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Show 197 that resulted in more than 500 deaths and 1,000 addi- tional casualties in Algeria during 1961, and continued on a similar scale during the first quarter of 1962.6 The usual practice was to open fire on Moslem civilians in Algiers or some other town from a rooftop or a Speeding jeep, selecting victims at random. did the people of Algiers, for instance, So inured become to the practice that it was not unconnon for patrons at a restaurant to witness an assassination only a few yards away, then go on eating as if nothing had happened.7 Beyond wanting to provoke the resumption of fullscale warfare, the OAS assassins also hoped to exploit their terrorist acts for their propaganda effect,8 an aim they shared with the rebels in resorting to assassination. Still another rationale for the assassinations committed by the OAS was outlined by one of the French die-bards who did not particularly share their views. Some believe that the only solution consists in hardening and even more blind and more and more bloody terrorism. This violence alone can bring end results such as the confrontation of the communities (European and Moslem) and the obligation of the army to side with the Resistance, in Spite of herself. Violence brought success to the FLN (Algerian rebels) and without it De Gaulle would never have abandoned Algeria. . 6Paul W. (Chicago: . Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 83. 70.3. News & World Report, May 28, 1962, p. 49. 8Blackstock, Op. cit., p. 83. |
