| OCR Text |
Show 412 455 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES m [5] We do not consider it necessary here to discuss all possible or hypothetical ramifications of 18 U.S.C. § 3060. Obviously, the purpose of it is that defendants are entitled to prompt preliminary hearings to determine whether there is probable cause for their detention. If such a hearing is not granted they are entitled to be released from custody, but they are subject to being again charged and submitted to proper procedures. A failure to grant a preliminary hearing does not acquit the defendant of the charges preferred against him. In the case now before us, Rogers did have bond set, he first said he had private counsel, then he had counsel appointed for him, hearings had been set for him in St. Louis but they were aborted because of the absence of his privately retained counsel, he waived further proceedings in Missouri and agreed to be transferred to Florida, and he had the benefit of counsel when he was subjected to the lineup. The only thing missing was a finding of probable cause for his detention, The failure in this regard might be excused on the basis of his waiver of further proceedings in Missouri. Even so, we think the District Court in December, 1970, when Rogers sought it, should have directed that he be released if not promptly given a preliminary hearing. That is all Rogers was entitled to, however, and it went only to his detention prior to indictment. Once indicted, the Government was entitled to hold him un^ der the indictment and he was not entitled to have the indictment dismissed. In fact, the statute expressly provides that if one is indicted before the date fixed for the preliminary hearing such a hearing shall not be required, 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e). Rogers was tried within two months of the indictment, he had counsel at his lineup, he had not then asked for a preliminary hearing after waiving further proceedings in Missouri, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, and the punishment imposed by the In '-"? trict Court, although different to iv, imposed on the other defendant r»§M within statutory limits. His conteriti^P in regard to these items are there*,?^!! rejected. *-^H The convictions of both Kent and R©MS ers are * Affirmed. ( © I tVi KUK«* STSTEK) GREENE COUNTY PLANNING BOARD, Petitioner, m -• -M. •' r U • ; - ^ •'-4 >»- • M FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION. Respondent. Town of Durham, New York and Ass<^ ciation for the Preservation of Durha«i Valley, Power Authority of the State of New York, the Sierra Club, Inter* venors. TOWN OF DURHAM, NEW YORK AND ASSOCIATION FOR the PRESERVE TION OF DURHAM VALLEY, Pe& tioners, v. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, Respondent. Nos. 434, 435, Dockets 71-1991, 71-199S. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued Dec. 16, 1971. Decided Jan. 17, 1972. Petitions for review of Federal Power Commission orders in proceeding on application of Power Authority of New York for authorization to construct high-voltage transmission line, charging, inter alia, that Commission failed to comply with National Environmental Policy Act and wrongfully refused to pay or order Power Authority of State of New York to pay expenses and fees of intervenors. The Court of Appeals, Irving R. Kauf- |
