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Show ESS urny shut down their s--,. the helium which is n >• H of course, be lost. ?>• rd fast prcwctipi et of termination oi iww ew the technology which , in the Twenty-First Cew vothing more than specu-mshier the sub]eat matter { iscussed in the Final State- i • is enough there to alert j o u t e r s and others con- j t l ^ fiv e " categories, § ! requi•"r"e s., 't-nnaott tuh*e« _D epart- j •- with and obtain tne^ora- j ideral agencies having juris- j Lctel expertise with respec: j •crmcntal Impact involved nij " : ; d action. The impact; i eets the standard.presence* 2%) in this regard, when k h t of the "rule of reason , eer e „a.p,^p.™ro-v,>edri.. The require-l j not be viewed as hP completion OJ he unreasonably dr. $ iB order to includ »nta or the results of qi essu .vhieh might shed some WadHdHiJ t on the subject of t n e u n v^ Such a result would olteij .1, delay or prevent any «-<- .vironmentai cases. >iwc j v; for adequacy ana «wnpww, a impact statement, not p e n , p F v. Corps oi £.ngmeex^ at 297. In this particular caw •t expressed the opinion tnat M I exytc SM«ea involve* resolution of the issues COS d „..- urgent and should a se was Wt,-1'" . . . .J stateaimttee nFt 2wd a*as«t 6rn\5o«7tt . i!sTs»uhe^ed imutnieS. .. 4 *-v>«* "Pinal Statemeii io7'.! ana tne i Ui"' • , : »*•*••*»•* to7o To havi vn November •-•;. •u"~- .,; 4. „.„• lnneef wonl th* Btatement ans io«iJcl v.Ti in the face or what we ^ LU +i<^o for prepare a reasonable ti r r ; e x- * the statement. > , ai ,o contended by the_ pavtii fees) that the statement is defei NATIONAL HELIUM CO Citeas4S#F tive because of failure to state the purpose of the contemplated action. Section 4332(2) (C) does not explicitly require that the purpose of the contemplated government action be spelled out. While in many types of governmental action the exact purpose of the action might be unclear and thus lead to confusion were it not stated, this is not such a case. The self-evident purpose of the proposed action here is to terminate the continued purchase of helium reserves which the Secretary regards as economically superfluous and beyond the goals set forth in the 1960 Amendments to the Helium Act. We see no merit in the further argument of the appellees that the real reason for contract termination was to effect a financial saving and that the Office of Management and Budget dictated cancellation. The Secretary terminated the contracts and the Office of Management and Budget does not have authority to dictate to the Secretary the decision that he is to make in connection with a contract entered into and terminable by him.1 [14] Applying the rule of reason which is enunciated in the cases, we con-clude that the statement is fully accepta- - bieh- - i t adequately discusses future ! needs and future supplies. It_jft;eighs the costs now as opposed to the fjjiijre-j It is a comprehensive and thorough document. We disagree with the derogatory comments of the parties and the district court regarding it. Much time and opportunity have been extended to the appellees. There has been much delay as a result and we repeat what we have said in our "prior decisions that inasmuch as the decision has been made the termination should be carried out without delay. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to dismiss the action. SFOSATION v. MORTON ' IC05 2d ww (V.ra) BKEITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge (concurring). I concur in the result. It may be that my differences with the majority go to form rather than substance. The decision in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 6G9, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254, SCRAP, does not affect federal jurisdiction in the instant case because we have no concern with any federal statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on an agency. The argument of the Government is that this case involves federal contracts and that the Tucker Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491, is the only statute which gives federal courts jurisdiction over government contract cases. In the first place, this suit does not arise out of any contract. It is concerned -with compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. In the second place the Tucker Act does not equate with the statute giving the Interstate Commerce Commission exclusive power to suspend rates. The general standard of judicial review of agency actions is found in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703(2) (A). The action is set aside if it is arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Vohpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-414, 91 S.Ct. 814, 23 L.Ecl.2d 136. The key phrase in § 706 is "agency action." NEPA directs that "to the fullest extent possible * ">:" * all agencies of the Federal Government shall * * * include in every * .'•* * major Federal action(s) significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official" covering stated subject areas. NEPA alters the decisionmaking process of the federal agencies and brings environmental factors to an equal footing with economic, technical, and other traditional considerations, all lac. v. Morton, sutio re. 7. Walter liolm & Company v. iferdfe, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 449 F.2-! 1000, 1013 (1971). Bsaassas&iSBa&K |
