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Show 196 weapons to ensure protection to their villages. The number of these groups has not ceased to grow, and the rebels have been impotent to hinder their action. The same applies to . . . groups of rural polices auxiliary units composed of civilian volun- teers. That was in 1957, however, and it is surely significant that deSpite such disclaimers as to the effectiveness of rebel assassinations, only a few years later French extremists felt compelled to use the same technique, Those extremists were, of course, the members of the Secret Army Organization (OAS), the French die-bards, who insisted on fighting on in defiance of President Charles de Gaullevs decision to seek a negotiated settlement. In resorting to the use of assassination directed against Moslem civilians, the OAS heped that the Moslems would be provoked into making reprisals against EurOpeans on such a scale that De Gaulle would be forced to resume the fighting in order to protect the EurOpeans. ‘The reprisals came, all right, but not on any signifi- cant scale until after the Evian peace agreement of March 18, 1962, had been signed and French forces were well on their way toward pulling out of Algeria. Before that tranSpired, however, the OAS resorted to a persistent campaign of bombings and assassinations 5Pinea, Op. cit., p. 8. |