following year paved the way for an agreement by re- pealing its declaration against tolls* Interstate compacts have been ertolled as a method of dealing with problems beyond the limited powers of the nation and the incongruous physi- cal limits of the states. They have been urged not merely as an expedient but as a desirable substitute for national action. Speaking from the other side Edward S. Corwin has said: "The compact clause can undoubtedly be utilized to good effect in those situations in which the national government is in position to force action under it as the alternative to direct nation- al control. As a means of solving problems created by an untethered state selfishness it is probably of very limited value" ("The Lessons of the Colo- rado River Compact," National Municipal Review* vol. xvi, 1927* p« U6l)« The device of the compact is scarcely a substitute for national action. It is likely that the long time view will see both forms of action take their places with other elements as parts of the process which is crisscrossing all political boundaries with the lines of functional union* On the administrative even more than on the judicial side compacts a,re likely to draw strength from national infusions. This will be true even if interstate agreements go further than in the past in creating genuinely cohesive, autonomous agencies of regional jurisdiction* Pregnant possibLl- |