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Show -ITU- prevented those states from legislating in such a manner as to obstruct the navigation of the river, so long as the use of it was as free to the citizens of other states as to their own. The clause contained in those articles, by which no -two or more states should enter into any treaty, confederation or al- liance between them without the consent of the United States in Congress as- sembled, could not have been construed as prohibiting them from authorizing the erection of a bridge by separate legislation, nor even by direct agreement or compact. In the language of the court (12 Peters 96), !They could, by their joint \vill, have made any improvement which they chose, either by canals along the margin of the river, or by bridges or aqueducts across it, or in any other manner whatsoever.f The acts of agreement by which they should do this would of course not have the character of a treaty, confederation or alliance, within the meaning of the articles of confederation* ' "Maine succeded Massachusetts in her rights to the soil and waters of this river; and New Hampshire and Maine, by their several grants, authorized the erection of this bridge* "Unless the constitution of the United States interposes an objection, their power to do this has been fully shown. . There is in the constitution no express prohibition upon the states which renders the erection of bridges over navigable waters within their jurisdiction unlawful." The intimation in Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge that "this prohibition ap- plies only to such an fagreement or compact1 as is in its nature political11 is expressly declared to be the law by the supreme court of Georgia in Union Brand R. Co. v. East Tennessee & Georgia R. Co#,8 involving a railroad con- structed under authority granted by the legislatures of Tennessee and Georgia. Says the court: "The framers of the constitution clearly intended nothing more than to prohibit -the several states from exercising their authority in any way which might limit or infringe upon a full and complete exercise by the general govern- ment of the powers intended to be delegated by the federal constitution. • •" The states of Virginia and Tennessee jointly appointed commissioners to survey and fix the boundary line between them, and subsequently, by legislation enacted in I8O3, adopted and ratified the boundary so ascertained. The validity of this action as concluding the respective states was before the Supreme Court of the United States in I893 in the case of Virginia v. Tennessee»9 It was held that the mere selection of parties to run and designate a boundary line imported no agreement to recognize the same, and that a legislative declaration, following the survey, that it was correct and that thereafter it should be deemed the true and established line did not in itself import a contract or agreement with the adjoining state, but at the most was merely an admission or declaration against interest. When, however, as in this case, the legislative declaration takes the form of an agreement or compact by reciting some consider- ation for it, for example, as made upon a similar declaration of the border 8(1853) 1U Ga. 327 9(1893) 1L4.8 U, S. 503, 13 S.C.R. 728, 37 L» Ed. 537. |