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Show ities of course exist. The water compacts thus far approved, however, have been little more than guaranties regarding stream flow to guide the states in their separate action. The Rio Grande Compact approved by Congress on June 17, 1930^ is in part an exhortation to the national government to aug- ment the river by vast engineering works; the interstate committee that it sets up is confined to investigations, with the proviso that its findings of fact shall not be conclusive in any court. Embryonic regional organs are many., but the only well developed examples achieved through compact hr.ve been the brilliant accomplishment embodied in the Port of New York Authority (approved 1921-22* hZ Stat. YJki 822) and the- application of the same idea for a very restricted purpose in the Lake Champlain Bridge Commission* To say this does not belittle the usefulness of compacts* among their other advantages* in facilitating various kinds of exterritoriality and thus in releasing the energies of the states individually. Numerous agree- ments, some of which are in the form of reciprocal legislation without con- sent by Congress, have made possible concurrent jurisdiction over boundary waters* Aa example of a different type is a provision in the South Platte River Compact, whereby Colorado and Nebraska enjoy the right to construct ditches in each other's territory. A compact approved in 1922 (lj.2 Stat« IO58) guarantees that waterworks owned by Kansas City, Missouri- and lo- oate'd in Kansas, will be free from taxes there* v/hile the same exemption is extended to waterworks owned by Kansas City* Kansass and located in Missouri. It has not been demonstrated that compacts in themselves will make possible more effective regulation of privately owned utilities* One sug- gestion of this sort concerned the marketing of anthracite coal in 1925-26 during the large anthracite strike, but it had no results. Another sugges- tion had to do with the stabilization of oil production, but a regional con- ference in June, 1929* failed to crystallise the movement for a compact, although it was evident that drastic restriction by the states separately would meet the stumbling block of interfield competition, The most impor- tant suggestions have dealt with the interstate phases of electric power* The impetus given directly-by the Giant Power Board of Pennsylvania* which was constituted as an investigative body under a statute of 1923 and con- tinued in 1925 by executive action of the governor after his legislative recommendations had been disregarded, led in the latter year to a conference of representatives of Pennsylvania, New York and New Jersey, attended also by official observers from seven adjoining states. Attempting to assume the desirability of a tri-state compact while discussing its terms^ the con- ferees were unable to agree upon either subject matter or scope. Driven back to the main question they met the emphatic skepticism of the members of the ifew York Public Service Commission who represented that state. Fol- lowing -the withdrawal of the Hew York delegates the attempt to conclude a compact lapsed altogether. Subsequent criticism has noted other obstacles besides the aloofness of the state utility commissioners. Certain crucial factors li!:e the holding companies are hardly regional at all. Legally considered, where interstate commerce is involved, the level of regional control can hardly rise above that possible for each state individually. To answer -that such objection can be met by some kind of devolution under na- tional legislation is an admission that compacts must find their role in the complicated movement tov.?ard a more cooperative type of federalism. -I46- |