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Show INTERSTATE COMPACTS By Arthur W« Macmahon The interstate compact is one of the forms that federalism gives to the endlessly flexible, increasingly significant uses of the contract as an in- strument of government• In the United States the term is derived from sec- tion 10 of Article I of the constitution, which, after declaring that "no State shall enter into any Treaty* Alliance, or Confederation," provides that "no State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agree- ment or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power." This, although in form a prohibition, is important practically as an authorization with con- gressional consent. Of the other federal constitutions that of Switzerland contains the most comprehensive authorization, allowing the cantons "to make conventions among themselves upon legislative, administrative, or judicial subjects" (art. 7) &&& "treaties with foreign powers, respecting the adminis- tration of public property, and border and police intercourse" (art. 9)» The express provision in Germany is confined to foreign treaties by the Lander on matters within their legislative competence (art. 78)3 i*1 Austria, on the other hand, to merely internal arrangements (art. 107)« The constitutional stipulations in the federal systems of Latin America also lack the scope given in the United Stetes. In Brazil provision is made for "mutual agree- ments and conventions of a non-political character" (art. 65); in Argentina, for "partial treaties for the purposes of the administration of justice, the regulation of financial interests, and the execution of public works of common utility" (art. 107); in Mexico for "friendly agreements" regarding boundaries (art. 116). The constitutions of Canada and Australia are silent on the point. Agreements in those countries are frequent, however, both among th.o provinces or states and between them and the central authorities. In all go- vernments, whether federal or unitary, conference and contract arise inevit- ably on bases more natural and universal than the phraseology of constitu- tions. Even where explicit permission exists, as in the United States, the bulk of contractual understandings are reached in practice without reference to it. The constitutional terms themselves have acquired no precision of mesin- ing. Alluding to the words "agreement or compact" the Supreme Court remarked ". . . we do not perceive any difference in the meaning, except that the word 'compact* is generally used with reference to more formal and serious engage- ments than is usually implied in the term Agreement1" (Virginia v. Tennessee, II48 U. S. 503, 520, (1893)). Congress, uncertain, has tended to couple them. The vital consideration is that, regardless of terminology or form, their contractual character has been established. In an early case the Supreme Court declared that "the terms compact and contract are synonomous" (Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S, 1, 92 (1823)). The question of how the consent of Congress may be given and the more important question of when it may be dispensed with altogether remain full of doubt. The Swiss constitution invites less ambiguity by requiring action by the federal assembly "only in case the Federal Council or another Canton protests" (art. 85). In the United States, Congress has sometimes assented in advance, oftener it has acted after the conclusion of the agreement. Its consent may be implied, as was illustrated in the already cited case of -1,3- |