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Show 401 U.S. 412 CITIZENS TO PRESERVE OVERTON PARK, INC. v. VOLPE 821 Cite as 91 S.Ct. 814 (U»T1) other "prudent" route requires the Secretary to engage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests. They contend that the Secretary should weigh the detriment resulting from the destruction of parkland against the cost of other routes, safety considerations, and other factors, and determine on the basis of tive Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply." S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945). J[4] Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act and § 138 of the the importance that he attaches to these Federal-Aid Highway Act are clear and specific directives. .Both the Department of Transportation Act and the Federal- Aid to Highway Act provide that the Secretary "shall not approve any program or project" that requires the use of any public parkland "unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park * * *." 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1964 ed., Supp. V). This language is a plain and explicit bar to the use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks-only the most unusual situations are exempted. Despite the clarity of the statutory language, respondents argue that the Secretary has wide discretion. They recognize that the requirement that there be no "feasible" alternative route admits of little administrative discretion. For this exemption to apply the Secretary must find that as a matter of sound engineering it would not be feasible to build the highway along any other route.24 Respondents argue, however, that the requirement that there be no 24. See 114 Cong.Rec. 19915 (statement by Rep. Holifield). 25. See n. 15. supra. 26. See 114 Cong.Rec. 24037 (statement by Sen. Yarborough). 27. See, e. g., S.Rep.Xo. 1340. 90th Cong.. 2d Sess.. 1&-19; II.R.Rep.Xo.1584. 90th Cong.. 2d Sess.. 12. F.S.Cong. & Admin. News. p. 3482 (1968). 28. The legislative history indicates that the Secretary is not to limit his consideration to information supplied by state and local officials but is to go beyond this informa-other factors whether, on balance, alternative feasible routes would be "prudent." But no such wide-ranging endeavor was intended. It is obvious that in most cases considerations of cost, directness of route, and community disruption will indicate that parkland should be used for highway construction {whenever possible. Although it may be necessary to transfer funds from one jurisdiction to another,25 there will always be a smaller outlay required from the public purse2<J when parkland is used since the public already owns the land and there will be no need to pay for right-of-way. And since people do not live or work in parks, if a highway is built on parkland no one will have to leave his home or give up his business. Such factors are common to substantially all highway construction. Thus, if Congress intended these factors to be on an equal footing with preservation of parkland there would have been no need for the statutes. [5] Congress clearly did not intend that cost and disruption of the community were to be ignored27 by the Secretary.28 But the very existence of the statutes29 indicates that protection tion and reach his own independent decision. 114 Cong.Rec. 24036-24037. 29. The legislative history of both § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1904 ed., Supp. V), and § 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V), is ambiguous. The legislative committee reports tend to support respondents' view that the statutes are merely general directives to the Secretary requiring him to consider the importance of parkland as well as cost, community disruption, and other factors. See. e. g., S.Rep. Xo. 1340. 90th Cong.. 2d Sess., 19: II.R.Rep.Xo.l5S4, 90th Jil2 |
