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Show -90- , • its will," ivhile New Ycrk goes thirsty or elsewhere gets its water for domestic use, why should a different rule apply in Colorado or any other State in respect to that portion of interstate waters-whatever it may be--to which the State is justly entitled? Can the eouality of the States be maintained if a populous and active State can possess itself permanently of all the interstate waters flowing to or upon its borders merely by taking the same at will for beneficial use before a sparsely settled or backward neighboring State is developed so as to make use of a fair portion of such waters within its domain? If so, why should the existence of such right in the more pop- ulous and active,State depend upon uniformity/ or lack of it, in the muni- cipal law of -waters within the two States, the needs of the greater State being the same in either event? These and many other considerations justify caution in assuming that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Laramie River case established more than the principle that legitimate existing uses of water must be protected when first adjustment of controversies between States is made* . The next decision of the United States Supreme Court in a water contro- versy between States involved a dispute over the disposal of too much water, rot too little. North Dakota sued Minnesota asking for an injunction, and for damages to the State' and its citizens claimed to have been caused by drainage projects ccnstructed in Minnesota by that State and its municipal- ities which raised the level of Lake Traverse and other boundary waters to the point of overflow upon the nearby farms in liorth Dakota with resulting injury, past and threatened. The Court declined to assume jurisdiction of the claim for damages on behalf of citizens of North Dakota, and held the evidence insufficient to prove that the overflow was caused by Minnesota. But on the law of the case, had the facts been established, the Court found no difficulty in declaring North Dakota entitled to injunctive relief against an unrea.sonable discharge of surface waters by artificial drainage into the interstate water course, to the damage of North Dakota, The jurisdiction of the Court was expressly based upon the. fact that the dispute, if be- tween independent nations. might properly be the subject of diplomatic ad- justment ; hence, as between States of the American Union, it was a contro- versy justiciable in the Supreme Court under the federal constitution*-'-' i the ground, inter alia, that for Solothurn to compute it on the basis of what • happened to the water in Aargau was a violation of the latter canton's t sovereignty. "HELD: Vfithin the limits outlined in Aargau v. Zurich, supra, each canton has absolute control over its territorial waters; this right includes the rirh"t to tax its grantees on any basis it sees fit, including that of the power made'potentially available by its concession. It is in the nature of compensation for the thing given, whether actually exploited or not, and therefore to be measured by its value in the place where the concession was made and where the water was obtained." 177 Uorth Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, I4i Sup. Ct. I38, 68. L. Ed. 3L\2 (1923)* The closing lines of the opinion invited the two. States to remedy the exis-ting condition, the causes of which were not susceptible of that clear |