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Show 1126 449 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES Perhaps Senator Jackson would have required some consideration and balancing of environmental costs-despite the lack of a formal detailed statement- but he did not spell out his views. No Senator, other than Senators Jackson and Muskie, addressed himself specifically to the problem during floor discussion. Nor did any member of the House of Representatives.38 The section-by-section analysis of NEPA submitted to the Senate clearly stated the overriding purpose of Section 104: that "no agency may substitute the procedures outlined in this Act for more restrictive and specific procedures established by law governing its activities." 39 The report does not suggest there that NEPA procedures should be entirely abandoned, but rather that they should not be "substituted" for more specific standards. In one rather cryptic sentence, the analysis does muddy the waters somewhat, stating that "[i]t is the intention that where there is no more effective procedure already established, the procedure of this act will be followed."40 Notably, however, the sentence does not state that in the presence of "more effective procedures" the NEPA procedure will be abandoned entirely. It seems purposefully vague, quite possibly meaning that obedience to the certifications of standard setting agencies must alter, by supplementing, the normal "procedure of this act." This rather meager legislative history. in our view, cannot radically transform the purport of the plain words of Section 104. Had the Senate sponsors fully intended to allow a total abdication of NEPA responsibilities in water quality matters-rather than a supplementing of them by strict obedience to the specific standards of WQIA-the language of Section 104 could easily have been changed. As the Supreme Court often has said, the legislative history of a statute (particularly such relatively meager and vague history as we have here) cannot radically affect its interpretation if the language of the statute is clear. See, e. g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB. 330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947) ; Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 57 S.Ct. 298, 81 L.Ed. 340 (1937) ; Fairport, Painesville & Eastern R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446 (1934); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Vindicator Consolidated Gold Mining Co., 284 U.S. 231, 52 S.Ct. 113, 76 L.Ed. 261 (1931). In a recent case interpreting a veterans' act, the Court set down the principle which must govern our approach to the case before us: "Having concluded that the provisions of § 1 are clear and unequivocal on their face, we find no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act. Since the State has placed such heavy reliance upon that history, however, we do deem it appropriate to point out that this history is at best inconclusive. It is true, as the State points out, that Representative Rankin, as Chairman of the Committee handling the bill on the floor of the House, expressed his view during the course of discussion of the bill on the floor that the 1941 Act would not apply to [the sort of case in question] * * *. But such statements, even when they stand alone, have never been regarded as sufficiently compelling to justify deviation from the plain language of a statute. * * *" 29055. Senator Muskie seemed to give greater emphasis to the supposed conflict between the two bills. See id. at 29053: 115 Cong.Rec. (Part 30) at 40425; 110 Cong.Rec. (daily ed.) at S4401. 38. The Commission has called to our attention remarks made by Congressman Harsha. The Congressman did refer to a statement by Senator Muskie regarding NEPA, but it was a statement regarding application of the Act to established environmental control agencies, not regarding the relationship between NEPA and WQIA. 115 Cong.Rec. (Part 30) nt 40927-40928. 39. Id. at 40420. 40. Ibid. |
