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Show -177- included under the power to regulate commerce» By way of dictum, however, it cited with approval the language which we have before quoted from the case of Virginia v* Tennessee ^ and applied this language to the articles of confederation. It did not, as it might have done, point out the fact that the articles of confederation merely prohibited "any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or state," and provided that "no two or more states shall enter into any treaty, con- federation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of congress*" It might have held, and plausibly, that the word "state," as used in the first paragraph of Article 6 of the articles of confederation, merely applied to foreign states, and that the word "agreement" therein used was an agreement in the nature of a treaty. It might have pointed out, as it did not, that it merely forbade two states from entering into "any treaty, confederation, or al- liance, without the consent of congress;" that the words "treaty, confederation, alliance" clearly characterized transactions of a political character, which affected sovereignty; and that, on the other hand, Section 10 of Article I of the federal constitution prohibits any "agreement or compact»" The supreme court of Louisiana, in the case of Fisher v« Steele^-3 in 1887^ sustained a contract between that state and Arkansas for the construction of a levee along the Mississippi River in Arkansas, against the objection that it -was in conflict with Section 10 of Article I of the constitution, treating the contention of invalidity somewhat scornfully* "On reading that objection in connection with the constitutional pro- hibition just quoted, the mind would naturally expeot a charge that the sta-te of Louisiana was projecting a treaty of alliance with the state of Arkansas^, or contemplating some joint scheme of commercial or industrial enterprise, or perhaps conspiring for the establishment of a new confederacy; but great is the relief when the mind is informed that the purpose which plaintiff resists with such a powerful shield is merely to build a piece, of levee in the state of Arkansas, if necessary, and if that state does not object, or consets. It is, indeed, too clear for argument that such a transaction is no more a pro- hibited compact between two states than is contained in the requisition of one governor for, and the consent of another to, the capture and arrest of a fugitive from.justice." To the opinions expressed in the foregoing cases may be added the dictum of Chief Justice.Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore*^ : "It is worthy of remark too that these inhibitions generally restrain state legislation on subjects intrusted to.the general government, or in wh.ioh the people of all the states feel an interest. A state is forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. If these compacts are with foreign nations, they interfere with the treaty-making power, which is con- ferred entirely on the general government; if with each other, for. politica.1 Supra, note 9» 13(1887) 39 La. Ann. UUl, 1 So, 882. 3iHl833) 1 Pet. 2i|3, 8 L. Ed. 672. |